

# Nationalism and Democracy :

## Taiwanese nationalism

### and

## Taiwan's democratization

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Yi-chueh Day

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University of Canterbury

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## **Abstract**

It is interesting that nationalism and democracy can be closely related and can reinforce each other in some countries. Most social scientists, however, concentrates their research either on nationalism or democracy.

This thesis explores the correlation between nationalism and democracy. Based on Huntington and other scholars' theories on democratization, I will argue that four possible factors (structural changes, the political elite's patronage, external influences and legitimacy crises) may contribute to the development of both nationalism and democracy although they were originally only used to explain how and why democratization happened in some countries but not others.

There are two main findings in this thesis. First, although Taiwanese nationalism was also a product of decades of colonial rule, it did not demand nation-building as much as its counterparts in countries such as Indonesia. Furthermore, Taiwanese most significant nationalist movement, the 228 Incident, aimed at the new coming rulers, the Chinese, instead of their previous colonizers, the Japanese. The incident also seemed to illustrate that shared history and common suffering is more meaningful in forming the sense of an imagined

community, a nation, than common myth of descent.

Second, structural changes, the political elite's patronage, external influences and legitimacy crises may have inspired Taiwan's democratization as well as Taiwanese nationalism in the 1970s-90s. Furthermore, although less apparent, to some extent these factors also appeared during Japanese colonial rule.

## Chapter One

### Introduction

The existence of Taiwan is probably one of the most ironic events in the history of the twentieth century. As a nation that is not recognized by most major countries since the 1970s, it has existed for more than forty-five years.<sup>1</sup> Being a small island without many natural resources, it created one of the most remarkable records in economic and political terms. While much research has been done to discover the secrets of its economic success, the political aspect of the “Taiwan miracle” did not gain the attention it deserved until recent years. The political evolution in Taiwan has been a very good example of the so-called “Third Wave” democratization.<sup>2</sup> The development not only shattered the assertion that Confucianism in the Chinese culture is incompatible with democratic values, it also contradicted the belief of scholars like Rustow (1970,p.351) that a consensus on national identity is a crucial characteristic of democracy.

National identity has been a controversial issue in Taiwan for decades. Because of its unique historical relationship with both China and Japan, Taiwan's democratization was closely related to the demand of Taiwanese people to have their own nation, that is, to Taiwanese nationalism. Although the majority of the population has Chinese ancestry, due to some historical experiences such as Japanese colonization and the 228 Incident in 1947<sup>3</sup>, Taiwan's residents with Chinese ancestry are subdivid-

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<sup>1</sup> This is counted from 1945 when the Chinese Nationalist Party, the KMT, started ruling Taiwan.

<sup>2</sup> The term “Third Wave” came from Huntington's book *The Third Wave*.

<sup>3</sup> A small incident that happened 27<sup>th</sup> of February 1947 turned into an island-wide rebellion in Taiwan the next day. It also caused a massacre carried out

ed into two ethnic groups, Mainlanders and Taiwanese.

In the past and even nowadays not all residents of Taiwan have been perceived or self-ascribed as Taiwanese. Only those whose parents both have ancestors who emigrated from China before the retreat of the government of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang in Chinese, KMT hereafter) during 1945-1949 have been accepted as Taiwanese. Taiwanese, together with the other two major ethnic groups, Mainlanders (those Chinese who settled in Taiwan during 1945-1949 and their offspring) and Aborigines<sup>4</sup>, have comprised the population of Taiwan since 1945.

Although Chinese claim their awareness of Taiwan can be traced as early as the Han dynasty (206B.C. - A.D.221) when *Han-shu* (the book of History) recorded the inhabitants of Taiwan (Lumley, 1976,p.24), the first known permanent Chinese settlement was not established until the sixteenth century (Mendel, 1970,p.11). Furthermore, China's last dynasty, Ching, was the only Chinese imperial court which officially ruled Taiwan, from 1683 to 1895. For most of the period of Chinese imperial history, Taiwan was neglected.

Taiwan's brief connection with China was cut off when the Ching Dynasty lost the Sino-Japanese war during 1894-1895 and ceded Taiwan to Japan. During 50 years of Japanese colonization, the long-standing rivalry in Taiwan between Chinese emigrants from China's southern provinces (Lumley, 1976,pp.283-318), Fukien and Kwantung, was gradually eased. Fifty years of colonial experience also shaped Taiwanese into a distinct group with their own culture, identity and a sense of solidarity which distinguished them from the later arriving

by Chinese soldiers from China. Details will be discussed in Chapter 4.

<sup>4</sup> They are of Malayo-Polynesian descent.

Mainland Chinese. This made conflict between Taiwanese and Mainlanders more easily break out when Taiwan was returned to China after Japan lost the Second World War.

Due to the civil war with communists in China, Mainland Chinese migrated to Taiwan in large numbers between 1945 and 1949. Although as a group they have been a minority in population, they have dominated Taiwan's political arena since then, up until democratization. Consequently, Taiwan's democratization has been a power struggle between a majority group, Taiwanese, and the minority group, Mainlanders.<sup>5</sup>

In the past, while Taiwanese outnumbered Mainlanders, the former were in a subordinate position; consequently the relationship between these two groups was in a tense but superficially harmonious condition. Since Mainlanders dominated the political arena, despite their smaller population, when Taiwan had a one-party authoritarian regime, democratization in Taiwan has involved a power redistribution between the two major groups. Taiwanese gradually expanded their political participation and finally gained control of the government by taking over Mainlanders' power.

Several factors have played an essential role in Taiwan's democratization process. The most significant ones are the social changes following the economic reforms, the rise of opposition movements, foreign (especially American) influence, and the willingness of the Chinese Nationalist party's leadership to initiate political reforms. Democratization has also been associated with rising Taiwanese nationalism. Since democracy and nationalism are not necessarily equivalent in every country, the

<sup>5</sup> Aborigines have been marginalized in the power struggle due to their small population, although their disadvantaged status has been improved gradually.

interesting interdependence between Taiwanese nationalism and democratization is a phenomenon worth exploring.

### **The importance of Taiwan's democratization in the world**

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall, it seems democratization has become an almost irresistible trend in the world. However, there are still some strong communist or authoritarian regimes like China.

Taiwan's democratization was noteworthy for its peaceful transition. Although its model may not be applicable to every country, as circumstances are different in each society, doing a case study of Taiwan may still be beneficial in providing directions and insights into the democratization of other nations. Especially in a country with a similar culture like China, Taiwan's experience may offer strategies and methods to use in order to open the political participation and contestation opportunities in a politically conservative regime.

### **The significance of Taiwan's democratization to Taiwan's people**

The success of Taiwan in transforming from an authoritarian regime to a democracy is also significant to its citizens. The process furnishes them with a chance which their ancestors had aspired to but never been granted, that is, to say whatever they wish to say and do whatever they wish to do as long as they do not violate laws.<sup>6</sup> The dream to be their own masters was further assured by the direct presidential election in 1996 even under

<sup>6</sup> Here by the term "law", I mean constitution and laws with popular consent, not those the government may manipulate as the KMT did when Taiwan still had an authoritarian regime. In fact, they used "laws" to torture political dissidents and silence Taiwanese before liberalization and democratization took place in Taiwan.

the shadow of China's military threat.

The first direct presidential election of Taiwan in 1996 entered the world spotlight because of China's missile tests at the same time. China's military threat did achieve part of its goal of preventing the growth of Taiwanese nationalism by affecting the election result. Taiwan's largest opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party, lost the election partly because its candidate, Dr. Peng Ming-min, has been well-known for his strong advocacy of Taiwanese independence. On the other hand, however, electors in Taiwan still said no to China by voting in a landslide for the KMT candidate whom the PRC condemned most, Lee Teng-hui. The election was a milestone for democracy in Taiwan because for the first time in Taiwan's history, its people could choose the leader who best represents the whole country. It partially fulfilled the dream of the Taiwanese to make decisions for themselves.

For those who are not familiar with Taiwan's history, China's military action may have been puzzling. They may not understand how a country could use its military power to intervene in another nation's election.<sup>7</sup> However, Taiwan's developments have been deeply influenced by powers beyond the island, especially China, Japan and the United States; the crisis in 1996 was only a demonstration of the strong belief held by the majority of Chinese in the PRC and quite a few residents in Taiwan that Taiwan is an integral part of China.

However, the definition of "China" varies even among those who think Taiwan is only a part of China. "China" may mean the People's Republic of China (PRC), ruled by the Chinese communist party to Mainland Chinese and most foreigners. To

<sup>7</sup> Taiwan is a nation or at least a political entity with sovereignty although some, especially Chinese, may not agree it is a nation.



some, especially some of the residents of Taiwan, “China” is the synonym of the Republic of China on Taiwan (R.O.C.). To others, “China” means neither of these. It is only a concept that comprises mainland China and Taiwan so neither side is entitled to claim that it solely represents the whole, because each is only part of it.

On the other hand, the crisis also revealed to us that not every citizen in Taiwan accepts the belief that Taiwan is only part of China. Although they will not deny that the majority of them do have Chinese lineage, a large number of them are not convinced that simply because of the common ancestry, they have to identify themselves as Chinese instead of Taiwanese. To many of them, Taiwan is their home, and their country. They may have affection toward the Chinese in the PRC. However, this does not mean they have to reunite with the PRC. To the contrary, they wish to have a distinct identity, and sovereignty of their own.

### **Thesis structure**

The principal focus of this research is to analyze why nationalism and democratization were so closely related in Taiwan. As a result, various theories about nationalism and democracy will be discussed, and the connection between the two will be examined. The modern political history of Taiwan will be used to refine theories concerning our understanding of the link between nationalism and democracy.

The development of a national identity in Taiwan will also be another important issue discussed in this thesis. The remaining chapters are outlined as follows:

In chapter 2, the relationship between colonialism, nationalism and democracy will be examined. It is apparent that the colonial legacy did create the sense of belonging to an “imagined community” through which nationalism was firmly established. In fact, one factor that created the different identity between Taiwanese and Mainlanders was their different colonial experiences. While Taiwanese were under 50 years of Japanese colonial rule, China was never colonized, although it suffered from aggressive foreign threats and wars. Colonial regimes also produced a new kind of elite who by mastering the language of the foreign ruling class were able to acquire values such as democracy, self-determination and nationalism to oppose the colonial administration. This chapter will also encompass a review of relevant literatures to build a more comprehensive model to explain why nationalism and democracy reinforced each other in countries like Taiwan.

In chapter 3, I will discuss a series of significant political movements under Japanese rule that shaped the theme of Taiwan's progress to a democracy. This transition involved a mutual reliance between Taiwanese nationalism and democratization. The precondition of Taiwanese nationalism, Taiwanese consciousness, did not occur until Japanese colonization from 1895 to 1945. The Home Rule movement during this period was the first Taiwanese elite movement that demanded both democracy and self-rule.

Chapter 4 will deal with the short period during 1945 to 1947 because it was the turning point for Taiwanese to develop a national identity separate from Mainland Chinese. Although the Home rule movement mentioned in chapter 3 failed, the same elite group kept up their struggle after the Chinese Nationalist Party, then the ruling party of China, took over Taiwan.

However, their efforts were unsuccessful again, and an island-wide Taiwanese uprising from the 28<sup>th</sup> February in 1947 brought a massacre which eliminated almost all the Taiwanese elite who had Japanese education. It also divided the ethnically Chinese community into two groups: Mainlanders and Taiwanese.

After discussing Japanese colonial rule and the KMT's takeover in chapters 3 and 4 respectively, chapter 5 will turn to the KMT's early coercive rule in Taiwan between 1950 and 1970. The KMT's severe suppression of political dissidents during these two decades hindered nearly all democratic and nationalist movements led by the Taiwanese until the 1970s. The long political darkness from the 1950s only saw a small number of courageous emigrant Chinese elite like Lei Chen who dared to challenge the dictatorial regime on Taiwan. The majority population in Taiwan was silenced due to the risk of imprisonment, torture, and loss of life.

Chapter 6 will discuss the changes in the domestic and international environment from the 1970s that induced democratization of Taiwan and the rise of its first opposition party, the Democracy Progressive Party (DPP). It will explain how the demographic and socio-economic changes following the economic take-off in Taiwan, such as the aging of life term mainlander representatives of Taiwan "elected" organs, and the higher education and literacy rate of Taiwan's inhabitants, accelerated the process of democratization and the spread of Taiwanese nationalism. Other social changes such as increasing disposable income and the development of communications may also have encouraged the process since Taiwanese could travel abroad and learn different values from overseas. Chapter 6 will also give us an idea of how international events, for instance, the end of the Cold War, the normalization of the relationship be-

tween the U.S.A and the PRC, and people's power in the Philippines inspired the Taiwanese political dissidents to seek more concessions from the authoritarian government and to promote Taiwanese nationalism.

At the end, chapter 7 will conclude this thesis by exploring democratization, the development of nationalism and their relationship based on the Taiwan case.

Chapter 2 will lead us to the main body of this thesis by discussing relevant theories on democracy, democratization, colonialism and nationalism.

## Chapter Two

# **Colonialism, Nationalism and Democracy**

### **Introduction**

People all around the world nowadays tend to take it for granted that the globe is divided into different nations. However, while researchers like Kohn and Smith believe that we can trace the idea of nation to early human history (Kohn, 1945,p.3; p.19; Smith, 1986,pp.11-12), it is generally believed that nationalism was an unfamiliar ideology which did not become widely accepted until the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries (Kedourie, 1994,p1).

Almost at the same time that nationalism established its prevalence, the concept of democracy also began to grow, firstly in Europe and then throughout the world. Inspired by these two political currents, the American and the French Revolutions expressed both nationalist and democratic aspirations. But why are nationalism and democracy so closely correlated, as in the two revolutions? Many scholars believe their common central notion, popular sovereignty, provides a powerful linkage.

On the other hand, the success of European nationalist movements also encouraged them to engage in competitive colonialism in Asia and Africa at the cost of native people in these countries. Later, in order to save administrative expenditure, colonial governments made Western style education accessible to locals. Unintentionally, their education created a new kind of elite who were able to lead their own nationalist movements against the colonial regimes. In fact, the colonial legacy shaped the development of nationalism in Asian

and African countries.

It appears from this short discussion that nationalism may be closely connected with both democracy and colonialism. This is exactly the case in Taiwan. This chapter will provide a theoretical framework for discussing the relationship between nationalism, colonialism, and democracy by exploring major relevant theories on the three.

### **Definitions of nation**

We can not discuss nationalism without firstly an analysis of the meaning of *nation*, the central concept of nationalism. Yet, this is not an easy task. Many social scientists, such as Max Weber and Anthony Smith, have proposed different definitions of the concept. However, to this date no consensus has been found on this issue.

Although there are no universally held criteria on judging whether a group of people is or is not a nation, we may still summarize the commonly used definitions to formulate an acceptable hypothesis for further exploration. The most often mentioned elements can be categorized as *concrete* and *sentimental*. Authors may have both concrete and sentimental factors in their definitions.

#### **Concrete elements of a nation**

Stalin is a well-known writer among those who define nation in terms of concrete factors. He believes a common language, territory, economic life, psychological make-up (national character) “manifested in a common culture” are all essential to each nation (in Hutchinsion and Smith, 1994,p.20). Kohn<sup>8</sup> holds a similar view but common descent, a political

<sup>8</sup> Kohn’s criteria include *common descent, language, territory, political entity*,

entity and a living and corporate will (to form a nation) are also important to him (Kohn, 1945,p.14). A survey of the literature indicates that a common myth of descent, culture, a political entity, shared history and territory are the most frequently mentioned concrete factors so they will be discussed in detail here.

### *1. Common myth of descent*

The process of nation-building is almost impossible without some myths. Myths are hard to prove but persuasive. They inspire people and give them reasons to create their own nation. A common myth of descent is one of the most widespread myths. Other myths may emphasize the superiority of a nation. For instance, Jews believed they were God's chosen people so they never gave up the hope to build their nation no matter how difficult the mission was. Since the belief of having a common ancestry is very helpful in creating a sense of belonging, it is understandable that many nationalists have cultivated among their potential fellow-members the myth of common ancestry in order to solicit support for forming a new nation.

On the other hand, however, as many nations have multiple ethnic groups within their borders, emphasis on common ancestry or kinship may easily divide them. In addition, improvements in transportation have enabled people to migrate freely, so the ideal that a single ethnic group composes a nation is practically unattainable in today's world. Consequently, a common myth of descent should be a supplementary but not an indispensable factor to define a nation.

Sometimes other features such as common culture, beliefs, or history may substitute for the myth of common descent. For

*customs and traditions, and religion* (1945,p.14).

instance, American citizens may not share the same descent, but they do hold strong beliefs in democracy, freedom, and their constitution. The importance of common culture and shared history will be discussed below.

## *2. Culture*

Some definitions of nationalism, such as German theories, were known for their emphasis on cultural aspects. Influenced by theories of Herder and Fichte, this type of cultural nationalism stressed the significance of a distinctive culture (Smith, 1971, pp.180-182). Cultural nationalism also believed that every nation had its own unique national character that can be seen in its folk music, art, and literature. Since language was the means of expression, it was viewed as an essential element to define a nation (Alter, 1994, p.43; Kohn, 1945, pp.428-230).

However, the argument loses its validity easily. Although we see nations like Japan where a single and unique language is spoken, people may establish different nation-states even though they share a common language. The fact that the citizens of the United States and the United Kingdom speak English but have separate nationalities is a convincing example of this point.

On the other hand, people of the same nation may speak different languages but still consider one another as fellow citizens. Switzerland is a typical example where three official languages (German, Italian, and French) are spoken. Therefore, although each nation tends to have one common language, (such as China whose people may not speak mutually comprehensible languages or dialects, but have a common official language for communication among fellow-members with a different dialect background), common language should not be an indispensable requirement of a nation.

Similar logic applies to other cultural traits like religion or custom and tradition. Although sharing religion and customs



helps to solidify a nation, we still see examples are abundant where people are able to coexist harmoniously within one nation even though they may come from different religious groups, practice different customs or carry out different traditions.

### *3. Political entity / state*

Trying to answer the question of what a nation is, Max Weber once claimed that “a nation is a community which normally tends to produce a state of its own”(in Hutchinson and Smith, 1994,p.25). His view represents a common assumption that a nation has to or at least tends to be coterminous with a state. But is a state essential for a nation?

Generally speaking, having an independent state does grant a nation better chances to enjoy citizen rights and political freedom. Not every nation, however, has the ability or will to establish its own state. This does not deprive them of the sense of nation. Examples of nations without their own states were abundant especially in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century when colonialism was very prevalent. At that time, foreign powers dominated the state in many Asian nations. The PLO is another example of a nation without a state. These examples demonstrate one clear conclusion: although building a state may be one of the goals of nationalism, possessing a state itself should not define a nation.

If a common myth of descent, shared culture and a political entity are not ultimately decisive in forming every nation, then what are the essentials of a nation? While the above factors seem to facilitate the creation of a nation, other elements seem to be crucial for a nation to develop. These factors will be discussed below.

#### *4. Shared history*

Shared history is another widely cited criterion. Renan (1990) holds that historical memories are important for a nation. But for him, common suffering is more powerful than happiness in creating the solidarity within a nation. He wrote: “suffering in common unifies more than joy does. Where national memories are concerned, grieves are of more value than triumphs, for they impose duties, and require a common effort” (Renan, 1990,p.19).

Normally due to their experiences of common suffering, a community determines to have their own nation instead of being dominated by foreign powers. Shared history enables every member to identify with their nation and their countrymen and prepare to sacrifice everything to consolidate the nation. However, it is difficult to say accurately how long that common history must have lasted in order to create a nation.

In addition to shared history, shared symbols or traditions may also be significant in shaping a nation. Although some of them may have been invented intentionally, as Hobsbawm has suggested (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983,p.1), traditions do associate members of each nation with the past and the history of their nations. Symbols such as a national flag and an anthem also provide them objects to identify with their nations.

#### *5. Territory*

Kohn (1945), Smith (1986) and Stalin (in Hutchinson and Smith, 1994) all consider territory as an important element of each nation. They believe without physically owning a territory, no community is entitled to be called a nation.

What is the significance of the national territory? James Anderson’s opinion may help to answer this question. To him, territory is important to each nation because

... territory is the receptacle of the past in the present. The nation's unique history is embodied in the nation's unique piece of territory- its 'homeland', the primeval land of its ancestors, older than any state, the same land which saw its greatest moments, perhaps its mythical origins. The time has passed but the space is still there (James Anderson, 1986, p.24).

In other words, the territory is meaningful in its connection with a nation's past. It has historical significance to each nation because it helps to create a sense of community. Human beings, as Kohn has argued, tend to identify with the land where they were born and grew up. They may also relate to people from the same land with strong emotional attachment (Kohn, 1945, pp.4-5). This sentiment may not necessarily convert into their love towards their nation and countrymen easily. But once it does, it motivates people to willingly sacrifice or even die for their nation.

We can conclude that two concrete elements are essential in each nation: *shared history* and *territory*.<sup>9</sup> Other elements, such as *a common myth of descent*, *culture* (language, custom, and tradition) and a *state* may also be important but not every nation has these characteristics.

#### Sentimental elements of a nation

After discussing some major and widely accepted concrete criteria of nation creation and examining their validity, it should be helpful to explore the opinions of those who define nations in terms of sentiment to look at the concept from a different angle. We will discuss *the will to form a nation* first, then Benedict Anderson's theory will be explored because it has made great contributions in this aspect.

<sup>9</sup> The PLO had no territory for decades nor did the Jews before 1945. But they did, however, have a homeland that they were emotionally attached to.

### 1. *The will to form a nation/national consciousness*

Kohn argued that “[n]ationality is formed by the decision to form a nationality” (Kohn, 1945,p.15).He believes factors mentioned earlier may have existed for a very long time before a nation is born. What transformed these factors into preconditions for the birth of a nation, however, was “ the awakening of national consciousness” (Kohn, 1945,p.16). In other words, the will to form a nation helps to explain the creation of each nation.

Renan (1990) took a similar position although he used a slightly different phrase. He argued “ consent, the desire to live together, the will to perpetuate the value of the heritage that one has received in an undivided form” (Renan, 1990,p.19) as one of the foundation of a nation. He further claimed “[t]he wish of nations is, all in all, the sole legitimate criterion, the one to which one must always return” (Renan, 1990,p.20).

### 2. *Nation as an Imagined community*

In his book *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson asserts that a nation is "an imagined political community-and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (1991,p6). According to him, a nation is *imagined* because no one can know every member of their nation. They know only those with whom they associate personally. He is also convinced that a nation is imagined as *limited* because no matter how large a nation is, it always has its boundary limitations. In his opinion, a nation is also imagined as sovereign for its birth in an age when Enlightenment and Revolution dissolved previous dynastic legitimacy.<sup>10</sup>Furthermore, a nation is imagined as a *community*

<sup>10</sup> Before the concept of nation was widely accepted, sovereignty was believed to belong to rulers. Furthermore, rulers' right to rule was divine and could not be challenged because it was said to be granted by God. When nationalism emerged, however, rulers lost their legitimacy and the nation become the supreme sovereignty.

as its every member has a sense of solidarity, so they believe in the companionship among them (1991, p7).

Anderson describes a nation as an imagined community. In other words, members of a nation acquire a sense of community. But where does the sense of community come from? Anderson's own answer to this is a process discussed below, but we may expect from previous discussion of concrete factors of a nation that *territory, history, myth and different aspects of culture* may all play vital roles in it; the weight of each factor and their combination varies with each nation.

Anderson believes "the convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined community" (Anderson, 1991,p.46). He describes how the birth of administrative vernaculars had gradually developed in the influence of the Reformation in Europe. Together with the thrust of capitalism for a larger audience for the printing industry, they helped bring about the rise of national consciousness and the creation of an imagined community (1991,pp.37-46).

What happened in colonized nations is another variant. European colonialism resulted in the emergence of the creole class, the Europeans born in colonies. Their birth in colonies usually restrained them from working for the colonial central government in Europe. Since their promotion was limited within the border of the colony of their birth and since they had no racial difference from their Europe-born counterparts, it is understandable that they concluded that they suffered discrimination because of their birthplace. Thus, they identified people within the colonies instead of Europeans from their theoretically *mother countries* as their nationals. On their way of pilgrimage<sup>11</sup>, the road to promotion, they also met travelling-

<sup>11</sup> By pilgrimage, Anderson means the route colony-born colonial bureaucrats

companions who shared their life experiences although they might be Creoles, Eurasians, Eurafricans, or Euramericans. Their sense of community gradually grew due to this kind of interaction within a colony (Anderson, 1991, pp.47-65).

Moreover, European or Japanese colonial regimes provided western style education to the natives. The language of the colonial regime became the communication tool between the local elite from different dialect backgrounds (Anderson, 1991, pp.121-123). Modern inventions such as newspapers also enlarged the sense of community (Anderson, 1991, p.134). How the nation as an imagined community grew in colonized nations will be discussed in more detail in a later section when we explore how colonialism helped the spread and development of nationalism. Meanwhile, Anthony Smith's theory can also provide us with insights in understanding nations.

#### **Territorial nations and ethnic nations**

According to Anthony Smith (1986), nations can be divided into two types: *territorial* and *ethnic* nations. He argues, Western European nations were *territorial* nations while nations in Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe were *ethnic* ones (Smith, 1986, pp.135-149).

In Smith's opinion, the concept of *territorial* nation can not be conceived without a sovereign statehood. It has a defined boundary, and members within its jurisdiction all follow the same legal code and have uniform rights and obligations. Citizenship and common culture are also important elements of a territorial nation. By common culture, he means "shared meanings and values, common myths and symbols" (Smith,

took when they sought promotions in their career. They were assigned from one place to another so they traveled like pilgrims at different stages of their lives. But unlike their European counterparts, the summit of their career was normally the capital of the colony, not the capital of their *mother country*.

1986,p135).

In a territorial nation, a common shared myth and shared memories create a common 'civil religion'. Through the help of common language and state education, the civil religion is passed on to the masses. As a result, the solidarity of citizenship can be reinforced (Smith, 1986, p.136).

On the other hand, Smith believes *ethnic nations* were formed on the basis of pre-existing ethnic ties (Smith, 1986,p.137). To him, assumed common origins and descent are essential to an ethnic nation. In addition, customs and dialects are as important in ethnic nations as the legal codes and institutions are in territorial nations (Smith, 1986,p.137).

Smith's classification is useful in defining a nation but has its own deficiency. For instance, it is not always easy to segregate precisely between ethnic nations and territorial nations. Most of the time, both types can coexist within a given territorial boundary.

In other words, when nationalism began to grow in each nation, the elite normally had to appeal to *primordial* attachment such as kinship, religion, language, customs (sometimes even 'race') to create a nation because their fellows still did not hold strong national consciousness. Once a nation is constructed successfully, however, those elements become less crucial although they still determine to some extent whether a nation is cohesive or inclined to disintegrate. In addition, *territorial* elements like citizenship and law may play a more significant role than their *primordial* counterparts once a nation is created.

A proposed definition of nation

After analyzing all elements mentioned above, we may find that no single factor is solely adequate in establishing a nation. To sum up, we may say a nation is an imagined community with an association with a specific territory. It tends to have its own state or sovereignty or at least seeks to obtain some control over its own community. People within it share a common history. The sense of the community may come from *territory*, *history*, *myth of origin*, and different aspects of *culture* or various combinations of these.

In different nations, the weight of any single characteristic varies. For instance, religion has never been a dominant feature in Taiwan. However, it may be very powerful in countries where religion plays an important role in daily life such as Indonesia. In Taiwan's case, ethnic and territorial elements never separate themselves completely in modern history. One may only argue that time changes their relative importance. In the earliest stage of Taiwan's nation formation, ethnic ties like kinship, language and shared history were definitely far more important. However, as time went by, territorial elements gradually increased in importance and added new meanings to the notion of a Taiwanese nation.

**Nationalism**

If we look at various definitions of nationalism, we will find that the concept has been defined as an ideology, a political movement, or both according to different social scientists. Alter, for instance, claims that nationalism is “both an ideology and a political movement which holds the nation and the sovereign nation-state to be crucial indwelling values, and which manages to mobilize the political will of a people or a large section of a



population” (Alter, 1994, p4).

We may not necessarily agree with all of this, but his definition illustrates a very significant feature of nationalism, that is, it is both an ideology and a political movement. They are intertwined and hard to separate but it is useful to divide them for the convenience of discussion. As a political movement, nationalism aims to realize a desire for nationhood. As an ideology, nationalism provides a theoretical foundation for people to attain the political goals of nationalist movements.

#### Desire for nationhood

Motivated by their faith in nationalism, nationalists everywhere devote their lives to that cause. Their goal may be to unite various smaller political entities into a nation as German nationalists did, to separate their nation from an existing sovereignty as Quebec nationalists attempted, or to rescue their nation from foreign domination as did nations in Asia and Africa. Sometimes they even try to achieve several goals at the same time through nationalism. Whatever their goal, however, they all need support from their fellow people. Therefore, nationalism is employed as a political movement for mobilizing people.

Whatever their approaches or objectives are, most nationalists have something in common: they yearn for their own nationhood. They believe that the nation should command the supreme loyalty of everyone within it and that every member of the nation relies for their welfare on its fortune. They think the distinction between rulers and the ruled is unjust because every member of the nation should have equal rights and responsibilities. As a result, citizenship and popular sovereignty are important elements in nationalism. And achieving and

guaranteeing them become the goals of nationalist movements.

Among those who define nationalism as both a political movement and an ideology, John Breuilly's opinion is a representative one. He argues that nationalism is "political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such actions with nationalist arguments"(1982,p.3). By nationalist arguments, he means three assertions: "(a) There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character; (b) [t]he interest and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values; (c) [t]he nation must be as independent as possible. This usually requires at least the attainment of political sovereignty"(1982,p.3).

The ultimate goal of almost all nationalist movements is to create a nation that is congruent with the state. Nationalism, as Gellner has suggested, is "primarily a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent" (Gellner, 1983,p1). Armstrong considers nationalism to be "[t]he right of individuals to choose the state to which they belong, that is, to establish territorial political structures corresponding to their consciousness of group identity" (1983,p.4).

The mobilizing power of nationalism was prevalent firstly in the American and French Revolutions. Before nationalism appeared as a widely held idea, the masses in every European state had neither interest nor power in politics. They did not care even if their rulers were a "foreigner". They were more inclined to accept the condition that their societies were divided into two classes: the rulers and the ruled. However, nationalism broke the class barrier and transformed the whole population into citizens and made "possible the political and cultural integration of the mass into the nation" (Kohn, 1945,p.20). Nevertheless, every nation is different in its popular mobilization. In broad terms,

mobilization may come from the “bottom-up” or from state sponsorship (Mann, 1990,p.45).

We always see conflicting interests in each nationalist movement. On the one hand, there is the class with the vested interest, the oppressor. (No matter whether they are a privileged class such as the monarch and nobility in the French Revolution or a colonial regime.) On the other hand, there is the oppressed class, the people who want to create a nation under which every member is treated equally as in the third Estate in the French Revolution or those colonized natives. That is one of the reasons why nationalism can mobilize people with different backgrounds to join nationalist movements because they see the hope to change their unpleasant life condition. However, the power of nationalism in mobilization also derives from its ideological base which emphasizes a *sense of community* and *equality*. We shall discuss them in the next section.

#### Nationalism as an ideology

Kohn emphasizes the ideological aspect of nationalism when he defines it as

a state of mind, permeating the large majority of people and claiming to permeate all its members; it recognizes the nation-state as the source of all creative cultural energy and of economic well-being. The supreme loyalty of man is therefore due to his nationality, as his own life is supposedly rooted in and made possible by its welfare (Kohn, 1945,p.6).

Nationalism, as an ideology, popularized itself in North America and Europe at its emergence. Later through the efforts of elite in developing countries with the hope of bringing political changes into their countries, it expanded its influence in Asia, Africa and even the whole world. But why was nationalism so popular particularly among intelligentsia? And how can it possess such an irresistible appeal so it seems to have

dominated the historical arena since the nineteenth century? (Smith, 1971,p.30).

As mentioned earlier, one of the explanations is its ability to mobilize people. However, we also need to discuss its ideological components to answer these questions. The ideological elements of nationalism include three themes: *national self-determination*, *popular sovereignty*, and *citizenship*. Because *popular sovereignty* and *citizenship* are closely related, they will be discussed together.

### 1. *National self-determination*

The conviction of revolutionary Europeans that human beings possessed inalienable natural rights was hard to prove philosophically but Kedourie claimed that Kant's philosophy provided a satisfactory theoretical basis and helped the development of nationalism (Kedourie, 1994, pp.12-13).

In Kedourie's interpretation, Kant made it very clear that morality could be separated from scientific knowledge. It is dominated by a different law from that which governs appearances. Therefore, "[m]orality is the outcome of obedience to a universal law which is to be found within ourselves, not in the world of appearances." This assumption was contrary to the common belief in senses in the early 18<sup>th</sup> century (Kedourie, 1994,pp.13-14).

Due to his argument that human beings decide the standard of morality, Kant added a new meaning to freedom. He believed that only when a man "obeys the law of morality from that which he finds within himself, and not in the external world" can he be called free (Kedourie, 1994,p.15). In other words, a person is free as long as his or her mind and will is free. Furthermore, "[t]he end of man was to determine himself as a free being, self-ruling and self-moved"(Kedourie, 1994,p.18).

This doctrine, as a result, encouraged young Europeans to put their convictions into practice. Therefore, for instance, a student society, the Burschenschaft was established to work for unity and democracy in Germany (Kedourie, 1994,p.19).

Kant also supported the idea that every state should be republican since it could express the autonomous will of its citizens (Kedourie, 1994,p.20). Since “[t]he only legitimate limits are self-imposed limits”(Kedourie, 1994,p.23), self-determination became a supreme good. And the national self-determination, one aspect of nationalism, also became attractive to many Europeans.

Although one may argue that approving individual self-determination need not necessarily have any connection with national self-determination, the desire to govern oneself can be easily turned into “the demand for individual consent to government” and then “has regularly been translated into self-government for *people* and hence for nations” (Canovan, 1996,p.9). What is really meant, however, by *national self-determination*? Mill explains this in his famous passage:

It is, in general, a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of government should coincide in the main with those of nationality.... where the sentiment of nationality exists in any force, there is a *prima facie* case for uniting all the members of the nationality under the same government, and a government to themselves apart. This is merely saying that the question of government ought to be decided by the governed. One hardly knows what any division of the human race should be free to do, if not to determine with which of the various collective bodies of human beings they choose to associate themselves (Quoted in Smith, 1971,p.9).

In other words, national self-determination means that a nation is entitled to have their own government, determine their destiny themselves and possess the right to associate themselves with whomever they wish. But how can this principle be put into practice in reality? Popular sovereignty and citizenship are the

key to this question.

## 2. *Popular sovereignty and citizenship*

The common legitimacy for European monarchy to rule was justified by the divine right of kings, through annexation, or marriage between European kingdoms before the eighteenth century (James Anderson, 1986,p.22; Guibernau, 1996,p.52). However, after nationalism began to grow, it changed the political order in Europe by challenging this rationale. Instead of accepting the legitimate right to rule from God and above, nationalism signified the principle of popular sovereignty by turning subjects of each kingdom into citizens of each nation. Therefore, the right to rule should be confirmed by the ruled. Furthermore, foreign rulers became unacceptable (Birch, 1993,pp.15-16).

The doctrine of popular sovereignty, which motivated revolutionaries of the French and the American revolutions and later nationalists in other countries, was indicated vigorously in Locke's and Rousseau's writings (Adams, 1965,p.174). They both believed in the concept of social contract in which the government was viewed as "the outcome of a contract freely made, a consent voluntarily given" by the people. Namely, the government had to legitimize itself by popular consent (Hayes, 1949,p.23; Guibernau, 1996,pp.52-53).

But their political thinking posed a question, that is, who should be included in *the people*? Although they did not provide satisfactory answers themselves, it is understandable that nationalists naturally equated *the people* with their *nation* when they applied the theories of these two famous political philosophers to support their nationalist yearnings. The well-known document of the French Revolution, *The Declaration of the rights of man and of the citizen*, for instance, outlined the principle by claiming "the principle of all sovereignty resides

eventually in the nation. Nobody [,]or [any] individual[,]may exercise authority which does not proceed directly from the nation” (Quoted in Hayes, 1949,p.35). As a result, the nation became the lawful origin of the practice of sovereignty. And defining the membership of each nation, in other words, deciding who could participate in the exercise of sovereignty, also turned into an essential issue so the concept of citizenship evolved.

The notion of citizenship was influential in the promotion of nationalism because it enabled members of each nation to shift their loyalty from a King to their nation. It involved a process that “ the nation, personified through symbols and rituals which symbolically recreate a sense of the ‘people’, became the focus of a new kind of attachment” (Gibernau, 1996,p.55). Brubaker (1992,p.35) argues that the French Revolution invented modern national citizenship. After the revolution, France was no longer the possession of any king. It belonged to every French citizen. The Revolution “created a class of person [,French citizens,] enjoying common rights, bound by common obligations, formally equal before the law”. It substituted a common law of privilege (Brubaker, 1992,p.39).

As a consequence of their position as citizens, French were also allowed to participate in government affairs (Brubaker, 1992,p.41). This connection with democracy will be explored in greater detail when the relationship between nationalism and democracy is discussed. The French ideals of citizenship also became the model for neighboring Europeans nations and the world.

We also see a sense of community and equality from the concept of citizenship. By having citizenship, every citizen has an imagined community, the nation, to identify themselves with. They acquire the sense of community from the membership of a

nation. Since every citizen has equal rights and responsibilities before the law within the nation, *equality* surely is one of the crucial elements of citizenship.

To sum up, national self-determination means a group of people who possess citizenship of a nation makes decisions for themselves by exercising sovereignty in their nation. One way to put popular sovereignty and national self-determination into practice, of course, is to have democracy. We shall discuss what democracy is in a later section. Meanwhile, since colonialism stimulated the growth of nationalism in colonized nations and since Taiwan was colonized, let us explore the relationship between colonialism and nationalism first.

### **Colonialism and Nationalism**

The close correlation between colonialism and nationalism presented itself in two aspects: First, European and later Japanese colonialism were motivated in part by nationalist sentiments of eagerness to create a glorious empire. Second, colonial regimes inadvertently bolstered the maturation of nationalism in their colonies because of the communication, transportation and educational infrastructure they brought with their colonialism. Since Taiwan has never colonized any nation, only the second aspect will be discussed in this section.

No matter whether they chose to rule indirectly as the Dutch did in Indonesia at the beginning of their colonial rule or directly as the Japanese did in Taiwan and Korea, it was unavoidable for the colonial government to appoint locals who were willing to co-operate in governing the colony. As a consequence, they started providing western style<sup>12</sup> colonial education in the hope that it might create a new group of

<sup>12</sup> In Japan's case, it included the Japanese interpretation of western civilization in its colonial education.



bilingual locals who would loyally help them rule the colonial territory (Anderson, 1991,p.115).

Colonial governments' education policies did achieve some success in creating a new group of local elite. What these colonial regimes did not expect, however, was how effectively their education was used in equipping local elite to lead their nationalist movements to challenge colonialism, instead of having the desired consequences. Colonialism was contributive to the growth of anti-colonial nationalism in the following aspects:

First, the common educational experiences contributed to a sense of community for people from different places within the colony. They may come from different dialect or religious groups but the language taught at colonial schools became their means of communication and broke down the barrier between them (Anderson, 1991,pp.121-123; p.133).

In fact, colonial government policies even reinforced their sense of community. For instance, the Dutch referred to all Indonesians as *inlanders* although they may have had different dialects. To colonial regimes, all *inlanders* were "equally contemptible, no matter what ethnolinguistic group or class they came from" (Anderston, 1991,p.122). As a result of being treated as colonized subjects in the same way and having common educational experiences such as uniform textbooks, standardized diplomas and teaching certificates, it was easy for native people to imagine a nation in their minds and identify with people within their nation. Their national consciousness may also have been aroused when they learned the geography of their nation and saw it on the map in classrooms (Anderson, 1991,pp.121-122). Furthermore, people they met at school also became the subjects of the imagination of a national brotherhood, so the imagined community was gradually created.

Second, on their way to further study and in finding a job, they (especially those who got very good western style education) started to realize that they were discriminated against because the colonial regime had a policy of favoring its own countrymen. Educated native elite also painfully recognized that even if they had better qualifications than those colonizers who were in charge, they got less pay for the same job or even lost jobs to those less qualified colonizers. Due to the awareness, they were dissatisfied with the colonial regime and filled with bitter feeling. They came to believe that only creating their own nations could solve the problem of discrimination, so nationalist sentiments grew (Kahin, 1952,pp.48-49; p.53).

Third, because they were able to read in the colonial language, they could learn Western thinking like nationalism and comprehend works by people like Locke and Rousseau either directly in English or by translation into other European languages or Japanese. These Western political thoughts broadened their minds and inspired their nationalist struggle (Anderson, 1991,p.116; Kahin, 1952,pp.49-50). Their familiarity with histories of the colonial mother country not only made them wonder why they themselves could not become independent from foreign influence, but also encouraged them to think it was possible to have their own nation as their colonial master had achieved (Kahin, 1952,p.49).

Fourth, the emergence of the new elite as a result of the colonial government's education also provided leadership for nationalist movements. In Indonesia, for instance, one of the reasons why nationalism could not grow before the new elite led the movement was that the Indonesian aristocracy refused to support it. The Indonesian aristocracy benefited from Dutch colonialism because the Dutch allowed them to exploit even more than they had before from their people, so it was

understandable that they saw no need to oppose the colonial regime (Kahin, 1952,p.41). As a consequence of the lack of leadership, the Indonesian masses could not relate their deteriorated life condition to colonialism. Once new local elite started to lead the movement and educate their people, however, the masses were easily mobilized and their quick response made the growth of nationalist movements possible.

In addition, colonial regimes also unintentionally nourished nationalism by introducing some novel inventions such as the railway, printing, and radio. These inventions were all helpful in spreading nationalist sentiments in these colonies. Before transportation innovations like the railway, steamships and motors enabled people to move easier, the majority of people in these colonies tended to stay in their small villages all their life. But these inventions made human movement easier and encouraged them to start working in big cities. On their trip to and from big cities, they met their countrymen and began to develop the sense of community. Furthermore, since new ideas normally began to ripen in urban areas, they could learn novel concepts like nationalism and introduce them when they returned to their hometown. As a result, transportation improvements helped the development of nationalism in colonized countries (Anderson, 1991,p.115; Kahin, 1952,p.42).

Printing and radio broadcasting were also important in stimulating the expansion of nationalism. Colonial regimes' policies to introduce western style education created a larger literate population. As more and more people were able to learn new ideas by reading them, the advancement in printing made ideas like nationalism more available to the educated people and helped it to extend its appeal. Since not everyone was able to read, however, printing did have its limit in spreading nationalist ideas. Radio, as a result, became a significant supplementary

tool for nationalists to manipulate. With the help of the radio, they could also attract the masses who were illiterate or from various dialect backgrounds (Anderson, 1991,p.135; Kahin, 1952,p.41).

In sum, colonialism was influential in the development of nationalism in colonized nations in several ways. 1. It instituted western-style education for the colonized thereby creating a new elite group; by learning and reading western ideas such as democracy and nationalism made available by their colonial education, they became leaders of nationalist movements. 2. The languages promoted by colonial regimes became the means of communications which diminished the language barriers within nations. 3. The common experiences of discrimination in areas like education and employment reinforced the sense of community among the colonized. 4. Colonial regimes introduced modern inventions, such as printing and railways. These bolstered the spread of nationalism.

### **Democracy**

Compared to nationalism, democracy is less controversial as far as definition is concerned. Democratic theorists have more consensus on what it is meant by democracy than their nationalist colleagues do on nationalism. Before we explore the elements of democracy, however, it should be useful to trace the evolution of the notion of democracy.

The term democracy was derived from the Greek words *demos* (people) and *kratia*(rule or authority). As a consequence, it means *rule by the people* in Greek. It is essential, consequently, to clarify the meaning of *rule* and *the people*. Since the notion of *rule* and *the people* are crucial in democracy, major controversies, as a result, were over the essence of these two terms. Theorists disagree with one another on the form of

*rule*. Some prefer direct rule; others accept the legitimacy of indirect rule, or representative democracy.

Theories of democracy were originally only for small city-states, as they had in ancient Athens. As nation-state replaced city-state as a popular government form, nevertheless, democratic principles began to be applied to larger communities, that is to nations. Since direct democracy seemed no longer possible as a result of the larger population and the size of each state, representative democracy has gradually become a synonym of democracy. The idea of democracy has become so widespread that even countries like China, which is not a democracy in reality, use terms like *people's democratic dictatorship* to mobilize people and justify their regimes.

Disagreement also occurred among political theorists on the issue of who should be *the people* in a democracy (Bogdanor, 1987,p.166). In ancient Greece, only free men whose parents were Athenian citizens were permitted to participate in public affairs. Women and slaves were deprived of the right to take part in politics. Even in countries which are known for their democratic achievement such as the United Kingdom, the United States and France, some disadvantaged groups, for instance, women, poor people or blacks were prevented from having their voices heard in politics for some time until universal suffrage became a reality. As universal suffrage becomes a widely accepted principle, however, the meaning of *the people* is no longer controversial. *The people* has been identified with adult population in each democracy regardless of their gender and race although people like children and criminals are still prohibited from participating in the ruling process.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Immigrant and people of an ethnic group born abroad, however, are sometimes still in an ambiguous position because of nationalism.

The popularity of democracy is in fact a modern phenomenon. Although the first example of democracy existed as early as in ancient Athens, it was not a highly regarded political system for some 2500 years until the political writings of philosophers like Locke and Rousseau were widely read and accepted<sup>14</sup>(Duncan, 1983,p.13). Locke's political theories were based on his conviction of inalienable human rights (life, liberty, and property in particular). He argued that government is established to guarantee these rights, so people can overthrow it when it does not fulfill its function. Although the "people" he referred to was a narrow group, namely, men with certain property, his theory was expanded by later democrats to apply to a larger population. And democracy was advocated by those democrats because it was believed to be the political system that can best protect people's rights.

The new interpretation of Locke's view was clearly expressed in the *Declaration of Independence*:

We hold these truths to be self-evident. That all men are created equal that they are endowed by their creator with unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty & the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights governments are instituted among men, deriving their just power from the consent of the governed, that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its power in such form , as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.(Quoted in Becker, 1961,p.8).

Even though the American and French revolutionists accepted Locke and Rousseau's democratic philosophy, they inherited the traditional disbelief in democracy from Greek philosophers. James Madison, for instance, wrote in his book

<sup>14</sup> We see this clearly, for instance, from Plato's disapproval of democracy in his writing.

*The Federalist* that “democracies have ever been found incompatible with personal security, or the rights of property, and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths” (Quoted in Birch, 1993,p.45). They viewed what they created in America and France as republics instead of democracies. However, these two nations have been considered as democracies in the modern sense since their creation. Furthermore, they inspired later democratic movements in other countries.

The meaning of democracy has shifted from direct rule by citizens to rule through indirect representation. What is its current meaning then? According to Holden (1988,p.5), democracy is “ a political system in which the whole people, positively or negatively, make, and are entitled to make, the basic determining decisions on important matters of public policy”. To the question what the concrete substances of democracy are, Dahl’s interpretation provided very good answers. He argued that *political equality*, *popular sovereignty* and *rule by majority* have been the essential elements of democracy since ancient Greece (1956, p.34). He gave us an example when he quoted Aristotle’s *Politics*:

The most pure democracy is that which is so called principally from the equality which prevails in it: for this is what the law in that state directs; that the poor shall be lodged with either of these, but that both shall share it. For if liberty and equality, as some persons suppose, are chiefly to be found in a democracy; but as the people are in the majority, and what they vote is law, it follows that such a state must be a democracy (Quoted in Dahl, 1956,p.34)

What he meant by *political equality*, *popular sovereignty* and *rule by majority* can be further explained as follows:

### Political Equality

Political equality has been considered as an important value in democracies since the American and French revolutions. Theorists like Macu even argued that asking for equality was the main reason for the breakout of the American Revolution (Breuilly,1982,p.5). The French revolutionaries also emphasized equality as one of their three goals.

The demands for equality resulted from the revolutionaries' common belief in universal human rights. We see this strong conviction in the political writings of both revolutions. The Declaration of Rights by the Philadelphia Congress of 1771, for instance, proclaimed:

That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society they cannot, by any compact, derive or divest their posterity: namely, the enjoyment of liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property and pursuing and obtaining happiness"(Quoted in Birch, 1993,p.116).

*Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen* also expressed a similar view when it declared that "the purpose of all political association is the conservation of the natural and inalienable rights of man: these rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression" (Quoted in Birch, 1993,p.119).

In other words, both revolutions promoted democracy because their activists believed every human being was born equal with universal rights and governments had to protect these rights. In other to guarantee their own rights, each individual is encouraged to participate in politics. In addition, governments also have to treat each of their citizens impartially.



### Popular sovereignty

Popular sovereignty is another crucial ingredient of a democracy. Birch (1993,p.49) believes the founding fathers of the United States shared a common belief in popular sovereignty. Among them, James Wilson of Pennsylvania, for instance, affirmed that:

in our own governments, the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power remains in the people. As our constitutions are superior to our legislatures, so the people are superior to our constitutions.... In giving a definition of what I meant by a democracy... I termed it, that government in which the people retain the supreme power (Quoted in Birch, 1993,p.49).

James Wilson's words acknowledged that the principle of popular sovereignty is fundamental in a democracy. Namely, sovereignty belongs to its citizens. Governments have to make decisions on the basis of their citizens' approval. Citizens practice sovereignty by participating in public affairs such as voting for their favorite representatives and joining political parties or pressure groups.<sup>15</sup> But how can popular sovereignty be realized in practice? Majority rule is the generally accepted principle.

### Majority rule

Majority rule is one of the important principles in practicing democracy. To answer the question of why the majority should rule, we may start with Aristotle's justification. He thinks majority rule is good because it improves the quality of decision making. In his opinion, each individual's ability and knowledge is limited but they can help one another to make a wiser common decision by sharing their information and experience through discussion and debate (Spitz, 1984,pp.149-

<sup>15</sup> Of course, this is the ideal condition of the practice of a democracy. In practice, not every democratic theorist agrees with this view-point because they consider it too idealistic.

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Ernest Barker repeated and expanded Aristotle's view in his comment on majority rule:

The majority will, when discussion is finished and the final vote is taken, have assumed a new quality. It will not, indeed, have become the agreed and active will. But it ...can become something of the nature of the will of all.. when it has thus attained a conduct or substance which does justice to the whole of the community.... (Quoted in Spitz, 1984,p.150).

Put in another way, Barker believes the final result of majority rule will produce a generally acceptable policy. Although the decision may still be wrong, it is the best possible option we can hope for within human beings' limited capacity (Spitz, 1984,p.151).

Majority rule is also championed because it may decrease "the feeling of alienation among the citizenship". Discussion and debate before voting enable people to be aware of the fact that other points of view do exist and improve their mutual understanding. They recognize other people's rights as citizens like themselves. As a consequence, it helps to "build a consciousness of community" (Spitz, 1984,p.151).

Hans Kelson also advocated majority rule because of his belief that it guarantees political freedom the most effectively, as it restrained the freedom of the fewest numbers of individuals<sup>16</sup>.

Since political freedom means agreement between the individual will and the collective will expressed in the social order, it is the principle of simple majority which secures the highest degree of political freedom that is possible within society (Quoted in Spitz, 1984,p.159).

On the other hand, however, majority rule does have its drawbacks. For instance, that Hitler was elected by the principle of majority rule is a commonly cited example to show the fact

<sup>16</sup> Richard Wollheim shared similar view although he argued for majority rule because it "best safeguards equal right". i.e., it frustrated rights of fewer

that the majority may make terrible mistakes.<sup>17</sup> We have to admit that majority rule is not perfect due to the potential dangers and problems in it. People rarely agree with one another on every issue. Since we all come from different backgrounds and have different values and ideas, it is obviously impossible to reach a consensus all the time. Because the ideal unanimous condition when we make public decisions is usually unattainable, we have no other option but to adopt the second best choice- deciding policies regarding public affairs when the majority of the group agree.

After discussing major principles of democracy, we may turn to the issue of how we can evaluate democracy in practice. In another book, *Polyarchy*, Dahl also contributes his definition of democracy. He argues democracy is “ a political system one of the characteristics of which is the quality of being completely or almost completely responsive to all its citizens” (Dahl, 1971,p.2). Consequently, he believes a government can only be democratic if its political system provides all full citizens unimpaired opportunities to “formulate their preferences”, to “signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government by individual and collective action” and to “have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of the government, that is, weighted with no discrimination because of the content or source of the preference” (Dahl, 1971,p.2).

Generally speaking, democracy in our time is widely considered as a political system that has these following characteristics:<sup>18</sup> 1. universal suffrage. 2. right to run for public office. 3. the right of political leaders to compete publicly for

people “without endangering the rights of all”(Spitz, 1984,p.160).

<sup>17</sup> Other possible problems of majority rule include, for example, that it may endow too much power to the majority so it may create majority tyranny that is unfair to those who are of the hopeless minority. The majority may also always be the same group, rather than, as some theorists predicted, that the composition of a majority group is flexible.

support. 4. free and fair (normally secret) elections. 5. the right of all citizens to form autonomous political parties. 6. the right to form other political associations. 7. the existence of alternative sources of information independent of the control both of the government and of one another. 8. institutions that ensure the peaceful departure of government leaders who lose elections, and their peaceful replacement by the winners (Bogdanor, 1987,p.167).

According to Dahl (1971), the above characteristics of democracy can be summarized into two dimensions: public contestation and the right to participate (in elections and [holding] office) (Dahl, 1971,pp.5-6).

### **Democratization**

As previously mentioned, the principle of democracy has been popular since the American and French revolutions so even undemocratic regimes claimed to be democratic. Although the rapid democratization in East Europe seems to demonstrate the appeal of democracy, not all undemocratic regimes have transformed into democracies.

Why democratization happens in some countries but not in others has been a research topic for some time. Various possible factors have been suggested. For instance, the importance of voluntary associations, a strong bourgeoisie, mass communications, a certain level of per capita income, literacy, and urbanization.... (Wachman, 1994,pp.35-36).

Summarizing major democratization theories, two main factors have been frequently proposed in explaining democratic transition. They are *structural changes* and *the political elite's role*. Among the literature, Huntington's *Third Wave* provides a very good framework to explain the democratization processes

<sup>18</sup> Dahl's criteria are very similar (Dahl, 1971,p.3).

in the 1970s and 1980s, especially those that occurred in Asian and African countries.

Based on Huntington and other scholars' arguments, this thesis will argue that *structural changes* (such as literacy rates and economic growth), *legitimacy crises*, *the political elite's patronage* and *external influences* are the four main factors that stimulate democratization in Taiwan.

#### Structural changes

In 1959, Seymour M. Lipset pioneered the research on the correlation between economic development and democracy. In his article, he suggested that economic progress would provide a better chance for democracy to develop.

Many scholars, for instance, Daniel Lerner (1958) and Barrington Moore (1966), shared similar views. It has been commonly argued that economic development creates a middle class and sectors over which governments have less control. Economic development also brings better education, higher living standards, and higher literacy rates. When people can read and can live better lives, they expect more from their government. As a consequence, they also want to have more freedom and fewer government restraints (Huntington, 1991, p.45; pp.59-72).

On the other hand, however, economic development itself may not always guarantee democracy as Lipset found in his research. Both Dahl (1971) and Huntington (1991) argued it is the higher literacy rate as well as better communication and education that accompanies economic development, not economic development itself, that increases the possibility of a regime's democratization.

Furthermore, people's higher expectations of the government do not necessarily bring them more freedom and result in democratization of their country if the ruling elite refuses to pay attention to their demands. Why were leaders of authoritarian regimes willing to initiate "the third wave" democratization, to use Huntington's phrase, which happened in some thirty countries in the 1970s and 1980s? *Legitimacy crises, political elite's patronage and external influences* are all possible reasons.

#### Legitimacy crises

Some authoritarian regimes may base their legitimacy partly on foreign support, especially that of the United States. When the Cold War with the Soviet Union ended, the American government no longer supported some of its authoritarian allies. Consequently, the legitimacy of these regimes was also curtailed. Facing legitimacy crisis either due to the loss of domestic or foreign support, the regime may be forced to consider political reforms in order to regain legitimacy, so democratization became possible in these countries (Huntington, 1991,p45; pp.85-100). For example, U.S. policies beginning in the seventies toward the promotion of human rights and democracy in other countries promoted the idea of democracy. Gorbachev's political reforms in the late 1980s and his decision to relax political control over East Europe helps to explain why democratization could happen in the Soviet Union and East European countries (Huntington, 1991,p45; pp.85-100).

By the 1970s and 1980s, many authoritarian regimes faced legitimacy crises as a result of the economic difficulties following the oil shocks of 1973-74 and 1978-79. Furthermore, their previous economic success raised living and education standards, and greatly expanded the urban middle class in many

countries as previously discussed. These all increased the pressure on these regimes to rebuild their legitimacy by introducing political reforms (Huntington, 1991, p.45; pp.46-58)

#### Political elites' patronage

Although structural changes are possibly helpful in explaining democratization, they cannot be fully responsible for regime transition. Political actors are probably at least equally important in the democratization process.

Danwart A. Rustow (1970), O'Donnell (1986), Giuseppe Di Palma (1990) and Adam Przeworski (1991) assume political elites' role in democratization is crucial. Two groups of political elite are major actors in any country's democratic transition: the ruling elite and the opposition elite.

In the opinion of these scholars, it is political actors who decide the prospect of democracy, not structural changes. They believe democratization occurs when the ruling elite and the opposition elite negotiate and compromise with each other.

On the other hand, changes within the ruling elite and government may also influence the possibility of democratic transition. The changes may occur in two aspects. First, the same leader may change his attitude toward democracy from opposed to supportive, although the reasons for the attitude change may vary from person to person. Second, the change may occur as a result of leadership succession. Because of human beings' mortality, when a leader gets old or dies, an authoritarian regime may face some dramatic changes. For instance, if the successor has pro-democracy ideas or is willing to undertake political reforms, the prospect of democracy may be brighter as a result (Huntington, 1991, pp.106-108; pp.315-316).

### External influences

Foreign actors can also be influential in other countries' democratization process for two reasons. First, as we have discussed, the policies of superpowers like the United States and the Soviet Union may push democratization to occur in other countries. This occurred when superpowers withdraw their support for a certain authoritarian regime because it created the regime's legitimacy crisis. Second, a country's democratization may have a "snow-balling" or demonstration effect in another country's democratization. In fact, East Europe's democratization wave in the 1980s was an illustrating example of this "snow-balling" effect (Huntington, 1991,p.46; pp.100-108).

In sum, there are four main types of factors that may nourish democratization to occur in certain countries: *structural changes* (such as literacy rate and economic growth), *legitimacy crises*, *the political elite's patronage* and *external influences*.

### Democracy, Democratization and Nationalism

After discussing nationalism, democracy, and democratization separately, we now can turn to the issue of how nationalism is connected with democracy and democratization. As mentioned earlier, nationalism has two characteristics: on the one hand, it is an ideology; on the other hand, it can be also a political movement. Therefore, we will discuss the ideological aspect of nationalism when we link it with the concept of democracy. The political movement aspects of both nationalism and democracy will also be explored when we try to see whether there may be common forces that can push both nationalism as a political movement and democratization to develop in certain countries. While the first task concerns the ideological linkage



between nationalism and democracy, the second task will discuss their correlation in real politics. We shall start with the association between nationalism and democracy first.

#### **Common elements of Nationalism and Democracy**

Nationalist movements are not always democratic at the same time. It is very clear, however, that nationalism and democracy were intimately correlated when they both became increasingly popular in Europe in the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries. Michael Mann (1990,p.45) even claimed that “modern nationalism is a product of the drive toward democracy. Aggressive nationalism [which is normally undemocratic and puts one nation’s welfare above those of other nations] is a perverted form of that drive”.

Hayes (1949) had a similar opinion when he argued nationalism and democracy were both derived from European’s humanitarianist thinking when they attempted to solve political problems of their times. We see their combination first in the American Revolution and then in the French Revolution when a nation was created and subjects of a monarch were transformed into citizens of a nation. His persuasive justification was depicted in his remark on the French Revolution:

All citizens,..., were equally to be endowed with individual liberties and with national obligations. Government was to be by all and for all; it was to be democratic and national. For political democracy and humanitarian nationalism [the earliest form of nationalism that advocated nationalist claim of a nation but also respected that of other nations] were born together in France; they were twins; they were different but simultaneous offspring of the same humanitarian parentage (Hayes, 1949,p.36).

The correlation between nationalism and democracy is mainly from their philosophical similarity. As discussed earlier, both of them emphasize popular sovereignty, equality, and liberty. Furthermore, the ability of nationalism to mobilize

members from different classes and backgrounds makes it a favored partner of democratic movements. Since nationalism and democracy both oppose privilege and oppression, they may strengthen each other when political movements are launched in both their names. In other words, nationalism is normally tactically utilized to expand the possibility of success of democratic movements, as Shafter has argued:

popular nationalism was ... part of the general movement toward republicanism and democracy, of the movement against monarchical, aristocratic, and clerical domination. The national idea and the nation-state became the instruments through which men could obtain liberty and pursue happiness (Shafter, 1955,p.115).

Popular sovereignty is assuredly the major principle that associated democracy and nationalism. It means citizens of a nation can decide their public policies concerning domestic or international affairs themselves by democratic means. Members of a nation are entitled to participate in the ruling process as a result of their citizenship. Because of their citizen status, they are granted protection, rights, and equality before law through their nation. As a consequence, it also reinforces them to identify with their nation. John Stuart Mill once explained how nationalism can endorse the goal of democracy to accomplish liberty: “ Representative government best ensures freedom, and if such a government is to function, the citizens must be able to decide with whom they would like to associate, hence the right of self-determination, and that of nationality”(Quoted in Kedourie, 1994, p.127).

In addition to the fact that nationalism and democracy have common elements (e.g. popular sovereignty, liberty, and equality) philosophically, political movements in many countries also combined them to enlarge the appeal of these movements. Eastern Europe where democracy advocates employed nationalism as a weapon to oppose the foreign influence of the

Soviet Union was a recent illustration of the tendency (Diamond & Plattner, 1993, p.x).

We also see many political movements with both nationalist and democratic goals in many other countries in their struggle for independence from their previous colonial regime. They normally acted in the name of self-determination. To people of these countries, “[w]e the people (i.e., the nation) will decide our own fate; we will observe only those rules that we ourselves set up; and we will allow nobody-whether absolute monarch, usurper, or foreign power- to rule us without our consent” (Diamond & Plattner, 1993,p.9). The American Revolution and the French Revolution both illustrated the claim, although while the former intended to seek independence from a colonial empire, the latter aimed at overthrowing a domestic dictatorship.<sup>19</sup>

Take the French Revolution as an example. We see the combination of democracy and nationalism in *Declaration of the Rights of Citizens and Man*: “the principle of all sovereignty lies essentially in the nation. Nobody, no individual can exercise authority unless it comes expressly from this source.... Law is the expression of the General will. All citizens have the right to contribute to its formation, either personally or through their representatives”(Quoted in Jenkins, 1990,p.13).

In other words, the revolution demanded both civil equality and political representation. As Sieye, a famous French intellectual who actively participated in the revolution, believed: “Like civil rights, political rights derive from a person’s equality as a citizen” (Quoted in Brubaker, 1992,p.40). The revolution reinterpreted the concept of citizenship<sup>20</sup> and transformed

<sup>19</sup> Jenkins (1990) believed the success of the French revolution was due to its mixture of both nationalism and democracy.

<sup>20</sup> The origin of the concept of citizenship can be traced to ancient Athens but

political rights into civil rights (Brubaker, 1992,p.43).

Although nationalism and democracy can intensify each other through their common philosophical origins and power to mobilize, sometimes nationalism may be manipulated by state leaders to oppose democracy. This may partly result from the fact that while both nationalism and democracy share some common essences such as popular sovereignty, nationalism basically emphasizes the idea of a group of citizens with a shared goal to glorify and solidify their nation, while democracy pays more attention to citizens as individuals with inalienable rights. Therefore, sometimes nationalism and democracy may contradict each other at those times when the nation as a community of citizens does not coexist with democratic practices that focus on a group of individuals who cherish their personal freedom and rights.

After discussing the philosophical correlation between nationalism and democracy, we shall discuss common possible forces for nationalism and democratization in the next section.

Common dynamics that promote  
nationalism and democratization

Earlier discussions reveal to us that structural changes, legitimacy crises, the political elite's patronage and external influences may encourage the emergence of democratization. We also see education, the development of a new elite and modern inventions motivated nationalism. What is the connection between them?

If we categorize them, education, the development of elite and modern inventions are structural changes. Both nationalist movements and demands for democratization require leadership because they both need to mobilize the masses to reach their

the French revolution gave it its current modern meaning that includes a wider community of people as citizens.

goals. As far as leadership is concerned, we often see an overlap between these two types of movements. Leaders of both nationalist and democratic movements are mostly from the intellectual group. Benefiting from their ability to absorb knowledge, they can comprehend sophisticated philosophical ideas such as nationalism and democracy and lead the masses to achieve nationhood and democratization.

But what makes them decide to promote nationalism and democracy? Partly it is out of self-interest, although they may also care about public welfare. Normally it is because the intellectuals feel disappointed to be prevented from participating in the ruling process, although they have good education. The restraints on their political participation may come from a domestic dictatorship or an alien colonial regime. In the former case, to expand their chances of political participation involves only democratic movements, since the rulers belong to the same nation. In the latter case, however, both nationalist and democratic movements are required to expel colonialism and to build a stable democracy.

Modern inventions such as printing (newspapers, magazines, and books) help the growth of both nationalist and democratic movements. Intellectuals use them to expand the appeals of their political movements. But they do have their limits because their audiences, especially for printing, are mainly the literate group. Therefore, the prevalence of education and higher literacy rates can stimulate the popularity of nationalist and democratic movements because they create a larger audience for them.

Although legitimacy crises and external influences are not included in the list of dynamics of nationalism, they may also be significant in the development of nationalism. In fact, the American and French revolutions happened because the

legitimacy of both French and British governments were no longer accepted by people. This demonstrates that a legitimacy crisis may result in the desire for nation-building.

Political elite's patronage may also be crucial. The opposition elite, as mentioned earlier, plays an important part in pushing the ruling group to reform and accept democratic or nationalist movements. On the other hand, the ruling group's attitude toward nationalism and democracy, whether it suppresses, tolerates, or supports them, determines the development of nationalism and democracy. In addition, external influences are also meaningful to nationalism. For instance, the success of the American and French revolutions did exert a powerful influence on other nations.

### **Conclusion**

In this chapter, we have discussed important concepts: nation, nationalism, colonialism, democracy, and democratization. Connections between nationalism and colonialism as well as nationalism and democratization were also explored. The task of the rest of the thesis will be to apply the theoretical framework of chapter 2 to evaluate the validity of the arguments of the major authors mentioned in this chapter. We shall summarize this chapter to provide a framework for following chapters.

A nation has both concrete and sentimental elements. The essential concrete elements include shared history and territory. Other concrete elements such as a common myth of descent and culture are helpful but not necessary for every nation. As for sentimental elements, the concept of the imagined community for a nation is fundamental.

Nationalism is both a political movement and an ideology. As a political movement, the goal of nationalism is to attain

nationhood so the separation between rulers and the ruled can be broken. Ideologically, on the other hand, nationalism has three crucial elements: national self-determination, popular sovereignty, and citizenship.

Democracy has three essential elements: political equality, popular sovereignty, and rule by majority. Its real practice can be summarized into two dimensions, as Dahl suggested, contestation and participation.

From my intensive research, I will argue in this thesis that the development of Taiwanese nationalism had two noteworthy features that have a wider, comparative and theoretical significance. First, although Taiwanese nationalism emerged as a result of decades of colonial rule, it did not occur as strongly as its counterparts in countries such as Indonesia. Furthermore, Taiwanese most dramatic anti-colonial nationalist movement, the 228 Incident, was not against the previous colonizers, the Japanese, but against the newly arrived group, the Chinese. Although Chinese proclaimed that Taiwanese were their compatriots, their discriminative policies were similar to those a colonial regime would adopt to rule a colony. In other words, what matters to the development of nationalism is, in fact, shared history and common suffering rather than common blood.

Second, what stimulated Taiwan's democratization in the 1970s-90s also inspired Taiwanese nationalism. Furthermore, although less influential, those factors could also be seen during the Japanese colonial era. I will test whether structural changes, the political elite's patronage, external influences and legitimacy crises were the common forces that impelled the development of Taiwanese nationalism and Taiwan's democratization as I propose.

## Chapter Three

### **Japanese Colonialism**

The modern history of Taiwan was deeply influenced by historical events occurring in China and Japan. We cannot understand how Taiwanese nationalism and Taiwanese's demand for democracy happened in Taiwan, as a consequence, without mentioning the legacy of Japanese colonization and the influence of the Chinese Nationalist Party's rule. In this chapter, we will see how Japanese colonialism aroused Taiwanese sentiment. And we will discuss how Japanese colonial rule turned Taiwanese into an ethnic group distinct from their Chinese cousins.

Unlike countries such as Indonesia, Taiwanese nationalism was not so strong as to push Taiwanese to seek independence and nation-building. On the other hand, however, the close correlation between democratic demands and national sentiment began to occur during the era of Japanese rule and has continued to develop since then.

In this chapter, we shall also see whether structural changes, the political elite's patronage, external influences and legitimacy crises stimulated the growth of pro-democratic and nationalist political movements in Taiwan during the colonial period.

#### **Before Japanese rule**

Taiwan's early history was filled with foreign colonization. Dutch, Chinese and Japanese all tried to utilize the island's natural resources and location so Taiwan was influenced by



these three foreign powers. Consequently, Taiwan's colonial experience gradually shaped Taiwanese to believe in their common history and to develop a unique identity. Nationalist sentiment, however, did not appear in Taiwan before the island was colonized by the Japanese beginning in 1895. To provide some background information, therefore, this section will discuss what kind of identity Taiwanese had before Japanese ruled the island from two dimensions: shared territory and shared history.

#### Shared territory

Taiwan's early history is still unclear. Although aborigines of Malayo-Polynesian descent lived on the island before Chinese settlers landed on Taiwan in large numbers, there is no detailed record of their lives (Gold, 1986,p.23; Long, 1991,p.3; Shih, 1996,pp.18-19; Wu, 1995,p.15). In addition, even though both China and Japan were influential in Taiwan's development, Taiwan was independent from both powers for centuries. Besides China and Japan, other colonial powers such as the Netherlands and Spain also intended to exploit the island.

In 1624,the Dutch successfully occupied Taiwan with their military conquest (Tseng, 1997,p.22; Long, 1991,p.27). Before the Dutch conquered Taiwan, there were only a few Chinese fishers, traders or pirates who visited Taiwan casually. Very few of them settled on the island (Shih, 1996,p.29). The Dutch, however, noticed Taiwan's excellent geographical location and intended to increase the productivity of Taiwan. They began to encourage Mainland Chinese to migrate to Taiwan (Tseng, 1997,p.36). Because of Dutch encouragement, Chinese gradually established them in Taiwan. Taiwan's Chinese population

increased. Furthermore, Taiwan slowly became a new shared territory for those Chinese migrants.

In 1662, Taiwan's first Chinese regime was established when Koxinga and his troops expelled the Dutch (Gold, 1986,p.24; Tseng, 1997,p.36; Wu, 1995,p.21). Many soldiers and ordinary people who either looked for a better life or hated the new Ching regime in Mainland China followed Koxinga to the island. The purpose of Koxinga in leading numerous Chinese to Taiwan was to use the island as a base to recover China for the Ming dynasty.

Koxinga's conquest of Taiwan attracted Chinese migration to Taiwan. Thus, by the seventeenth century Chinese settlers, disaffected with the Ching government, began to cross as a steady flow of migrants to Taiwan. They settled primarily in the southern part but gradually spread throughout the western plain and into the north. Most of them came from Fukien and Kwangtung provinces, directly opposite on the Mainland. Encountering aboriginal farmers in the best coastal lands, they organized themselves into bands and gradually expelled the aboriginals from the fertile plain into the poor mountainous area.

Koxinga's efforts to recover the Ming dynasty, however, failed two generations later when his grandson surrendered Taiwan in 1683 to China's last dynasty, Ching (Chang, 1995,p.43; Gold, 1986,p.25; Tseng, 1997,p.47; Tsurumi, 1977,p.6). Even though Ching was China's first dynasty to officially rule Taiwan, it still ruled only a part of Taiwan. And it also repeated the traditional prejudice toward Taiwan in the history of China; that is, it considered the island as an uncultured area that was not worth careful rule or migration. The dynasty set several limits to isolate the island. For instance, Mainland Chinese were prohibited from migrating to Taiwan. Furthermore,

Taiwanese were not allowed to serve in the Ching army (Chang, 1995,p.44; Chen, 1996,pp.135-136). The Ching dynasty's harsh laws, however, did not stop Chinese from migrating to Taiwan, so Taiwan's Chinese population increased dramatically during the Ching dynasty (Chang, 1995,p.45; Chen, 1996,p.141).

We shall discuss the development of education and the bureaucracy in Taiwan to see how the island became a shared territory of Taiwanese that distinguished itself from China and Japan.

### *1. Education*

Koxinga built the first Chinese regime in Taiwan. Chinese culture did not have a great impact on Taiwan's population, however, until Koxinga's son, Cheng Ching, established the first Chinese schools on the island. When Koxinga's family ruled Taiwan, bureaucrats either graduated from these official schools or inherited their family positions.

The Ching dynasty basically continued the educational policy of Koxinga's family. It set up public schools in Taiwan to teach traditional Chinese classics such as Confucius' The Four Books. In other words, before Japanese rule the island, most of Taiwan's literate population only had traditional Chinese education, similar to their counterparts in Mainland China.

### *2. Bureaucracy*

As mentioned above, Taiwan's educated population had a similar education to those in Mainland China before Japanese rule. The Taiwanese, however, had difficulty entering the power circle of China. During the Koxinga family's rule, Taiwan's bureaucrats were limited to Taiwan. As Koxinga only ruled

Taiwan, the Taiwanese never had the opportunity to serve in China.

Then Taiwan was surrendered to the Ching dynasty. Ching did not allow Taiwanese to rule themselves. Instead, bureaucrats were sent from Mainland China. Although there were still official schools for Taiwanese who dreamed to serve in the Ching dynasty, none of them got high-ranking positions during the dynasty (Chang, 1995,p.44).

#### Shared history

Taiwanese's belief in a common history was based on their common experiences of colonization from different foreign powers. As mentioned in an earlier section, the Dutch, Chinese, and Japanese ruled Taiwan during different periods. Although they governed differently, Taiwanese never gained equal footing in their land. Consequently, Taiwan's history was a series of struggles to counter colonizers.

Before Japanese arrived on the island, the population of Taiwan was composed of three groups: Fukiennese, Hokka, and Aborigines. Conflicts were frequent between these three groups. Although both Fukienese and Hokka groups had Chinese ancestry, rivalry was common before Japanese administration. Even within the Fokkienese and Hokka group, conflict and killing happened regularly between them when there were quarrels between people from different villages of Fokkien or Kwantung provinces.

There were two main reasons for the intergroup rivalry between Chinese settlers. First, communication problems occurred because they spoke mutually incomprehensible Chinese dialects. The second major reason was economic. Chinese migrants competed for land and water. Furthermore,

because the Ching government was never competent enough to protect Taiwan's population, they sought help from their kinship groups or from people from the same town or province (Chen, 1996,p.183).

Furthermore, as a result of the weakness of the Ching administration, Taiwan's residents did not have the idea of "imagined community" before the Japanese arrived. Instead, they only had local identity which separated the three main groups, even though they had a shared history.

### **Under Japanese colonization**

After discussing Taiwanese's early identity, we will cover Japanese colonial rule and its impact on the identity of the Taiwanese from four aspects: structural changes, political elite's role, external influences and legitimacy crisis

#### **Structural changes**

The Japanese introduced modern inventions and new style education into Taiwan during their colonization. Therefore, Taiwan was transformed into a more economically developed society. As a result of the transformation, Taiwanese had a better idea of democracy and nationalism. The first group of the Taiwanese new elite also emerged in this period.

##### *1. New inventions- transportation and communication*

Taiwan lacked an island-wide transport and communication network before the Japanese arrived. This impeded the emergence of an imagined community. The Japanese endeavor to expand and introduce new inventions to Taiwan, therefore,

provided the preconditions for the growth of Taiwanese nationalism.

Under Japanese administration, railways and roads were augmented. Take railways as an example. The Ching dynasty built Taiwan's first railway from Taipei to Keelung (28.6 km) by 1891 (Chang et al, 1970b,p.96). But it was Japanese colonial regime which completed a rough network of Taiwan's railways (Chang et al, 1970b,p.97). The Japanese expanded the scale of railways in Taiwan from 60 miles under Ching rule by 1893 to 534 miles by 1929 (The Government-General of Taiwan, 1929,p.40). The average number of passengers per day also increased from 1,080 persons in 1899 to 12,740 persons in 1912 (Chang et al, 1970b,p.134). There were no modern roads in Taiwan under Ching rule. By 1929,the Japanese built 15,017 kilometers of roads and 468 kilometers of highways (The Government-General of Taiwan, 1929,pp.43-44).

Japanese also introduced modern inventions such as telephones, radio to Taiwanese and improved the telegraph network (Chang et al, 1970c, p.352-357, p.360, p.362, pp.379-380). For example, the Japanese colonial government established Taiwan's first broadcasting station in 1928 (The Government-General of Taiwan, 1929,p.34). Taiwan had five broadcasting stations before the KMT ruled the island. By July 1944, there were 97,541 radios (Chang et al, 1970b,p.223). Like newspapers, broadcasting was manipulated by the Japanese colonial government to promote its colonialism. The Taiwanese listeners increased from 1,507 persons in 1918<sup>21</sup> to 44,050 persons in 1944 (Chang et al, 1970c,p.363). The first telephone was installed in 1897. The number of households which owned

<sup>21</sup> Before Taiwan had its own broadcasting station, residents in Taiwan listened to programs from Japan.

telephones also grew from 5,365 in 1917 to 23,219 in 1944 (Chang et al, 1970c,p.360-362).

Taiwan's first newspaper was published in 1896, the next year after the Japanese colonized the island (Chang et al, 1970b,p.176; Chang, 1981,p.15). To prevent the threat newspapers may create for its dictatorial regime, the Japanese colonial government put newspapers printed in Taiwan under strict censorship. Therefore, any demand for Taiwan independence, criticism against the regime or praise of nationalist movements was harshly punished (Chang et al, 1970b,p.176, p.186; Chang, 1981,p.15).

The main language Taiwan's newspapers used under Japanese rule was Japanese, although Chinese was allowed in part of the newspaper's content in the beginning. After 1937, however, Chinese was no longer tolerated in any publication, so Japanese became the only approved language (Chang et al, 1970b,p.177).

Under Japanese restrictions, newspapers in Taiwan were used mainly as a means for Japanese propaganda. And most of their editors were Japanese. In addition, their contents were limited to promoting Japanese colonial policies and diminishing Taiwanese national consciousness (Chang et al, 1970b,p.176). Therefore, although there was six newspapers by 1944, newspapers were used to diminish Taiwanese national sentiment and to promote colonial policies (Chang et al, 1970b,p.176).

Although transportation and communications did improve a lot during Japanese rule, we can see from these figures that those who had access to these inventions were still a minority. In addition, these new inventions were monopolized by the Japanese. Therefore, it was very difficult for the Taiwanese elite to spread nationalist and democratic ideas by utilizing these

inventions. On the other hand, however, these inventions might help the growth of an “imagined community”, as Anderson argued. Because of these inventions, the Taiwanese could, for instance, meet and talk to people from different places and read the same newspapers. This might result in a sense of solidarity.

## *2. Education*

Before Japanese ruled the island, as indicated earlier, Taiwan only had some traditional Chinese schools in which Confucian classics such as The Four Books were taught (Lee, 1964,pp.17-23). These schools prepared Taiwanese to pass civil service examinations in China, so they trained a minority group of Taiwanese elite with traditional Chinese education. After the Japanese controlled Taiwan, they introduced a new style of education to replace the traditional Chinese education aiming for imperial examinations in China. Therefore, a new group of Taiwanese elite emerged. This group of new Taiwanese intellectuals gradually replaced the traditional elite and became the leaders of Taiwanese nationalist and democratic movements under Japanese rule. Although they thought and spoke like Japanese, they were the leaders of anti-colonial movements (Tsurumi, 1977,pp.177-176).

The goal of Japanese colonial education in Taiwan was originally to train qualified labor, to cultivate loyal subjects of the Japanese emperor, and to teach Taiwanese the Japanese language. Therefore, they focused mainly on the elementary and vocational schools in the early years of their rule. Then the first civilian governor-general, Den Kinjiro, increased the number of schools in the 1920s for the Taiwanese and opened the door of schools for the Japanese children to some outstanding Taiwanese students (Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991,pp.23-24).



Taiwan's educational system was divided into four levels under Japanese rule: elementary schools, middle schools, high schools, and a university. Although Japanese proclaimed that they would treat Taiwanese equally, discrimination that favored Japanese did exist under their colonial rule. Separate schools for Japanese and Taiwanese was an obvious example of the fact that Japanese enjoyed some privileges.

Take elementary education as an example. While Taiwanese children enrolled in common schools, Japanese children studied at primary schools. Primary schools were superior to common schools. In 1938, for instance, the colonial government spent about fifty yen on each primary school's Japanese students but only twenty five on common school's Taiwanese students (Chi, 1985,p.228).

Japanese students also composed the largest group in Taiwan schools from middle schools to university, although they were only a minority group of Taiwan's whole population. For instance, Taiwan had 14 public and private middle schools in 1938. Although only 5.4 percent of the population were Japanese, 65.8 percent of those who studied at middle schools were Japanese (Chi, 1985,p.231). In the same year, while 157 Japanese students (69%) studied at Taiwan's only university, Taihoku Imperial University, only 70 Taiwanese students (31%) enrolled (Tsurumi, 1977,p.254).

Taiwanese children accepted Japanese-style education during the occupation. In some respects, the objective of reshaping Taiwanese to think of themselves as Japanese was achieved successfully among Taiwanese children. A Taiwanese told Tsurumi:

I remember one really bad fight I had with a Japanese boy at primary school. Did I fight him! He called me *changoro* [ a derogatory Japanese term for a Chinese] and I pounded him. I

was so mad. I was not mad because *changoro* was an insulting name for a Taiwanese or a Chinese to be called. I was mad because I was no *changoro*. I was every bit as Japanese as he was! Or so I thought at the time (Quoted in Tsurumi, 1977, p.157).

Nevertheless, the education system also reminded some Taiwanese of the fact that they were another ethnic community. The Taiwanese had to work harder than the Japanese to attain higher education after they finished elementary education. Furthermore, some schools were mainly reserved to Japanese students and only a few remarkably bright Taiwanese students got the opportunities to enter (Mendel, 1970,p.21). Even if they got in, they started to recognize partial treatment, which favored Japanese students, and the anti-Taiwanese prejudice among their Japanese teachers and classmates. Tsurumi portrayed the discriminatory condition:

One primary school graduate remembered that during his last few months in primary school his father had surprised him with the remark that he would soon be attending Taihoku Second Middle School if he successfully passed the entrance examinations. He had inquired why he should not be sent to Taihoku First Middle School. After all, he knew he was a top student and everyone knew that Taihoku First was the best. His father's blunt reply that Taiwanese boys went to the Second Middle School and not to the First gave him a rude shock. This was the first time in his life, he said, that he realized that he was Taiwanese and not Japanese (Tsurumi, 1977,pp.157-158).

Another informant recalled that after he went to the Taihoku Second Middle School he realized that Japanese students in his class did not have to pass the entrance examinations as he and Taiwanese boys had to. Therefore, Japanese boys who were not intelligent enough to attend the school which was reserved to the Japanese, the First Middle School, were able to study at the Taiwanese school simply because they were Japanese. At the same time, equally bright or brighter Taiwanese boys were excluded through the examination system (Tsurumi, 1977,p.158).

Fifty years of Japanese colonial rule from 1895, however, did improve Taiwanese's standard of education. The rate of literacy in Japanese of the Taiwanese increased from 1 percent in 1905 to 12 percent in 1930 to 27 percent in 1940 (Ho, 1978, p.33). But colonial education did not dramatically change Taiwan's social structure. Agriculture was still the biggest economic sector in Taiwan. In 1908, it accounted for 73.14 percent of Taiwan's employed population. At the same time, only 6.44 percent of Taiwanese worked in the industrial sector (Shih, 1996, p.73). By the end of Japanese rule in 1934, the percentage of industry workers had a slight increase to 7.54 percent but agriculture still comprised the largest number of Taiwanese workers (71.42 %)(Shih, 1996, p.87). In other words, Taiwan at this stage was not industrialized enough to have a large middle class.

As Kahin and Anderson observed in Indonesia's case, Taiwanese's common experiences of discrimination at school and at work might have stimulated them to have a stronger sentiment to identify with one another and build their own imagined community. The colonial language, Japanese, also became a means of communication between different dialect groups in Taiwan. The improvement in communication and transportation might also have stimulated them to think that they belonged to the same community, so an imagined community gradually emerged.

#### **Political elite's patronage**

Under Japanese rule, there was an obvious phenomenon: while the opposition elite was mainly composed of Taiwanese, the ruling elite was almost all Japanese. The Taiwanese opposition elite did not have the power to negotiate with the Japanese colonial regime.

Japanese colonial education did not change Taiwanese's subordinate position since the Ching dynasty. Under Japanese colonization, Taiwan's governors and their subordinates were Japanese. The Japanese government did not appoint Taiwanese as high-ranking officials until 1926. Besides, although numerous Taiwanese had good education and qualifications, only fifteen of them served as high-ranking executive and judicial officials between 1926 and 1945. Even for those Taiwanese who were able to work with Japanese, their chances for promotion were limited (Wu, 1986, p.189).

The most significant and apparent change in the ruling group that happened under Japanese colonization was the replacement of Mainland Chinese officials by Japanese bureaucrats. These Japanese officials were mainly soldiers. Although these Japanese rulers may differ in the degree of discrimination and suppression against the Taiwanese, they were all faithful in carrying out policies that would benefit their mother country at the cost of Taiwanese freedom and Taiwan's democracy. As a result, there were very few changes in the ruling elite during Japanese rule.

During fifty years of Japanese colonization, Japanese governors and their subordinates continued similar policies. They maintained Japanese privileges. They suppressed the Taiwanese demand for democracy and any political movement with nationalist sentiments. They censored newspapers and manipulated education to keep Taiwanese under control.

We can cite one example to see the Japanese colonial government's hostility against Taiwanese nationalist and democratic movements. On February 28, 1921, the Japanese colonial governor-general, Den Kenjiro, appeared before the Petition Committee of the House of Peers. He argued that

Taiwanese petitions for a local parliament were in fact advocating independence when he presented the following statement:

The aim of Japanese rule in Formosa[Taiwan] was not to make the island into a self governing entity with legislative and financial autonomy, such as the one we see in various autonomous colonies of England. Rather, by elevating the cultural standard of Formosans[Taiwanese] to that of Japanese, it purports to convert the island into an area to which the Japanese constitution may eventually be extended.... The Formosan demand for a separate legislature, therefore, is incompatible with the basic policy of Japan. It is nothing more than a scheme to transform the island into an independent country not dissimilar to England's Australia or Canada.... (Quoted in Chen, 1972, p.487).

Therefore, under Japanese colonial government, Taiwanese political movements, either national or democratic, were discouraged, sometimes even prohibited, by all means. Consequently, it is understandable that Taiwanese nationalist and democratic movement could not win enough popular support under Japanese rule. Therefore, on the one hand, the Taiwanese opposition elite was unable to ask the Japanese government yield to their nationalist and democratic demands. On the other hand, the Japanese ruling elite did not have the will or see the need to welcome Taiwanese nationalist and democratic activities. As a consequence, under Japanese colonial rule, both nationalism and democracy did not gain a powerful influence in Taiwan.

#### **External influences**

During Japanese administration, Taiwanese nationalist and democratic movements were influenced by events from three nations: China, Korea, and Japan. By the 1920s, the limited access to higher education could not meet Taiwanese demand so the colonial government was forced to permit Taiwanese

students to seek higher education in Japan (Tsurumi, 1977,p.177). This policy had a significant impact on the development of Taiwanese nationalism and also stimulated Taiwanese demands for democracy because ideas like democracy, liberalism and socialism were popular in 1920's Japan. Woodrow Wilson's self-determination for nations was also influential to Taiwanese students in Japan who cared about Taiwan's future (Tsurumi, 1977,p.178).

Encountering patriotic Chinese and Korean students and learning about events in these two countries also motivated Taiwanese students in Japan to think about the future of their homeland<sup>22</sup>(Tsurumi, 1977, p.179). Furthermore, Japan's domestic political atmosphere also encouraged Taiwanese's aspiration for democracy and home rule. The so-called Taisho democracy of the 1920's in Japan influenced many Taiwanese who came to Tokyo.

#### **Legitimacy crises**

The Japanese colonial government was the first island-wide government established in Taiwan. Ever since they began ruling Taiwan, the Japanese had always claimed that they would like to assimilate Taiwanese and give Taiwanese equal treatment. However, unjust policies resulted in Taiwanese resentment and the regime's legitimacy crisis. Accordingly, during Japanese administration, Taiwanese developed an ethnic awareness although the colonial regime aimed at transforming Taiwanese into faithful subordinates of the Japanese empire.

<sup>22</sup> 1919's March First Independence Movement in Korea and the later brutal suppression and China's May Fourth Movement touched Japanese liberals and social reformers, not to mention Taiwanese who experienced similar conditions (Tsurumi, 1977,p.179).

Taiwanese realized they were discriminated against because Japanese, as previously shown, enjoyed better education and employment. Japanese discrimination against Taiwanese occurred also in economic opportunities, political participation, and in judicial decisions.

Economically, Taiwanese faced discrimination in several ways. For instance, they were not provided with equal opportunities. Japanese got more pay even if they performed the same task as Taiwanese. Japanese also dominated better paying positions even when Taiwanese were as well or better qualified. Under Japanese rule, Taiwanese were more likely to be in clerical rather than decision-making positions (Tsurumi, 1977,p.159). Furthermore, the Japanese were given a privileged position in the economic structure. They monopolized the highly commercialized and industrialized processing sector. The Taiwanese had little choice but to engage in the primary sector activity of handicraft, agriculture, forestry, and fishing (Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991,p.23; Gold, 1986,p.39).

The same rule applied to political participation. Top posts at all levels of government were in Japanese hands. Only a few Japanese-trained Taiwanese were appointed village headman later in the occupation (Gold, 1986,p.135).

What was even worse to Taiwanese was the colonial Law No.63 that gave the Japanese governor-general unlimited power to do whatever he considered necessary to govern Taiwan. Because of this law, colonial courts were set up in Taiwan. Since the courts only bound Taiwanese, the Japanese had judicial privileges over Taiwanese in Taiwan (Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991,p.23). A different judiciary system meant that if the interest of the Taiwanese contradicted that of the Japanese, Taiwanese interests were sacrificed.

In response to Japanese's discrimination, a series of attempts to get equal treatment from the Japanese occurred under Japanese rule. Consequently, Taiwanese's first wave of pro-democracy political movements, the Home Rule movement, occurred under Japanese occupation. Although nationalist sentiment was not very obvious in the movement, it did demonstrate that Taiwanese consciousness, an important element of Taiwanese nationalism, gradually developed under Japanese rule. Consequently, we need to discuss the Home rule movement in order to understand the evolution of Taiwanese demands for democracy and nationalism in Taiwan.

Although these political movements demonstrated the legitimacy crisis of the Japanese colonial regime, they were never powerful enough to threaten the regime. Nationalist and democratic movements under Japanese rule were not successful in gaining their demands. We shall discuss these movements in detail in the next section.

### **Political Movements**

Because of the discriminations against them mentioned earlier, Taiwanese endeavored to win equality, self-rule, and democracy by supporting the so-called Home Rule movement. Strictly speaking, the movement was not a single movement. It was composed of several events carried out by several Taiwanese associations with common goals: to win Taiwanese equal rights from the Japanese colonial government and to rule Taiwan by Taiwanese. The movement was first launched when the Assimilation society was established in 1914.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>23</sup> 1914 might be meaningful because it was one generation after occupation and the third year after China became a republic. In other words, Taiwan's new Japanese-educated elite emerged and the movement might have been influenced by Chinese nationalism.



### *1. The Assimilation Society*

With the hope that elimination of Law No. 63 could give them equal rights before the law, the Assimilation Society, led by a member of the Taiwanese elite, Lin Hsien-tang<sup>24</sup>, was formed in 1914 in the name of promotion of equal treatment between Taiwanese and Japanese, and full assimilation of Taiwanese (Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991,p.22; Mendel, 1970,p.22). They urged that Japanese laws should be applied to Taiwanese. They appealed to the Japanese Diet by submitting several petitions.

Although we do not see clear nationalist sentiment since they were still willing to stay within Japan's empire, Lin Hsien-tang personally might have thought of the possibility of gaining Taiwanese self-rule and democracy by reuniting with China. He was forced to give up the hope to reunite with China when two Chinese nationalists, Liang Chi-chao and Tai Chi-tao advised him that Taiwan should seek democracy and self-rule by following "a path within the colonial framework" because China was too weak to provide any substantial help (Gold, 1986,p.42; Mendel, 1970,p.22).

Even though a well-known Japanese politician, Itagaki Taisuke, was invited to be the leader of the Assimilation Society, the society did not succeed as a result of strong opposition from Japanese, especially those who lived in Taiwan.

### *2. New People's Society*

In March 1920, Taiwanese students in Japan created another Taiwanese political association, the New People's

Society, in Tokyo. They published a magazine trying to educate Taiwanese at home and consolidate their support against Japanese discrimination (Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991,p.24; Tsurumi, 1977,p.180). But the society was split when some of its members disagreed on the proposal of one of them, Lin Ch'eng-lu, that Taiwan should have its own parliament. Lin argued it was not enough to have Japanese law applying to Taiwanese because they were different people with different cultural characteristics from the Japanese ( Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991,p.243; Tsurumi,1977,p.185). We may say this was one of the first wave of pro-democracy demands in Taiwan. Lin's remark also demonstrated that he definitely had a Taiwanese consciousness.

Lin was a graduate of Japan's Meiji University (Shih, 1996,p.206; Tsurumi, 1977,p.185). His proposal was nationalist oriented. The proposal showed that he believed Taiwanese were a different ethnic group from Japanese, so Taiwanese needed a separate parliament to rule themselves. In fact, the demand for a separate parliament also implied his eagerness for Taiwanese self-determination on issues within the island. Therefore, it was the first Taiwanese political proposal that aimed for democracy and nationalism. Lin's educational background also confirmed Anderson and Kahin's observation, that is, leaders of colonial nationalism normally got good colonial educations.

In November 1920, when the forty-fourth Diet decided to retain Law No. 63 with only minor revisions, the movement for abolition of the Law became a lost cause. Therefore, New People's society was forced to adopt Lin's proposal because it became the only feasible alternative. From then on, creating a

<sup>24</sup> Lin was a stubborn nationalist. He refused to speak Japanese all his life although he was appointed to several important posts under the Japanese colonial administration.

Taiwan parliament became the goal of thousands of Taiwanese. Between 1921 and 1934, there were fifteen petitions submitted to the Diet asking for the creation of a Taiwanese parliament (Li, 1996,p.57). In 1923, the more active members of the New People's Society created the League for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament. The League gradually replaced the Society although the latter was never officially dissolved.

### *3. The League for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament*

The League aimed at having a legislative body popularly elected by all residents of the island regardless of race. They hoped to have a legislature functioning as a miniature Diet, with the power to enact laws and to approve the budget of the governor-general. If their goal had been accepted, it would have turned Taiwan into a federated state of Japan. Consequently, the Japanese residents on the island were annoyed because they viewed the demand as a step preliminary to creating an independent Taiwan. But the aspiration of the League attracted widespread support from native intellectuals and middle class people such as teachers and doctors. Many influential liberal Japanese, both in and out of the Diet also encouraged and assisted the movement. Therefore, with this support, the movement was able to survive for fifteen years, although stringent police control was always present (Chen, 1972, p.484).

According to Chen (1972), three themes were the main concern of the fifteen petitions submitted by the League. First, they argued that the Japanese constitution clearly recognized the separation of power between the executive and the legislature, but in Taiwan the governor-general exercised both powers contrary to the fundamental principle of government. Second,

many laws enacted by the Imperial Diet were either inadequate or incapable of dealing with conditions peculiar to Taiwan. A special legislature consisting of the elected representatives of the populace of the island was needed to enact laws tailored to their needs. Finally, the island had enjoyed financial independence since Japan discontinued its subsidy. The Taiwanese demand for a voice in the formulation of the colonial budget, therefore, was justified (Chen, 1972,p.484).

In order to avoid the charge that they were trying to advocate a “secessionist goal”, every petition emphasized that the island would remain under the legislative authority of the Diet for matters of common legal concern to all territories within the Japanese Empire, and that the Taiwanese aspiration for a parliament was as legitimate as the universal suffrage advocated by the people in Japan in the 1920’s. Petitions usually also reaffirmed Taiwanese loyalty to the Japanese government and claimed that granting them the opportunity to participate in the legitimate political process of government would enhance rather than “diminish their good will toward the Japanese” (Chen, 1972, p.484).

To convince the Japanese government that the League had wide support on the issue of creating a separate parliament in Taiwan, the League collected signatures of the Taiwanese. The number of signatures of the fifteen petitions can be seen in Table 3.1. Considering the population of the island was approximate three million, a few thousand signatures may seem not convincing that the League had popular support. Taking into account the threat that signing a petition would divulge their identity and expose themselves to possible police retaliation and harassment by Japanese residents, however, the support was

significant (Chen, 1972, pp.484-485; Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991, p.24).

Table 3.1 Petitions and Number of signatures Submitted to the Japanese Diet By the League for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament					
1 <sup>st</sup> ,	1921	187	9 <sup>th</sup> ,	1929	2,050
2 <sup>nd</sup> ,	1922	512	10 <sup>th</sup> ,	1929	1,932
3 <sup>rd</sup> ,	1923	278	11 <sup>th</sup> ,	1930	1,314
4 <sup>th</sup> ,	1924	71	12 <sup>th</sup> ,	1931	1,380
5 <sup>th</sup> ,	1924	233	13 <sup>th</sup> ,	1932	2,684
6 <sup>th</sup> ,	1925	782	14 <sup>th</sup> ,	1933	1,859
7 <sup>th</sup> ,	1926	1,990	15 <sup>th</sup> ,	1934	1,170
8 <sup>th</sup> ,	1927	2,470			

Source: Chen, 1972, p.485, Table I.

Table 3.2 Division by Educational Background of Non-students Who signed one or more of the Fifteen Petitions		
Education	Numbers of Signatures	Percentage
College	1,139	6.6%
High School	1,074	6.1%
Elementary	6,810	39.5%
Elementary-equivalent	3,831	22.2%
Illiterate	4,380	25.4%
Unknown	28	0.2%
TOTAL	17,262	100.0%

Source: Chen, 1972, p.485, Table II.

We can see from Table 3.2, 74.4 percent of those who signed petitions got at least elementary or equivalent education. In other words, those who had stronger political consciousness were themselves the products of Japanese colonial education<sup>25</sup>.

The League, with the cooperation of the Taiwan Cultural Association, also attempted with some success to develop a

mass movement to support its goal. A series of circuit lectures was organized in the native language by these two associations. Many Taiwanese students in Japanese universities also devoted time to the cause by serving as speakers. And Taiwanese welcomed these lectures with regular attendance. Taiwanese support was also demonstrated in their enthusiastic farewells to the League delegates for Tokyo for the presentation of petitions. On February 2, 1925, for instance, thousands of well wishers were eyewitnesses in Keelung harbor to greet their leaders carrying the sixth petition to the Diet (Chen, 1972, pp.485-486).

The Japanese colonial authorities were in a dilemma when the League demand to establish a parliament confronted its colonial rule. The governor-general found it difficult to forbid the movement, because the League proclaimed a legitimate goal and resorted only to lawful tactics. On the other hand, however, since he was the protector of the interests of the Japanese residents, who were vastly outnumbered by the natives, he could not allow a parliament based on popular election. In addition, he feared that if he permitted the movement to grow it might develop into a massive full-fledged nationalistic movement supported not only by intellectuals but by other segments of the population, because the League's demand was imbued with a strong tinge of national consciousness. Consequently, the colonial regime adopted positive countermeasures.

The Japanese colonial government adopted three types of countermeasures: conciliation, coercion, and police repression. From 1921, the governor-general started to appoint some Taiwanese of "high scholarship and experience" to the Consultative Council that previously consisted solely of high ranking Japanese officials. But since the Council continued to

<sup>25</sup>Taiwan's population was approximately three million so those who signed

remain an advisory organ, this window dressing did not appease Taiwanese.

With ineffectual conciliation, the Japanese began to resort to coercion. Those who were directly involved in or in sympathy with the movement were dismissed from their posts in local government, public schools and Japanese firms. The Bank of Taiwan also stopped loans to those Taiwanese who were considered “politically undesirable” (Chen, 1972,p.487; Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991,p.24; Tsurumi, 1977,pp.187-190). But coercive actions from the colonial regime only radicalized the movement. Skeptical about the chances that Japanese could be persuaded to grant Taiwanese a separate legislature, the more radical elements of the League decided to win the support of labor and the peasantry. Consequently, the League was split due to its factionalism.

#### *4. The Taiwan Cultural Association*

From 1927 to the early 1930's, the rivalry between supporters of the movement to create a parliament in Taiwan was so intense that different factions formed their own organizations. Major associations during this period were the Taiwan Cultural Association, the People's Party, and the League for the Attainment of Local Autonomy.

The Taiwan Cultural Association was established in October 1921 by Chiang Wei-shui, a physician in Taipei (Li, 1996,p.34; Mendel, 1970,p.23; Tsurumi, 1977,p.192). It is believed to have been the most significant organization in the development of Taiwanese nationalism under Japanese rule. In order to operate inside the island, however, the Association

petitions were around 0.54 percent of the whole population.

declared its only aim was to promote native culture. Chiang once stated:

Formosans are charged with the responsibility to be the catalysts for Sino-Japanese friendship, a sine qua non for the harmony of Asian people. The harmony of Asian peoples, in turn, is a sine qua non for world peace, the greatest aspiration of mankind.... To fulfill this historic mission, we need talent. It is to the cultivation of such human talent that this Association is dedicated. However, Formosans are presently suffering from a disease. Without curing it, the cultivation of talent is not possible.... According to my diagnosis, the disease is the result of mental malnutrition. The only cure lies in taking more mental nourishment. The cultural movement is the only therapy (Quoted in Chen, 1972, pp. 489-490).

It seems that Chiang shared Itagaki's<sup>26</sup> idea of forming a Sino-Japanese alliance against white imperialism. It was said, however, that the real aim of the Association was to awaken Taiwanese national consciousness and to develop a political atmosphere favorable to the ultimate enforcement of the principle of self-determination. Chiang was trying to use Sino-Japanese friendship as an excuse so the Association could devote itself to the development of native culture at a time when the Japanese colonial regime was appealing to all possible means to achieve the goal of the cultural assimilation of Taiwanese (Chen, 1972, p.490).

Before the Association was taken over by leftists, it had sponsored several summer schools and night schools that taught subjects such as Chinese language, literature, Chinese history, and geography and European intellectual history. it also

<sup>26</sup> Itagaki, as mentioned earlier, was a liberal Japanese who participated in the formation of Taiwan's first political association under Japanese rule, the Assimilation Society, which aimed at assimilating Taiwanese and granting them equal rights to Japanese.



sponsored a round of circuit plays and Chinese opera “in the native tongue” (Chen, 1972, p.490; Li, 1996, p.35; Tsurumi, 1977, pp.197-198).

The Association also contributed to the home rule movement due to its close cooperation with the League for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament. Because the League could not establish its headquarters on the island as a result of the colonial authority’s disapproval, the Association was very helpful in collecting signatures for the League to continue its petition campaign to influence the Diet (Chen, 1972, p.490; Tsurumi, 1977, p.192).

During World War I, Taiwan’s industry expanded due to the flow of Japanese private capital into the island. Consequently, disputes between the Japanese-controlled factories and native labor became increasingly frequent. Meanwhile, the Association also attracted more and more members of students from high schools and colleges. And the demands within the Association to mobilize the peasantry against the Japanese became increasingly popular. Therefore, its more moderate and conservative elder members withdrew from the Association when more radical youths took control of the organization in January 1927 (Fix, 1993, pp.27-28).

##### *5. People’s party*

After withdrawal from the Association, the moderate members, including Chiang Wei-shui and Tsai Pei-huo decided to form another organization. As a consequence, the People’s Party was formed in July 1927. They declared the Party’s goal was to establish democracy, to develop a fair economic system, and to eliminate social inequities (Chen, 1972, p.491; Fix, 1993, p.28; Tsurumi, 1977, p.192).

By 1927, eight petitions to create a parliament in the island had failed. And Japanese Premier Wakatasuki in 1926 also rejected the notion of creating a separate legislature on the island when he claimed that Taiwanese were not ready for home rule because their cultural standard was not as high as that of the Japanese (Chen, 1972, p.489; p.492). Realizing the dream to have a separate legislature might be unattainable, Taiwanese began to feel that local autonomy with elected councils might be acceptable. Therefore, the Party presented a petition for the reform to create autonomy at the local level to the governor-general in April 1928. It cited examples of the British in India and the Americans in the Philippines, and urged Japanese in Taiwan to allow local autonomy. The petition was still in vain due to the fact that Japanese were afraid they would lose their privileged status if they allowed popular elections based on universal suffrage, since they were outnumbered by the Taiwanese.

But the People's Party was divided over the issue of whether they should take an active part in the labor movement. Tsai Pei-huo and his followers did not welcome the idea of involvement in the labor movement for fear that it may invite police repression and hinder the party's goal to promote local autonomy. But the activist group, led by Chiang Wei-shui, believed that support from labor was essential for their movement to succeed.

#### *6. The League for the Attainment of Local Autonomy*

Concerned about the prospect of total suppression, on August 17, 1930, Tsai and other moderate elements of the Party formed another organization, the League for the Attainment of Local Autonomy (Fix, 1993,p.26; Li, 1996,p.58). To deny that

the League had any interest in class conflict or any nationalist aspirations, it included several Japanese and wealthy native merchants generally considered collaborators of the government-general (Fix, 1993,p.32). It also conducted all meetings in Japanese. Responding to the formation of the new League, the People's Party amended its original platform so as to distinguish itself from its rival group, and began to claim it was a political party of workers and farmers representing the interests of the people without property. But the radical transformation caused suppression from the colonial regime and the party was dissolved.

As a result of the People's Party's dissolution, the League for the Attainment of Local Autonomy became the only political organization remaining on the island. But the League did not win popular support because it was considered "at best an organization of landlords and wealthy merchants and at worst a Japanese puppet willing to compromise principles for personal gain" by many Taiwanese. Consequently, its several attempts to enlarge its support to boarder segments of society were unsuccessful between 1932 and 1934. The League spent most time with the officials of the government-general trying to persuade them to accept the idea of universal suffrage and popularly elected councils (Chen, 1972, p.493).

Their efforts were without much success, although in October 1934 the governor-general revealed that he would initiate reforms to promote local autonomy in the following year. The reform program irritated the Taiwanese because it still favored the Japanese residents.

First, all but provincial and municipal councils were to be advisory organs (meaning that their decisions would not be binding.) The chief colonial administrator would be either ex officio the speaker who could dissolve the council at will or with the approval of his superior. Second, only one half of the members of each council were to be elected, the other half

appointed by the governor-general or provincial governor- a restriction which all but insured the Japanese domination of the councils. Finally, the franchise would be restricted to those who, among other things, had paid annual property and household taxes of five yen (Chen, 1972,p.494).

Because the Japanese paid much more tax per person, in the election of 1935, fewer Taiwanese (28,952) than Japanese (30,969) were qualified to vote (Chen, 1972, p.494).

Since the sole purpose of the League was fulfilled, it was advised to disband. The outbreak of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in Manchuria that climaxed in militarism and anti-Chinese sentiment forced the League to comply with the "advice". This put an end to Taiwanese political movements under Japanese rule.

To summarize the goals of the six organizations, two of them, the Assimilation Society and the New People's Society, attempted to attain the goal of equality with the Japanese. Three of them, the League for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament, the People's Party and the League for the Attainment of Local Autonomy, wished to have some kind of home rule. While the former advocated creation of a representative body, the latter two intended to improve the existing system of local autonomy. The other one, the Taiwan Cultural Association, although officially it claimed not to commit itself to any particular political goal, in fact gave its behind-the-scenes support to the cause of a Taiwanese Parliament (Chen, 1972,p.495).

Second, the leaders of the organizations usually overlapped. The well-known Lin Hsien-tang was the real or at least honorary leader for all six organizations. Tsai Pe-huo also joined all of them. Chaing Wei-shui, the founder of the Cultural Association, also participated in the formation of the People's Party and actively devoted himself to the movement to establish a

parliament in Taiwan. Except Lin Hsien-tang, who was a rich landlord with traditional Chinese education, leaders of these organizations normally were new elite who got very good colonial educations. For instance, Tasi pei-huo was a teacher who graduated from Tokyo Normal school; Chaing Wei-shui was a physician who graduated from Taipei medical school (Shih, 1996,p.206; p.210).

Although nationalism was never an evident slogan in these political associations (this was probably due to the fear of Japanese suppression), we can see Taiwanese nationalist aspirations from, for instance, Lin Ch'eng-lu's proposal of creating a parliament for Taiwanese. When Chiang Wei-shui established the Taiwan Cultural Association in October 1921, he was in fact trying to preserve Chinese culture and maintain Taiwanese identity<sup>27</sup>. Both Lin and Chiang and many Taiwanese of their times endeavored to seek democracy and nationalism through these political associations, although their nationalist aims were obscured, which probably was due to their concern of colonial repression.

Furthermore, these political organizations never challenged the Japanese government's right to rule Taiwan. They admitted Japan's state sovereignty in Taiwan so they never publicly demanded the right of national self-determination of the Taiwanese. But they did ask for democracy and hoped they might gain self-determination by democratic means. There was only limited competition between these organizations because most of the time, they never coexisted. Besides, they were never able to compete with the Japanese in the political sphere. Political participation during Japanese administration was also restricted since members of these organizations only composed a

minority of Taiwan's population. Besides, they were not powerful in forcing the Japanese government to grant the Taiwanese equal rights.

### **Changing Identity**

During its rule over Taiwan from 1895 to 1945, the Japanese attempted to transform Taiwanese into loyal subjects who identified themselves with the empire. The goal was only partly achieved. Although the Japanese promoted Japanese language, the Taiwanese elite organized some poet societies to maintain their Chinese heritage.

Unlike nationalists in other colonies, Taiwanese nationalists had two routes to choose when they considered the future of their homeland, and undertook political struggle against the Japanese colonial regime: complete independence from Japan and China, or reunion with China.

As Japanese introduced Western-style education to the island, a new type of intellectuals emerged in Taiwan in the 1910s and 1920s (Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991,p.17). Since their educational achievement and social status were mainly due to Japanese colonialism, they naturally were less emotionally attached to Chinese culture and the Chinese nation than the traditional Taiwanese elite with Chinese education who had enjoyed prestige and wealth under the Ching dynasty (Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991,pp.17-18). Members of both groups, however, had more or less emotional attachment with China as most Taiwanese of their time did (Clark, 1967,p.64).

Taiwanese nationalist and democratic movements under Japanese rule were very moderate considering the fact that they

<sup>27</sup> During Japanese colonial rule, Taiwanese drew distinction against Japanese. They did not yet clearly distinguished themselves from Chinese in their minds.

only asked for self-rule, for local autonomy under the Japanese empire, without calling for independence or self-determination. This changed when the KMT ruled Taiwan from 1945.

Even though the Japanese tried to “assimilate” Chinese, their Japanization policies were not very successful. For instance, Taiwanese still kept their traditional folk religion and entertainment. In addition, although the colonial government prohibited Taiwanese from speaking local dialects, Taiwanese spoke Japanese in public but spoke Taiwanese at home. In other words, Japanese colonial rule did not turn Taiwanese into Japanese. On the other hand, however, fifty years of colonialism did transform Taiwanese into “non-Chinese”, which made them distinct from Chinese on the mainland (Geoffroy, 1997,p.38)

### **Conclusion**

If we compare Indonesia's colonial experience as described by Kahin and Anderson with that of the Taiwanese, we will see some resemblances and some divergences. First, Taiwanese also developed their sense of community due to the colonial regime's policies as their Indonesian counterparts did. Under Japanese rule, Japanese became the common language of different dialect groups of Taiwanese. The trend was clearly demonstrated in the 228 Incident of 1947 so we will discuss it more in the next chapter. Furthermore, the way Japanese equally discriminated against them regardless which dialect group they belonged to also strengthened Taiwanese's sense of community because they suffered common humiliations and deprivations.

Second, unlike Indonesians under Dutch rule who eagerly intended to build an independent nation-state, however, Taiwanese under Japanese colonial rule did not enthusiastically seek independence nor to build their own nation-state.

Taiwanese nationalist movements before 1949 were satisfied to stay within the Japanese empire as long as the Japanese government granted them self-rule and democracy. We should not assume, however, that Taiwanese nationalists had no emotional attachment to China. In fact, two well-known Taiwanese national movement leaders, Lin Hsien-tang and Chiang Wei-shui, at least emotionally wished to reunite with China. It was China's vulnerability that prevented them from seeking the support of China. In other words, under Japanese rule, Taiwanese were ambiguous about their national identity. Many of them did not distinguish themselves from Mainland Chinese.

Third, Japanese education was influential in Taiwanese demands for democracy and nationalism. Japanese colonial education also trained a new elite in Taiwan as Dutch colonial education cultivated Indonesia's new elite. The ability of these Taiwanese elite to read classics on democracy, self-determination and nationalism in Japanese or other foreign languages such as English nourished their skills and confidence in promoting democracy and nationalism.

Fourth, the Japanese colonial regime also delivered new inventions such as railways, printing, and radios. Although the Taiwanese elite could not use these inventions to spread their nationalist ideas as widely as their Indonesian counterparts because of the Japanese monopoly and censorship, these inventions might have helped the growth of an imagined community in Taiwan because Taiwanese could travel, communicate, and meet each other much easier.

In sum, although the Taiwanese elite learned Western ideas like democracy and nationalism from Japan, they had difficulty mobilizing mass support for several reasons: First, the literacy



rate was still low and the newspapers as well as broadcasting were controlled by the Japanese. Second, the Japanese were hostile to both nationalist and democratic movements so they suppressed them. In addition, the Japanese colonial government never faced a severe legitimacy crisis so they did not have the need to yield to the Taiwanese elite's demands. To put it another way, external influences were important in Taiwan under Japanese rule, although nationalist and democratic movements did not succeed due to the lack of either significant structural changes or major changes within the ruling group, the inability of the opposition elite to bargain with the ruling group and the lack of serious legitimacy crises.

On the other hand, however, the Taiwanese common colonial experience, especially at schools and at work did create the preconditions of nationalism. That is, the imagined community gradually emerged as a result of colonial education and new inventions. Furthermore, structural changes, the political elite's patronage, external influences and legitimacy crises did play some role in launching Taiwan' earliest nationalist and democratic movements during the era of Japanese rule although these forces were not mature enough to motivate political movements to succeed.

## Chapter Four

### **Identity during the transitional period between Japan and the ROC**

In Chapter 3, we have seen fifty years of Japanese rule molded Taiwanese into a different ethnic group from the Japanese. As mentioned earlier, however, Taiwanese themselves did not yet distinguish themselves clearly from Mainland Chinese. It was when the Taiwanese started to have personal experiences of living with mainland Chinese from 1945 that Taiwanese began to seek independence from China and to build their own nation. The years between 1945 to 1947 were crucial because many Taiwanese were transformed from pro-Chinese to anti-Chinese. Taiwanese national consciousness also became apparent during this period so we will discuss relevant developments in this chapter to provide background information for subsequent chapters. As a result, the focus will be on the changing attitude of the Taiwanese toward China, the Chinese and the KMT government, largely due to the 228 Incident.

Before we discuss the Chinese government's takeover in 1945, let us briefly describe the Japanese colonial government's mobilization in Taiwan during World War II.

#### **Mobilization by the colonial regime**

During World War II, Taiwan was used to support Japanese imperialism. Many Japanese soldiers departed from Taiwan on their way to invade China, the Philippines and South East Asia. To ensure Taiwanese would support the war, the Japanese colonial government carried out a series of policies

that aimed at transforming Taiwanese into loyal subjects of the Japanese emperor (Chang, 1995,p.84; Chen, 1996,p.367).

The Japanese attempted to completely replace Chinese culture by Japanese culture so they began to forbid Taiwanese from studying Chinese or speaking Taiwanese dialects. The Japanese also stopped offering Chinese courses at Taiwan's schools. In addition, the government no longer allowed newspapers to print partly in Chinese (Chang, 1995,p.82; Chen, 1996,p.368; Gold, 1986,p.44; Hsieh, 1996,p.49).

As the war to invade China became increasingly heated, the Japanese colonial regime was more devoted to eliminating the influences of Chinese culture in Taiwan. Therefore, Chinese style temples were destroyed. The Taiwanese were prohibited from wearing Chinese style clothes and from celebrating the Chinese New Year. By 1940, the colonial government began to ask the Taiwanese to adopt Japanese names and abandon their original Chinese names (Chang, 1995,p.82; Chen, 1996,pp.368-369; Gold, 1986,p.44; Hsieh, 1996,p.49; Li, 1996,p.81).

Although the Japanese wartime mobilization was supported by a few Taiwanese, it caused much more resentment among Taiwan's local population (Geoffroy, 1997,p.37). Instead of diminishing Taiwanese's national identity, the mobilization stimulated the growth of Taiwanese consciousness. In addition, anti-Japanese sentiment became more widespread around the island although the Taiwanese dared not openly challenge the colonial policies (Shih, 1996,p.98).

### **Chinese take-over**

After 50 year of Japanese colonization, Taiwan was returned to China in 1945. Originally Taiwanese saw it as a chance for them to gain democracy and dignity. However, the Chinese nationalist government and Chinese from the mainland

disappointed them. The KMT's early rule did not have significant differences to Taiwan's population from the previous Japanese regime. To most of them, there was only one difference: Chinese took the places of Japanese and became their new masters.

Taiwanese were described as sincerely welcoming their Chinese compatriots and as enthusiastically expecting Taiwan's return to China (Chen, 1996,pp.397-398; Wakabayashi, 1997,p.68; Wu, 1995,pp.16-17). This is well illustrated in the following spectator's remark:

From across Taiwan, the old and the young, women and men, had converged on Taipei and Keelung. Hordes of people had come, living in hotels and crowding the homes of relatives and friends. No hotel vacancies could be found, and even the inns in the cities' outskirts were filled with a week before the troops were to arrive. Every day and night, people lined up on the fifth floor of the Keelung Harbor Service Office, or climbed to the top of the hills on Sheliiao Island to look out over the waves rushing in from the Pacific, wondering all the while when the troop ships from the mother country would arrive. Upon seeing a troop ship, crowds began to set off firecrackers and wave the national flag. Line after line of people clapped and cheered. This crazy swirl of welcoming cries rent the sky, and it seemed as if the earth shook.... Never had the Taiwanese assembled in such a way to greet military troops. At that time, even the poorest villagers had come to build a great decorative way to welcome the soldiers as they passed through. Throngs of people slaughtered pigs and fowl to feed the weary warriors. In one very poor village, it seems, 300 farms had slaughtered 500 pigs to welcome the officials and troops (Quoted in Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991,pp.47-48).

But the high expectations of their fatherland were shattered when they had many unpleasant encounters with the Mainlanders. Moreover, their slight understanding of the condition of China disillusioned them. They were disappointed at the fact that the equal treatment in education, political participation, employment, jurisdiction and economic freedom that they had longed for but were unable to get during the Japanese administration were still unattainable under KMT rule. Furthermore, some inequitable policies of the Chinese KMT

government also increased the tension between Taiwanese and Chinese. Their conflict was so severe that once it did erupt, it was too serious to solve. From then on, frustration and disgust occupied many of their minds so much that they started feeling regret to have thought that uniting with China would bring them better lives. Many refused to view themselves as Chinese any longer. A small incident on the 27<sup>th</sup> of February 1947 worsened their conflict with mainland Chinese when it turned into an island-wide uprising on the next day, and resulted in a massacre of Taiwanese by Chinese soldiers.<sup>28</sup> This incident unexpectedly influenced Taiwan's politics for the coming decades. The details of the incident and the consequent Taiwanese bitterness will be discussed later.

Although both the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party claimed communists played an important part in the uprising, those Taiwanese who dominated the resolution committee<sup>29</sup> of the uprising were supporters of the KMT (Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991,p.138). Furthermore, while Japanese education may have alienated the Taiwanese from their Chinese origins, Japanese propaganda was not responsible for the conflict, as most anti-KMT Taiwanese in the uprising were the most stubborn anti-Japanese activists (Geoffroy, 1997,p.36). Consequently, to understand how a small accident could trigger an island-wide rebellion, we have to trace deeper roots of Taiwanese resentment, grievance and hatred against mainland Chinese from 1945. Before we explore the reasons for the uprising, however, let us first understand what happened on 27 February 1947.

## **228 Incident**

On February 27, 1947, a poor forty-year-old Taiwanese

<sup>28</sup> The event has been remembered as the 228 Incident.

<sup>29</sup> A committee was set up by the Taiwanese to solve the problems causing by

widow, Lin Chiang-mai, was beaten by Monopoly Bureau agents, who disregarded her begging, when she refused to hand over contraband cigarettes and struggled to get her money and cigarettes back. Several Taiwanese passersby tried to protect her, and one of them was shot accidentally by one of the agents. His subsequent death enraged the Taiwanese crowd. They reported to a nearby police station and demanded the KMT government execute the agent who killed the passerby (Cohen, 1991,p.11; Gold, 1986,p.50; Li, 1996,p.264; Long, 1991,p.54; Mendel, 1970,p.31; Shih, 1996,pp.221-222).

The spread of the news attracted six or seven hundred people to the Police Bureau. The Taiwanese wanted the killer executed and demanded the KMT government hand all agents involved in the incident over to them. The KMT's promise to investigate and to punish these agents after an investigation could not satisfy the Taiwanese crowd. And the incident mobilized an island-wide anti-KMT political movement from the next day.

It was obvious that the incident was only a catalyst. The true reason behind the Taiwanese's gathering and protest was that they believed they had suffered too long ever since the KMT government ruled Taiwan. And their hatred was deep-rooted already. We can see this point from the fact that some of the young people of the crowd shouted, "The Taiwanese want revenge now!". They even announced that "[a]nyone who does not come out and assemble is not real Taiwanese!" (Quoted in Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991,p.105; Shih, 1996,p.223)

The angry crowd even captured the office of Taiwan Hsin-sheng-pao (The Taiwan New Life Daily). They demanded the paper report the incident. Meanwhile, as the crowd continued their protest, more Taiwanese joined their action when they

the 228 incident.

became aware of the incident (Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991,p.105; Shih, 1996,p.222).

We can also see Taiwanese's resentment toward China from the fact that they even removed characters for "China" (Chung-kuo) from signs on the China Hotel and the Bank of China and replaced them with a Japanese banner reading "Down with Military Tyranny." on February 28 1947. They also beat two officials of the Monopoly Bureau to death (Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991,p.105).

As the crowd marched, they finally occupied the Taiwan Radio Station and broadcast to the Taiwanese people, asking them to gather at the New Park and to join their march to the headquarters of the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office. By that time Taiwan had about 100,000 radio sets so the broadcast was influential (Chang, 1995,p.127; Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991,p.106; Mendel, 1970,p.32; Shih, 1996,p.226; Wakabayashi, 1997,p.73).

The situation became worse when Taiwanese began to ask questions of passersby in Japanese<sup>30</sup>, and to beat and curse Mainlanders who could not speak Japanese (Chang, 1995,pp.127-128; Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991,p.106; Mendel, 1970,p.32; Shih, 1996,p.225). Their anger had become so severe that they hated everything related to China and Chinese. As a consequence, some innocent Chinese were beaten severely or even killed as Wang K'ang, a Shanghai journalist, described<sup>31</sup>

<sup>30</sup> It was said they would ask passersby first in Taiwanese. If the person couldn't speak Taiwanese, they would ask questions again in Japanese or ask people to sing the Japanese national anthem. This was because Taiwanese was not the only dialect of Taiwanese people. By the time the KMT took over Taiwan, the majority of Taiwanese could speak Japanese regardless of their dialect background. Therefore, Taiwanese used Japanese to distinguish their fellows from Mainland Chinese since the majority of the latter group could not speak Japanese.

<sup>31</sup> It is believed, however, generally speaking, Taiwanese did not beat or kill Mainlanders indiscriminately. The majority of the Mainlanders who were attacked were people like corrupt civil servants whom Taiwanese hated

(Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991,p.106):

Some Mainlanders were beaten on the head, and blood flowed; some had fallen to the ground and were gasping for breath. Just at that same moment, a passenger train had disgorged its passengers. Some of them, Mainlanders, had just emerged from the railway station only to be beaten severely; many were wounded and others killed. They never knew why they were attacked. there were two military men dressed in their uniforms strolling hand in hand down the street. They were quickly surrounded by Taiwanese, who used their fists and rocks to beat them. They were bleeding severely and groaning in pain, and the crowd still continued to beat them (Quoted in Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991,pp.106-107).

The broadcasts also induced people in the nearby cities of Keelung and Pan-ch'iao to violence. They believed Taiwan's problems were all the Mainlanders' fault. They shouted "rice is expensive because the Mainlanders are eating all of it. The Mainlanders have only come to cheat us, and we are now worse off!" (Quoted in Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991,p.107; Shih, 1996,p.226).

Taiwanese eagerness for self-rule and democracy also reveals itself in their slogans like "Let Taiwan rule itself!" "Let's Have a New Democracy!" and "The Taiwanese should immediately rise up, struggling for their bread and fight for freedom and democracy!" (Chang, 1995,p.130; Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991,p.106; p.110) When they controlled Taipei's city radio station, they also urged Taiwanese to attack corrupt official by making broadcasts:" The provincial government's corrupt officials and underlings are all in it together with the military police and local officials. They allow our rice to be sent

although some not so rational Taiwanese did kill some innocent Mainlanders. Furthermore, it was reported that many Taiwanese protected innocent Mainlanders from danger.



abroad, so that the people do not have enough grain and are dying of starvation. Since we are dying of starvation, why not rise up and survive?" (Quoted in Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991,p.107; Shih, 1996,p.226).

As Taiwanese were mobilized to join the rebellion, the animosity, frustration, and bitterness of the Taiwanese towards the Mainlanders that had increased in the year and a half since the KMT came to Taiwan were released in the revolt. The violence continued for two weeks until a Resolution Committee was set up by Taiwanese elite and government officials who attempted to find a solution and retain social peace and order. They filled the vacuum left by Mainlanders who fled as a result of the violence. They formed a Resolution Committee and held daily mass meetings to listen to popular complaints and demands (Chang, 1995,pp.128-136; Cohen, 1991,p.11; Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991,p.135; Shih, 1996,pp.231-232). Since the whole island was controlled by the Taiwanese, the Administrator-General of Taiwan, Chen-I, agreed to receive the Committees' suggestions of reforms by March 10 and promised not to bring more troops into Taiwan (Mendal, 1970,p.32; Gold, 1986,p.51).

Nevertheless, Chen broke his promises soon when more than 13,000 soldiers were sent from the mainland, beginning on March 8, to suppress the rebellion. Thousands of people were killed during the slaughter carried out by Chinese troops. Most of them were potential Taiwanese political leaders such as students, doctors, newspaper editors, lawyers, the Resolution Committee members and anyone who was considered involving in the uprising (Chang, 1995,p.145; Cohen, 1991,p.12; Gold, 1986,p.51; Lin, 1996,pp.92-93; Long, 1991,p.54) Many innocent civilians were also murdered. Numerous Taiwanese were compelled to take refuge in Japan and Hong Kong (Cohen,

1991,p.12; Mendel, 1970,p.37) .The cruelty of the KMT army infuriated the Taiwanese, some of them even transferred their hate toward the KMT to all Mainlanders and they determined to build up an independent Taiwanese nation (Chang, 1995,p.154; Lai, Myers & Wei ,1991,pp.183-193).

But how could a small incident arouse such a large scale rebellion? To answer this question, we have to know how KMT rule and the cultural conflict with Mainlanders affected Taiwanese life after 1945.

### **KMT rule between 1945 to 1947**

During the Second World War, Taiwan had lost many of its agriculture and industrial foundations due to the American bombings. As a consequence, inflation became a problem when agriculture and industrial production declined, and when Taiwan lost its connection to Japan, its major economic partner, after the war was over. When Chen-I, Taiwan's first Chinese Governor-General, arrived in Taiwan, he energetically started putting Taiwan's agricultural and industrial sectors under the KMT government's control. This move, in addition to his many other economic policies, worsened the inflation problem.

Chen-I also allowed Mainland Chinese to take all important posts left by the Japanese. He justified this policy by claiming that Taiwanese did not have required skills and could not speak Mandarin. But it was not convincing to the Taiwanese, because they found the government was full of unqualified Chinese who had relatives in high positions. Furthermore, some Japanese still kept their jobs although they spoke no Mandarin. Therefore, Taiwanese were annoyed by the unfair treatment (Geoffroy, 1997,p.45-46).

Chen-I's unwillingness to speak Japanese also affected his rule. Although he was a fluent Japanese speaker, Chen refused

to speak Japanese, the language spoken by most Taiwanese in addition to their mother tongues, during his administration of Taiwan. Although his decision might be a posture of national pride, it hindered him from communicating with Taiwanese people and from learning their needs, since he could not speak the local dialect. The significance of the language issue will be discussed later when we talk about the language barrier between Taiwanese and Mainlanders. His extraordinary loyalty to his subordinates also posed another problem. Because he never dismissed them even if they were reported to be corrupt, some inefficient and greedy officials kept working in the government. And their misbehavior angered Taiwanese.

### **Misbehavior of the Mainlander civil servants and soldiers**

After 50 years of Japanese rule, Taiwanese were used to the efficiency and discipline of the Japanese bureaucracy and soldiers, although they hated the discriminative policies and harsh rule. As a consequence, it was unendurable when they realized the KMT's bureaucracy and troops were not as highly trained and disciplined as their Japanese counterparts.

Peng Ming-min, a well-known Taiwanese nationalist, recalled how his father described the disappointment and shame Taiwanese felt when they first saw KMT troops landing in Taiwan:

The ship docked, the gangways were lowered, and off came the troops of China, the victors. The first man to appear was a bedraggled fellow who looked and behaved more like a coolie than a soldier, walking off with a carrying pole across his shoulder, from which was suspended his umbrella, sleeping mat, cooking pot, and cup. Others like him followed, some with shoes, some without. Few had guns. With no attempt to maintain order or discipline, they pushed off the ship, glad to be on firm land, but hesitant to face the Japanese lined up and saluting smartly on both sides. My father wondered what the Japanese could possibly think. He had never felt so ashamed in his life. Using a Japanese expression, he said, "If there had been a hole nearby, I would have crawled in!" (Quoted in Wachman, 1994, p.94).

The KMT army's abuse of ordinary civilians, such as refusing to pay bills and even stealing, and the government's corruption also irritated the Taiwanese. Taiwanese had been so used to the safety and order, which the Japanese colonial government supplied, that they could not tolerate the chaos that the Chinese Nationalist government had brought them. What tormented them most was that the culture of their fatherland to which they had aspired was verified to be a backward culture in their eyes:

We all took up flags and went to welcome them [the KMT]... President Chiang has come to take over Taiwan! That was really how we felt entering the embrace of our fatherland. But although we genuinely accepted the mainland takeover, we immediately began to sense the conflict of culture. Moreover, the conflict of culture was extremely intense. It was discovered that the Japanese culture which we had originally loathed was, as compared to the culture of our fatherland, a strong culture, superior culture. And the culture of the rulers[the KMT] is a worthless, inferior kind of barbaric culture.... That kind of conflict was extremely intense and transformed us from the heights of identification to the height of hostility (Quoted in Wachman, 1994,p.95).

The residents of Taiwan did not comprehend, nevertheless, their *compatriots* from the mainland had suffered from the continuous calamities of war and the decline of their country ever since the middle of the Ching dynasty (from 1839)<sup>32</sup>. The Mainlanders could not afford to have relatively well-off and dignified lives such as the Taiwanese. Furthermore, they were unaware that the unstable conditions in Mainland China after World War II had finished would trigger a renewal of the civil

<sup>32</sup> In 1839, the Ching dynasty signed China's first unequal treaty with the

war in 1947. This impeded the Chinese government from meeting their expectations. On the other hand, those Mainlanders also failed to understand the grievances of the Taiwanese, who were colonized and oppressed by another nation. Amazed at the prosperity of Taiwan compared with China, they utilized Taiwan's resources without paying attention to Taiwanese feelings (Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991, pp.49-51).

In addition, attitudes toward the Japanese also kept them apart. Ever since the first Sino-Japanese War from 1894 to 1895, Japan had been one of the worst enemies of China. Japan's aggressive ambition hurt Chinese even worse when it formally invaded China in 1931. The Chinese remembered the humiliation and pain such as brutal and violent torture and rape by the Japanese with bitterness<sup>33</sup>. Their aversion to Japanese was so strong that they hated anything that had something to do with Japan. On the other hand, however, Taiwanese did not have such bitterness toward Japanese. Although they did hate Japanese for their harsh rule and discrimination, they had been Japanized to consciously or unconsciously be accustomed to the Japanese life style. Furthermore, the Japanese colonial government's endless effort to eliminate Chinese influence from Taiwanese also molded them to be more like Japanese than Chinese. And this was intolerable and incomprehensible for those Chinese Mainlanders. Therefore, they viewed Taiwanese more like enemies or traitors than brothers and sisters, and their hatred toward Japan also hindered them from harmoniously coexisting with the Taiwanese.<sup>34</sup>

Great Britain. The treaty signified the beginning of the Ching's decline.

<sup>33</sup> The rape of Nanking was one of the most well-known examples of Japanese cruel torture towards the innocent Chinese civilians, especially women.

<sup>34</sup> Those Mainland Chinese forgot the fact that Taiwanese did not choose to be colonized by the Japanese. It was China's Ching dynasty that gave Taiwan up. After fifty years of Japanese colonial rule, it was quite natural for the Taiwanese to be more like Japanese than Chinese.

Language barriers also created mutual misunderstanding and bitterness. Since most Taiwanese could not speak Mandarin, and most Mainlanders spoke neither local dialects nor Japanese, the language problem created misunderstanding and even conflict among them.<sup>35</sup> We may see how communication problems occurred due to the lack of a common language between Chinese and Taiwanese from this example:

Most Taiwanese could not understand Mandarin very well. One day, a military officer who had been wounded arrived at the National Taiwan University hospital. The doctor informed him that his wound was not serious. The doctor's pronunciation was not very clear in Mandarin. The military officer thought the doctor had insulted him by saying, "You are a traitor." As a result, the officer beat the doctor, and the soldier who had brought the officer in even joined in the beating. This matter was brought before the police for judgment, and both parties realized that language misunderstanding had been the cause of the violence. The doctor had said, "Ni-te ping hen ch'ing" [Your illness is not serious], and the officer had mistaken that to mean "Ni shih Han-chien" [You are a traitor] (Quoted in Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991, p.94).

Chen-I's language policy also annoyed Taiwanese. He asked Taiwanese to learn Chinese and forbade them to use Japanese or local dialects. It was estimated that seventy percent of Taiwan's population spoke Japanese at that time so the policy was in fact depriving them of their rights "to express their opinions on public occasions, to receive information, and even to discuss problems" (Quoted in Geoffroy, 1997, p.40). Many Taiwanese writers also had to give up their writing since they could not write in Chinese. They felt Chinese forced them to

<sup>35</sup> China has many dialects because almost all of its provinces have their own dialects. While some are similar, some are very different. Both Mandarin and Taiwanese dialects were local dialects of different provinces in China. While Mandarin was the dialect of China's capital in the north, Beijing, before it became the official language of all Chinese, the dialect spoken by the majority of Taiwanese was derived from the dialect of a southern province of China, Fukien. These two dialects are mutually incomprehensible.

learn another language just as Japanese had done. Some of them even had the feeling that they were colonized again; the only difference was that this time, the master was Chinese instead of Japanese.

### **The conflict between Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese**

When Chen-I, Taiwan's first Chinese Governor-General, and his subordinates arrived in Taiwan, Taiwan's economic development had been far more advanced than any province in China. The living standard of Taiwanese was also higher than anywhere in China (Lin, 1996,p.78; Wu, 1995,p.17). But those Chinese officials did not view Taiwan as a liberated territory, instead, they saw it as a conquered land, so they considered Taiwan's resources and properties as their war trophies (Chang, 1995,p.112; Lin, 1996,p.78). They kept telling Taiwanese that Taiwan's population should thank Chinese who sacrificed their lives and fought for eight years in the anti-Japanese war so Taiwanese could be liberated from brutal Japanese colonialism. They even jeered and abused Taiwanese by calling them disgraceful names such as "subjugated slaves", which caused the Taiwanese considerable resentment, and looked down upon them because Taiwanese thought and lived like Japanese (Chang, 1995,p.112; Shih, 1996,pp.217-218).

Under these circumstances, Taiwanese identity gradually changed. They started to doubt that Mainland Chinese sincerely saw them as countrymen. A famous Taiwanese elite, Lin Mao-Sheng, illustrated Taiwanese's disappointment and disillusion when he talked to his son:

They Chinese constantly say we [Taiwanese] are [their] compatriots, but in fact, they treat us even worse than the Japanese did. They occupy all government posts, power and profit. They treat Taiwanese as if [we are] tools and slaves. They think Taiwanese are inferior (Quoted in Li, 1996,p.226).

The Chinese's hatred toward Japan was understandable because the Japanese ambition to annex China had tormented China's population for a long time. But their antipathy toward Japanese culture was irrational. Because they hated Japanese, generally speaking, Mainland Chinese tended to overlook Japanese's better-developed political, economic and social achievements. Many of them still considered Japan as a *backward* country that benefited a lot from learning the civilization of ancient China. After Japan surrendered at the end of the Second World War, many Chinese also transferred their animosity toward the Japanese to the Taiwanese, because they noticed Taiwanese were too much like Japanese after 50 years colonial experience under the Japanese empire.

Because they suffered tortures and humiliations from the Japanese and they were proud of their past heritage, Chinese had feelings of both inferiority and self-conceit when they faced Japanese. After Japan lost the war, many Chinese sought vengeance to make up for the loss of their self-esteem from Japan's aggression. When Taiwan was returned to China, some Chinese vented their anger on Taiwanese instead of Japanese. Therefore, Taiwanese became the scapegoats of Japanese colonialism, although they were also its victims. This was one reason for the hostility between Taiwanese and Chinese. In other words, Chinese discriminative policies as well as their many wrongdoings and their massacre of Taiwanese after the 228 Incident were partly due to this contradictory attitude toward the Japanese (Chiang, 1995,p.61).

Moreover, because they regarded Taiwan as a colonized land, Chinese discriminated against the Taiwanese politically and economically. Many American watchers believed when the Second World War was over, most Taiwanese happily



celebrated the end of Japanese colonial rule. Many Taiwanese, as mentioned earlier, were also delighted to see Taiwan return to the embrace of their fatherland, China. They believed they would no longer be second-class citizens, as they had been under Japanese rule, so they could get equality and dignity. But although Chinese called Taiwanese *fellow countrymen* after they took over Taiwan, they did not trust Taiwanese. In addition, Taiwanese, especially those who were rich or well-educated, were considered as collaborators of Japanese colonialism and became targets of blackmail and purges (Lin, 1996,p.81).

Furthermore, the Chinese controlled the police and secret police. They were partial toward those Chinese who committed crimes by pressuring judges. Under Japanese rule, Taiwanese were not granted equal judicial rights as Japanese but the court was generally trusted by Taiwan's population. However, Taiwanese confidence in the courts was shattered when those Mainland Chinese arrived and abused the courts. Although there were many Taiwanese lawyers and judges, the courts were afraid to charge Chinese, so Taiwanese no longer trusted the courts and were no longer willing to solve their grievances and disputes through legal means. Mendel (1970,pp.29-30) depicted the condition in the following words:

Formosans learned not to trust the courts for any redress of grievances against mainlander officials because, even though many lawyers and judges were Formosan, the police and secret police were controlled by Chen Yi<sup>36</sup>. Many mainlander-run economic syndicates had their own independent armed police to enforce blackmail, bribery, and squeeze. When one native Formosan dared to bring charges in a county court against a mainlander policeman who had beaten him, the Formosan judge, as well as court aides sent to arrest the accused policeman, were themselves removed from office, beaten, and presumably killed.

<sup>36</sup> Chen Yi is another way to spell Chen-I's name in English.

As American observers witnessed, post-war Taiwan was separated into two classes after the KMT controlled the island: the ruling Chinese and the ruled Taiwanese. Chen-I's government was like a new colonial regime. What was even worse to the Taiwanese was, however, that Chen's regime was more repressive, more corrupt, more unfair and paid less attention to people's welfare than the Japanese colonial government (Lin, 1996,p.81; Wu, 1995,p.17).

Under fifty years of Japanese colonial rule, the Taiwanese were deeply influenced by Japanese culture in every aspect such as food, clothing, residence and transportation. These had distinguished them from Chinese in language and life style. Furthermore, many well-educated Taiwanese, either indirectly through Japan or directly through other Western countries, were enlightened by modern Western ideas like nationalism and democracy. Since Taiwan was a small island with a good transportation system, foreign cultures could easily affect Taiwan's population. Because Japanese devoted much effort to upgrade Taiwanese's educational level, Taiwanese were generally better educated than Chinese. Their life style was incomprehensible to those Chinese soldiers, many of whom were from poor farmer families from inner China and were illiterate. But Chinese considered themselves as rulers when they landed in Taiwan and were determined to "re-educate" Taiwanese and to eliminate the "evil influence" of Japanese culture on Taiwanese without considering their own relative backwardness compared to Taiwanese. Therefore, the Chinese's ignorant and insulting attitude and behavior was humiliating, hateful and unbearable to the Taiwanese. These all angered and annoyed the Taiwanese (Chang, 1995,pp.96-97, pp.112-117; Lin, 1996,pp.83-84).

Because of their somewhat better education resulting from

Japanese colonialism, Taiwanese were less inclined to tolerate Chinese domination than the masses in China, who were mainly illiterate farmers. Taiwanese knew how to express their anger and dissatisfaction and criticized government officials in newspapers for their corrupt misconduct (Lin, 1996,p.82). This was unimaginable for those corrupt officials who were used to extorting the powerless Chinese masses who could not counter-attack, but had to swallow their grievances. Kerr's remark confirmed this when he uttered: "To neutral observers, it was apparent that the men from the mainland were amazed and baffled to find these despised 'colonials' insistent on their rights before law. These were not the docile, illiterate peasants and coolies they had been accustomed to exploiting on the mainland" (Quoted in Mendel, 1970,p.30).

Chen-I's regime also annoyed Taiwan's population when it claimed that the constitution of the Republic of China, which had been put into effect on December 25,1947 in China, would not be implemented in Taiwan until December 1949.This disappointed the Taiwanese because they believed unless they could elect their representatives at every level of government as the constitution authorized, they were not fully protected (Chang, 1995,p.124; Lin, 1996,p.82).

In sum, the reasons for Taiwanese disharmony with Chinese was the fact that their economic development, social structure and educational standards were too different. While China was still mainly an agricultural and feudal society, Taiwan was on the road to become a modern industrial society by 1945, due to Japan's fifty-year colonial domination. Furthermore, Japanese colonial rule shaped the Taiwanese into a different ethnic group from Mainlanders. Although Taiwanese sincerely wish to be part of the Chinese nation, after two years of discrimination and mistreatment from the Chinese, they had

lost faith in Mainlanders and the KMT government. As a result, the Taiwanese no longer considered themselves as Chinese. And Taiwanese's changing attitude in their national identity resulted in the 228 Incident and the subsequent development of Taiwanese nationalism.

### **Changing Identity**

Taiwanese opposition movements against the KMT resulted from the massacre by the KMT's troops after the 228 Incident. Thousands of people were killed during the slaughter. As mentioned earlier, most of them were potential Taiwanese political leaders such as students, doctors, newspaper editors, lawyers, and anyone who was considered involved in the uprising (Gold, 1986,p51; Wu, 1995,p.17). Some innocent civilians were also murdered. Numerous luckier Taiwanese elite were compelled to take refuge in Japan and Hong Kong (Cohen, 1991,p12). The cruelty of the Chinese Nationalist army infuriated the Taiwanese, and some of them began striving for independence (Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991,pp.183-193). In consequence, the Taiwanese independence movement closely correlates to Taiwan's opposition movement from then on.

The KMT's early corrupt rule between 1945 and 1947 and the Mainlanders' misbehavior were the most important reasons for the 228 Incident. By 1947, the Taiwanese had been so disappointed at the Chinese takeover that their "Chinese" national identity was under threat. The KMT's harsh repression of the 228 Incident sharply reinforced the changes of the identity of some Taiwanese, especially the elite. Their disappointment at the KMT and the Mainland Chinese resulted in the desire for a separate nationhood. Consequently, they began to promote the idea that Taiwanese were not Chinese so they should have their own nation instead of being ruled by the KMT.

We can cite one example to see the change of identity of the Taiwanese. Thomas Liao was a well-known figure of the first generation Taiwanese nationalists. Before 1947, he was in fact an enthusiastic Chinese nationalist. He believed China should have a federal system and every province should have self-rule. If not for his disgust at the KMT government's corruption and inefficiency and the mistreatment of Taiwanese, he would not have become a pro-independence Taiwanese activist (Geoffroy, 1997, p.56; Hsieh, 1996, p.60).

Nevertheless, Liao did not promote Taiwanese independence until he was accused of stirring up the 228 Incident, although he did not participate in it. After the 228 incident, Liao and his followers established the Formosan People's League, and appealed a few times to the United Nations for temporarily putting Taiwan under its trusteeship and to decide Taiwan's future by a plebiscite (Geoffroy, 1997, p.57; Hsieh Li-fa, 1996, p.61).

### **Conclusion**

As mentioned in the previous chapter, although Taiwanese thought they were a distinct group from the Japanese, their nationalist sentiment was still unclear under Japanese rule. In other words, the Taiwanese did not clearly distinguish themselves from the Chinese identity. Their attitude changed sharply when they came into conflict with Mainland Chinese from 1945. And the uprising on February 28, 1947 dramatically intensified Taiwanese identity and pushed them down the road to seeking independence from China and to fulfilling their dream of democracy. The conflict between Taiwanese and Chinese from 1945 when China took over Taiwan was mainly due to their different life experience since 1895. As shown

earlier in chapter 2, shared history plays a significant role in the formation of a nation. After 50 years of separation, Chinese and Taiwanese had become significantly different in their thinking and attitudes. They also had very little mutual understanding. Consequently, the antagonism was hard to avoid once they met each other.

The uprising of February 28, 1947 was a significant event in Taiwan. It demonstrated Taiwanese eagerness to seek democracy and self-rule. Its tragic ending left a scar in Taiwan's political development. It also convinced many Taiwanese that they could rely on nobody else, even Chinese, to have democracy and freedom of their own. And from then on, many of them have striven to have their own nation. However, as a consequence of the KMT's coercive and authoritarian ruling style, Taiwanese were forced to hide their bitterness and became indifferent to politics. On the other hand, of course, the fact that the KMT introduced policies that enticed the Taiwanese to concentrate on making money may also help explain the Taiwanese apathy to politics. Before conditions allowed them to be active in politics, only a few liberal Chinese and Taiwanese dissidents dared to challenge the notorious regime. This will be discussed in the next chapter.

## Chapter Five

### **Under the KMT**

After the 228 Incident, we see two decades without major political movements in Taiwan, until the 1970s. The Taiwanese did not openly challenge the KMT's legitimacy. They endured the KMT's suppression of local dissidents. In this chapter, we will answer the question of why the nationalist and democratic movements were unable to threaten the authoritarian regime during these two decades. To answer the question, we will discuss the KMT's early rule from the following aspects: *structural changes, the political elite's patronage, external influences and legitimacy crises.*

#### **Structural changes**

Due to their close relations with China's landlords in the past, the KMT failed to carry out land reforms in China which would harm the landlord's interests (Ferdinand, 1996, p.39). However, after they lost the civil war in China and retreated to Taiwan, the KMT learned from their failure in China and realized that land reforms must be undertaken in Taiwan if they were to win the support of peasants. Land reforms would also diminish the economic base of Taiwan's landowners to prevent them from challenging the regime ( Berman, 1990, p.296; Chang, 1991, p.2; Ferdinand, 1996, p.39; Jacobs, 1991, p.11; Long, 1991, p.77). Consequently, a series of agricultural reforms between 1949 and 1953 which laid the reliable foundation of later industrial development was adopted. The reforms were very successful in rural areas and the KMT got tremendous patronage from residents of the countryside, especially peasants ( Chang, 1991, pp2-3; Ferdinand, 1996, p.39).

At this stage, Taiwan was still basically an agriculture society. In 1952, 35.9 percent of Taiwan's population worked in agriculture but only 18.0 percent in industry (Tien, 1989, p. 25). In education, literacy rates increased continuously from 56.0 percent in 1950, to 72.9 percent in 1960 to 84.7 percent in 1969 (Chan & Clark, 1992, pp. 165-166).

The progress in communication begun by the Japanese was advanced under the KMT's rule. The number of newspapers and broadcasting stations increased. Before the KMT abolished Martial Law in 1987, 31 newspapers had existed in Taiwan since 1961. Broadcasting stations increased from 5 under Japanese rule to 33 before 1987 (Chan & Clark, 1992, p. 170; Chi, 1996, pp. 125-126; Tien, 1989, pp. 196-197). As a result of Martial Law, however, this growth had very little impact on either nationalist or democratic movements because these communication media were strictly owned or controlled by the KMT and were under severe censorship. They were only allowed to promote propaganda of the regime. Education was even more influential in the effort of thought control by the regime so we shall mention it in more detail.

Ever since Chen-I set up the regime in Taiwan, the KMT had indoctrinated the Taiwanese with Chinese nationalism. From elementary schools to university, students were required to learn Chinese literature, history, and geology. The KMT's official ideology, The Three Principles of the People, was also a compulsory subject of study for those who intended to pass the university entrance examination. One passage may help us to see how the KMT utilizes education to implant Chinese nationalism in Taiwanese:

My daughter now is in high school. She has to memorize all the cities, all the agricultural products, and industrial products of every province [of China], the weather, the rivers, and the natural resources. Everything. We had to memorize all this before, thirty years ago. I forget everything. Now, my daughter ... has to memorize what I had memorized and we



know so little about Taiwan....we are forbidden to learn. We have no access. No resource. Some get into trouble when they began to know about Taiwan... people feel you are associated with independence or the opposition. (Quoted in Wachman, 1994, pp. 82-83)

Through education and control of media and communication, the KMT convinced many post-war born Taiwanese of their Chinese identity. Considering himself or herself as a member of Chinese nation, many Taiwanese accepted the KMT's undemocratic rule because the party promised it will recover China one day and guarantee all Chinese, including Taiwanese, to enjoy democracy.

Because Taiwan did not have fundamental structural changes under the KMT's early rule, Taiwanese nationalist and democratic movements were not very prevalent as a result of the lack of leaders and supporters. The KMT's propaganda and suppression also played important roles in preventing anti-KMT movement, either nationalist or democratic, from growing.

### **Political elite's patronage**

During the KMT's early rule, opposition elite was still weak in their power to demand reform and bargain with the ruling elite. And the ruling group had very few changes. Important government posts were in Mainlanders' hands. Furthermore, the KMT's leader, Chiang Kai-shek was the only and ultimate power-holder for decades. The KMT justified its dictatorship by claiming that it was necessary as a result of the Chinese communist party's rebellion in China.

The KMT's dictatorship and Mainlanders' privileges started from 1945 when Chen-I, the Taiwan governor, led KMT troops and officials landing in Taiwan. After the 228 Incident, Chen-I was replaced, but the KMT's policies that favored Mainlanders and discriminated against Taiwanese continued. In other words, Taiwanese were still in a subordinate position under the KMT's rule. Chiang Kai-shek's life-long position as

president solidified the authoritarian tendency of the KMT regime. The Temporary Provisions during the Period of National Crisis were implemented in China and Taiwan after 1947. They replaced the Chinese constitution, valid from 1946. The Provisions granted the President of the Republic of China limitless powers.

To justify their legitimacy to rule the island after they lost Mainland China, the KMT claimed that the whole country (R.O.C) was in an emergency situation due to the communist rebellion, so the constitution should be suspended until China was reunited by the KMT. Thus, Martial Law was announced and all the human rights guaranteed by the constitution were frozen. Furthermore, in order to ensure each province of China had its own representatives, the right to elect the members of both national representative bodies, the Legislature Yuan and the National Assembly, was to be postponed until China was recovered.

Between 1949 and 1975, opposition candidates were only permitted to compete with KMT candidates in local elections, but no national opposition organizations were allowed (Domes,1993,pp119-120). In addition, dissidents were severely oppressed.

To sum up, under the KMT's early rule, the ruling group was composed primarily of Mainlanders. For fear that they might lose political power in Taiwan because they were a minority group, it is understandable that the Mainlanders would not allow demand for democracy or for Taiwanese independence to grow; these demands would threaten their regime. Accordingly, Taiwanese did not get equal opportunities in the political arena. Furthermore, nationalist and democratic movements were severely suppressed under the KMT's early rule.

### **External influences**

The U.S. and Japan are the most important foreign countries in Taiwan's modern political development. Because the US was afraid that the Soviet Union and China might co-operate, its government supported the KMT's undemocratic regime during the Cold War. Support and aid from the American government were always a foundation of the legitimacy of the KMT's one-party dictatorship.

Originally the Truman administration adopted a hands-off policy regarding Taiwan when the KMT lost China and retreated to Taiwan. But the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June, 1950 caused Washington to believe that the existence of Taiwan was in the US interest, because of China's slogan to aid Korea and to oppose America. Therefore, Taiwan became seen as essential to the security of the Pacific and the US in that area. From then on, the US Seventh Fleet was sent twice to the Taiwan Strait to protect the small island from China's attacks. Furthermore, the US government also continuously supplied the ROC with economic and military aid, and had military bases in Taiwan until the mid-seventies.

As a result of their economic and military aid, American influence had a significant two-fold effect on Taiwan's domestic politics. On the one hand, its endorsement of the KMT solidified the dictatorial regime. On the other hand, however, the American government also used their aid to push the regime to take on a series of economic reforms that led to the emergence of Taiwan's middle class<sup>37</sup> as Taiwan's economy took off. This changed Taiwan's politics as a consequence. Furthermore, pressure from the US government also eased the KMT's

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<sup>37</sup> Although the Taiwanese middle class first appeared under Japanese rule, they were not a large group. Under the KMT, another group of new middle class emerged. They were educated in Chinese and larger in number,

coercive actions against political dissidents.

Japan was less influential compared with the US. But it provided a shelter for Taiwanese nationalists. After the 1947 massacres, many Taiwanese sought exile in Japan. They conducted research on the origins of Taiwanese nationalism and provided theoretical foundations for the later political movement for independence (Cohen,1991,pp.281-282). Under the leadership of Thomas Liao<sup>38</sup>, they established a Provisional Government of the Republic of Formosa. In the 1950s and 1960s, Japan was the overseas anti-KMT activity center that attracted the largest population of Taiwanese nationalists. Later other Taiwanese association were created in Japan as well. For instance, the Taiwan Youth Association(Formosan Association in English ) was established in 1960 with Wang Yu-teh<sup>39</sup> as its first chairperson. Shih-Ming<sup>40</sup> also established the Association for Taiwanese Independence in 1967.

Japan attracted so many early Taiwanese nationalists due to its 50 years of colonial rule over Taiwan. The sympathy of Japanese politicians and people toward Taiwanese nationalism was another factor. Despite pressure from the KMT, the Japanese government seldom deported Taiwanese. Consequently, Japan became an important base for the development of Taiwanese nationalism. But as more Taiwanese went abroad for further studies in the United States, the U.S. gradually became a more significant place for the growth of

compared to their earlier Japanese-educated counterparts.

<sup>38</sup>Thomas Liao was a US-trained engineering Ph.D. was a professor of a university in China. Between 1945 and 1946, he also worked for Taiwan's government led by Chen-I (Geoffroy, 1997, pp.55-56).

<sup>39</sup> Wang was born in a rich family. Although he didn't get his Ph.D. from Tokyo University due to the interruption of the Pacific War, he was a well-known linguist, writer and intellectual (Geoffroy,1997,p.60).

<sup>40</sup> Shih-Ming got his Bachelor of Political Science in Japan. He had personal experience of fighting the war of resistance against Japan's invasion of China with the Chinese Communist Party (Geoffroy,1997,p.63).

Taiwanese nationalism, beginning in the 1960s (Kuan,1994,p.116).

### **Legitimacy Crises**

The KMT's first legitimacy crisis, as shown in chapter 4, happened in 1947 when Taiwanese initiated an uprising against mainlanders and the KMT. At the beginning of the 228 incident, Taiwanese were able to overthrow the KMT regime. Because the Taiwanese believed in Chen-I's promises to undertake reform in Taiwan, the KMT was able to solve the legitimacy crisis by killing and coercion. The KMT's cruelty toward dissidents frightened Taiwan's population so much that few of them were brave enough to threaten the regime afterwards. Consequently, the KMT did not face another serious legitimacy crisis after the 228 incident until early 1970s. Although there were challenges both from abroad and from within Taiwan, they never won island-wide support to threaten the KMT regime.

Two years after the 228 incident, the KMT lost the civil war with the Chinese communists and retreated to Taiwan , in 1949. It suppressed political dissidents with all possible means. Security agents were almost everywhere, especially on campuses and in working places. Anyone who called for the implementation of democracy or promoted the Taiwanese independence movement was jailed or even executed. Sometimes the regime even arrested innocent people who might simply be unlucky enough to know people who made "subversive" demands.

Under Martial Law, those who "threatened national security" were tried by courts martial. Due to the secret trials and continuous physical torture, people were often forced to admit to offences they never committed. Consequently, the price to challenge the KMT was so high that Mainlanders and Taiwanese alike were afraid to speak out. During the long

darkness in politics, however, there were still some brave dissidents who criticized the regime and demanded political reform. These political demands started from the publication of the well-known journal, *Free China*.

### **Political movement**

#### **Free China**

In consequence of the regime's authoritarian characteristics, dissidents usually faced severe oppression (Domes, 1993, p120). Led by pro-democracy KMT supporters like Hu Shih and Lei Chen<sup>41</sup>, *Free China* was at first even supported by the KMT. The regime intended to use the journal to win American support by showing it was a 'democratic' regime that allowed free criticism. As the critiques toward it became harsh, however, the KMT withdrew its endorsement and began to crush the journal and people like Lei.

From 1955 to 1960, articles by scholars, native Taiwanese dissidents, and former KMT officials dissatisfied with the authorities appeared in *Free China*. They questioned the KMT's ruling style and demanded political reforms to replace the KMT's one-party rule with pluralism and demanded it give up the myth of recovering the mainland (Berman, 1990, pp.247-249). In October 1956, the journal published a special issue in which several articles criticized Chiang Kai-shek, the KMT party leader and president of the Republic of China, for his dictatorial leadership style. They recommended Chiang find a successor and establish a cabinet system. In late 1956, a professor at National Taiwan University, Yin Hai-kuang<sup>42</sup> also criticized the

<sup>41</sup> Hu Shih was famous for his role in China's pro-democratic May Fourth Movement in 1919. Hu got his Ph.D. in the US. Lei Chen was a follower of Hu. Lei graduated from Japan's Kyoto University.

<sup>42</sup> Yin Hai-kuang was trained in China. According to his student, however, he was deeply influenced by a very pro-liberalism scholar at university so he admired western civilization, especially science and democracy (Lin, 1990, p.312).

regime for its authoritarian policies and its application of emergency law. In addition, he questioned Chiang's claim that "the KMT was the government and the KMT government was the nation"(Chiou,1993,p.32).

Lei Chen also attempted to form an opposition party, the Chinese Democratic Party, with support from some of the Taiwanese intellectual political elite who luckily escaped the 228 Incident, such as Kuo Yu-hsin and Hsu Shih-hsien<sup>43</sup> (Berman, 1990, p.251;Chiou, 1993, p.33; Kuan,1994,p.109). But the attempt was interrupted when Lei and the editor of his journal, Fu Cheng were arrested on the 4<sup>th</sup> of September 1960. Lei was accused of untrue charges of 'making propaganda for the communist bandits', and 'knowing a communist bandit but not reporting on him' and he was jailed for ten years as a result (Berman,1990,pp.251-252).

After the attempt to form an opposition party with liberal Chinese failed, Taiwanese dissidents continued their struggle for democracy and self rule through participation in local elections, because these local elections were their only channel to voice their demands. There were no substantial parties to compete with the KMT. Furthermore, sovereignty was never an issue at election campaigns due to the KMT's harsh punishment for challenging its claim as the only legitimate government of China.

At the earliest stage after the KMT founded its regime in the island, opposition groups comprised both liberal Mainland intellectuals and local born upper class Taiwanese elite. The KMT's suppression of liberal Chinese not only "impaired the growth of democratic movements in Taiwan for the next decade", it also "ended any possibility of reconciliation between the Taiwanese and the Mainlanders, of bridging the painful gap

<sup>43</sup> Kuo Yu-hsin graduated from Taiwan's only university under Japanese rule, Taihoku Imperial University. Hsu Shih-hsien was the first Taiwanese female to get her medical doctorate in Japan.

between the two groups of people caused by the February 28 Uprising”(Chiu, 1993,p.35). As Chiu puts it, “[i]f the February 28 massacre had pushed many Taiwanese into the irreversible separatist Taiwan independence path, the Lei Chen or *Free China* affair further alienated the Taiwanese people and made them even more committed to the independence cause”(Chiu,1993,p.35). Taiwanese became disillusioned to find it was impossible to have democracy or sovereignty under the KMT without completely overthrowing the regime.

In other words, the failure of the attempt of liberal Mainlanders like Lei Chen and the Taiwanese elite to organize a party in fact convinced the Taiwanese that the KMT would not grant them democracy even if the Taiwanese followed the KMT’s rules within the KMT’s ROC framework. Since the KMT used Chinese nationalism to justify their undemocratic rule, there seemed to be only one ideology that could possibly counter the KMT’s legitimacy and grant the Taiwanese democracy, that is, Taiwanese nationalism. To put it differently, only Taiwanese nationalism could deny the KMT’s claim that Taiwanese were Chinese so they should be ruled by the KMT. As a consequence, Taiwanese nationalism became the Taiwanese’s tool for democracy after the KMT suppressed dissidents like Lei Chen.

One of the reasons that nationalist and democratic movements did not win popular support in Taiwan may be a lack of leadership. First, after the 228 Incident, most Taiwanese elite were either killed or exiled. Second, as noted earlier, the land reform resulted in the decline of landlord economic power. Traditionally, in addition to the educated middle class and bureaucrats, the landlord had composed part of Taiwan’s leadership group for political movements. As a result of the loss



of their lands, however, landlords lost both their ability and interest to participate in politics. Consequently, the Taiwanese could not be efficiently mobilized to challenge the KMT.

### **Changing Identity**

The identity of Taiwanese could divide them into two groups during the KMT's early rule. While the KMT convinced one group to believe in their Chinese ethnicity, the other believed that Taiwanese were different from Chinese due to their disappointment at the KMT and the Mainlanders. Because of the KMT's harsh penalties against Taiwanese nationalists, however, Taiwanese nationalism did not prevail on the island.

But the KMT's severe repression of the activities of Taiwanese independence could not exclusively explain why Taiwanese nationalism was not as popular in Taiwan as in the overseas Taiwanese communities. Another more significant factor was that residents of Taiwan had the KMT's official ideology, Chinese nationalism deeply instilled in them. This ideology emphasized the goal of recovering China and opposing Chinese Communists, so they accepted the "imagined community" of the Chinese nation that was invented and propagated by the KMT (Wang, 1996, p. 164).

The KMT also undertook a program to resuscitate traditional Chinese culture. But their version of the *traditional culture* was very selective, and was invented by them. Schools, media, family and the military were all part of this program (Chun, 1994, p. 54). Furthermore, the KMT consistently insisted that they were the guardians of traditional Chinese culture. In addition to preserving national treasures the regime brought when it retreated from China, the KMT criticized the Chinese communists' efforts to simplify Chinese characters. Textbooks were filled with the portrait of how a high civilization, China, advanced in science and technology in ancient history, failed to

face foreign challenges from the mid-nineteenth century, with the sufferings of the Chinese for more than a century as a result. Post-War Taiwanese students have been educated to believe in the superiority of Chinese culture. In addition to learning to be proud of their Chinese cultural heritage, they were always continuously reminded that they have a holy mission to fulfil: to save their brothers and sisters in mainland China from brutal communist rule, to catch up with the advancement of Western civilization and to create a civilization that can match what their ancestors achieved in the glorious past.

In reaction to the Cultural Revolution on the mainland between 1966 to 1976, the KMT initiated a large-scale Cultural Renaissance movement (*wenhua fuxing yundong*) in 1966. Several committees of provincial government and city district and rural township were set up in the following years to carry out the work of promoting the movements in elementary and middle schools (Chun,1994,p.57). The methods these committees employed to undertake their task to spread Chinese culture was summarized by Allen Chun (Chun,1994,p.58):

Within the schools, Cultural Renaissance was an important part of both curricula and extra-curricula programs. Courses on society and ethics as well as citizenship and morality were taught at the elementary and middle-school levels. At the high-school level, introduction to Chinese culture, military education, and thought became a staple part of the curriculum. Outside the classroom, essay and oratory contests on topics pertaining to Chinese culture were regularly held as well as study sessions to discuss current speeches and writings. These were supplemented by activities in other aspects of traditional culture, such as music, dance, folk art, painting, calligraphy and theatre. Moral education, moreover, was not limited to the schools and children. The schools were meant to be a cultural training ground that extended eventually to the family and local community in the form of army training groups, social work teams as well as women's and neighborhood associations. Local organizations usually awarded prizes to model youth, model mothers, model teachers, model farmers and other deserving Samaritans on convenient occasions like Martyr's Day, the birthdays of General Yuefei, the Ming dynasty naval hero Koxinga, the consummate teacher Confucius, and others. Even teachers underwent moral supervision and training by periodically participating in study groups and attending various

talks given by scholars on topics pertaining to Chinese culture.

Not all traditional Chinese culture was encouraged, however. Only the authoritarian aspects of Confucianism were emphasized. The KMT's propaganda efforts were devoted to "filial piety, respect for social authority, and everyday etiquette" (Chun, 1994, p. 60). The KMT's leader, Chiang Kai-shek, was also portrayed as a national hero, even a national savior. He was also labeled as the successor of the founding father of the Republic of China, Dr. Sun Yat-sen. And Sun was described as the successor of the great Confucius. They both inherited China's rich cultural legacy so their status was unchallengeable. Furthermore, challenging the leader was equated with being unnationalist and unpatriotic because Chiang was the *only* person who could lead the Chinese to a bright future.

The KMT created myths to justify its undemocratic rule. It urged Taiwanese to endure the current undemocratic conditions because their brothers and sisters in China were still suffering. It was promised that once the KMT recovered China, Taiwanese could have democracy immediately. The reason they could not elect members of parliament was because, the KMT argued, Chinese on the mainland could not elect their representatives, and if the KMT allowed Taiwanese to elect their MPs, they could only represent local public opinion, not that of the whole of China. Therefore, Taiwanese should wait patiently until the whole of China was united by the KMT again.

By propagandizing the myth of mainland recovery, the KMT was in fact trying to create a Chinese nation in Taiwan. When the KMT claimed that its Republic of China was the only legitimate government of China, Taiwanese nationalists or democrats could be labeled as heretics because they threatened the Chinese nation. The KMT's indoctrination of Chinese nationalism also created a group of Taiwanese who identified

themselves strongly as Chinese so they never challenged the legitimacy of the KMT.

In contrast to their effort to transform Taiwanese into “true” Chinese, the KMT discouraged any development of Taiwanese consciousness, which might threaten their regime. Consequently, they discouraged the usage of the Taiwanese native dialects and downgraded native Taiwanese culture.

Many Taiwanese had common humiliating experiences in childhood when they spoke their own mother tongue and were punished at schools. The KMT’s policy to promote the *national language*, namely Mandarin, and Chinese culture did make Taiwanese children identify as Chinese in childhood, but it alienated them when they grew up and realized what they learned from textbooks was only propaganda and myths. The influence of the KMT’s indoctrination is clear if we examine the following passage:

Under KMT indoctrination... we not only don’t know much about Taiwan... we learn[ed] to despise Taiwanese , Taiwanese language. They said Taiwan has no language, no culture. Taiwanese history started from the day the KMT arrived in Taiwan. Taiwan has no purpose in itself. The purpose of Taiwan is to be a stepping stone to go back to China. It is a transition. It is like a hotel. So, the only hope for Taiwanese is the mainland. The ultimate goal is in the mainland. Everything here is so small. Mountains are small, rivers are so short . [There are] volcanoes, earthquakes. “So, how can we stay here?[ Mainlanders asked.] The KMT brought that kind of philosophy, that kind of view to Taiwan and imposed that ... view on Taiwanese. So, we feel humiliated... downgraded.... We have no hope because we are too small. We have no culture (Quoted in Wachman,1994,pp.111).

In other words, Taiwanese were educated to believe in the superiority of Chinese and their culture. They were not allowed to develop their distinctive identity from the Chinese nation. Due to the effects of both penalties and indoctrination, Taiwanese nationalism was never openly prevalent in Taiwan during the KMT’s early rule.

## Conclusion

We have discussed the KMT's early rule, but see *structural changes, political elite's patronage, external influences and legitimacy crisis* did not have a major positive impact on Taiwan during 1950s to 1960s. So Taiwan's nationalist and democratic movements were not potent between the two decades.

We can conclude this chapter as follows:

First, Taiwan was still basically an agricultural society so it lacked a powerful middle class. Furthermore, many Taiwanese elite were killed in the 228 Incident. As a consequence, structurally speaking, the KMT's ROC did not face major changes during these two decades, so both Taiwanese nationalism and the demand for democracy did not have enough support.

Second, under the KMT's early rule, there was very few changes within the ruling group: both in the composition and the group's attitude. The Mainlanders dominated political power as the Japanese did. As a group, they were hostile to both Taiwanese nationalist and democratic movements so these movements were suppressed.

Third, although both American and Japanese governments provided shelter for some Taiwanese elite, they basically tolerated undemocratic conditions in Taiwan and supported the KMT. Even though the US government occasionally put pressure on the KMT to ease the regime's harsh suppression of local dissidents, the US support of the KMT increased the regime's legitimacy. In sum, although external influences had both positive and negative effects on Taiwan's nationalist and democratic movements during the KMT's early rule, negative effects prevailed over the positive ones in the two decades

between 1950 and 1970.

Fourth, the KMT did not have a significant legitimacy crisis during the two decades. This resulted from both their severe suppression of political dissidents and their indoctrination of Chinese nationalism. The KMT's suppression resulted in Taiwanese indifference toward politics. Furthermore, the Taiwanese lacked leaders as a result of the massacre after the 228 Incident. Accordingly, no island-wide political movement was possible to challenge the KMT. The indoctrination of Chinese nationalism also created a group of post-war Taiwanese who did not doubt the legitimacy of the KMT because they believed in the myth of mainland recovery and the imagined community of the Chinese nation.

To sum up, nationalist and democratic movements were not widespread in Taiwan under the KMT's early rule because the preconditions (*structural changes, the political elite's patronage, external influences and legitimacy crises*) were too immature to support the movements.

## Chapter Six

### **Taiwanization of the KMT**

Because of the KMT's terrifying suppression of political dissidents since the 1950s, very few Taiwanese or Mainlanders dared to challenge the dictatorial regime. Nevertheless, we still see, as the last chapter indicates, some brave liberal Chinese like Lei Chen who attempted to force the KMT to establish democracy in Taiwan although their efforts failed. Then there was a long dark period for those who promoted democracy or Taiwanese nationalism until Taiwan's first opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP afterwards) was formed in 1986. The birth of the DPP was a milestone event in the development of Taiwan's democratization and Taiwanese nationalism so we will discuss it in this chapter. We will also discuss the KMT's Taiwanization and the rise of the DPP from the point of view of *structural changes, the political elite's patronage, external influences and legitimacy crises*.

#### **Structural changes**

Through their indoctrination and oppression, the KMT established a stable authoritarian regime. Nevertheless, as Taiwan's economy took off from the 1960s, social changes such as better education followed economic development. A new middle class came into existence as a result. Well-educated and self-assured, they were no longer satisfied with the limited freedom they had and demanded more political participation and liberties. They took more active roles in politics through advocating opposition movements or participating in social movements.

The emergence of middle class

Since the 1970s, Taiwan has gradually transformed into an industrial society. In 1973, the industrial sector (33.7%) for the first time accounted for a larger share of the workforce than the agriculture sector (30.5%) (Pang, 1993,pp.33-34). Meanwhile, the literacy rate kept increasing from 85.3 percent in 1970 to 89.7 percent in 1980 to 92.6 percent in 1988(Chan & Clark, 1992,p.166). The percentage of college students also rose from 0.12 in 1952,to 0.32 in 1960, to 1.39 in 1970, to 1.92 in 1980 to and 2.49 in 1988 (Chan & Clark, 1992,pp.168-169).

At the same time, Taiwan’s economic success and industrialization also stimulated a growing population of middle class (See Table 6.1). As a group, they replaced the previous majority group of the KMT’s supporters, the farmers, and became a significant group in Taiwan’s society.

Table 6.1 Employment Pattern as a percentage of the Labor Force in Taiwan, 1951-1989.

Year	Professionals & technicians (1)	Administrators & managers (2)	Supervisors & clerks (3)	Salespersons (4)	Servicepersons (5)	Agriculture & forestry workers(6)	Production workers (7)
1951	2.49	0.28	5.70	10.34	6.26	56.07	18.80
1956	3.27	0.35	6.57	9.46	6.57	52.62	21.15
1961	3.91	0.37	7.33	9.27	6.53	49.33	23.34
1966	4.93	0.41	8.32	9.93	7.05	44.53	24.87
1971	4.81	0.44	9.94	11.23	7.20	34.95	31.43
1976	5.18	0.85	10.90	11.73	5.82	28.59	36.92
1981	5.59	0.87	13.32	12.87	7.46	18.60	41.26
1986	6.26	0.85	13.77	13.45	8.57	16.90	40.19
1989	7.12	1.01	15.62	14.77	9.03	12.78	39.67

Source: Pang, 1993,p.37, Table 7.

According to Pang (1993,p.36), Taiwan’s middle class is composed approximately of members from (1) to (5). We can



see the growth of the middle class from the table above. In other words, Taiwan's middle class population increased from 25.07 percent in 1951, to 27.33 percent in 1961, to 33.62 percent in 1971, to 40.14 percent in 1981, and to 47.55 percent in 1989. Although the new middle class are composed of both Mainlanders and Taiwanese, it is certain that the majority of them are Taiwanese.

This type of new Taiwanese middle class is distinctive from the Mainlanders, most of whom rely heavily on the KMT's system of rules, and are mainly soldiers, teachers and civil servants. They differ in several aspects: first, their culture is different from the Mainlanders. They use Taiwanese, the language recognized by the KMT as a dialect and which the KMT prohibited for public usage. Second, the Taiwanese all got a complete post-war "Chinese education", and they all can speak the "national language", Mandarin, without any difficulty. Third, many of them have overseas personal networks through either commercial business or their own overseas study, or that of their friends or their family members. They are freer from the KMT's party-state domination than the Mainlanders (Wakabayashi, 1994, pp.242-243).

In addition, the new middle class is mostly from the private sector, not the bureaucracy or state enterprises. Therefore, the KMT cannot threaten their jobs as in the past. Furthermore, because the new Taiwanese middle class can retreat from politics at any time they encounter the KMT's oppression, many of them became political movement activists. They challenged the KMT's dictatorship and took over the role played by those traditional Taiwanese dissidents who had Japanese education. Therefore, the emergence of the new Taiwanese middle class is an essential condition for the growth of political movements for

democratization and Taiwanese nationalism (Wakabayashi, 1994,p.243).

Since the 1970s, Taiwan's economic development improved the general living standards of Taiwan's population. For instance, the number of television sets per 1,000 population increased from 1.4 in 1963 to 60.1 in 1974. The popularity of telephones also rose from 9.8 per 1,000 population in 1961 to 57.0 in 1974 (Yeh, 1978, p.40). Taiwanese also had disposable income to travel and study abroad and consume foreign products, especially those from the US, such as movies, music, magazines and books. Accordingly, as Berman puts it, " Increased literacy and higher education levels, coupled with study abroad for the elite, made it difficult to enforce the dictates of the government upon its citizenry." (Berman, 1990, p.290). In other words, higher literacy and experiences of study abroad increased the exposure of the Taiwanese to western ideas such as democracy and nationalism so they became more difficult to control, manipulate or indoctrinate by the KMT regime. Consequently, democracy and Taiwanese nationalism had larger potential Taiwanese proponents.

### **Political elite's patronage**

After 1949 when the KMT regime was stabilized, party leaders created a system which favored the Mainlanders, to solidify their support and discourage the Mainlanders from cooperating with the Taiwanese. According to Gates (1981,p 248), the distribution of power between the Taiwanese and the Mainlanders used to be so uneven that the ethnic boundary surpassed class consciousness. In other words, even a poor Mainlander had enough relative advantage over a wealthy Taiwanese that he would not unite with a poor Taiwanese to compete for their class interest.

The Mainlanders' dominion and the KMT's dictatorship changed slowly after Chiang Ching-kuo took control of the government. Chiang began to assume formal ruling power in 1972 when he was nominated as Premier of the Executive Yuan. He became president of the Republic of China later in 1978. He began the process of the KMT's Taiwanization (Domes, 1993,p.121; Lee, 1991,p.495; Liu, 1991,p.201).

Realizing the KMT could not survive without local support, the party had begun to recruit Taiwanese in the 1950s. The status of these Taiwanese KMT members, however, was low, as they had few important posts in the KMT or the government. In the early 1970s, the KMT's myth of "China recovery" completely collapsed after the US established formal diplomatic relations with China, and the PRC entered the United Nations (Chiang, 1995,p.196). To prevent the KMT from losing domestic support, Chiang Ching-kuo accelerated the KMT's Taiwanization by appointing Taiwanese to important government posts that had been dominated by Mainlanders, such as governor of Taiwan province and mayors of Taiwan's two largest cities, Taipei and Kao-hsiung. The number of Taiwanese ministers in the Executive Yuan Cabinet was also increased from three out of nineteen in 1972 to seven out of nineteen by 1986 (Domes, 1993,p.121).

Another change in the ruling group was the fact that the younger and better-educated generation, most of whom were Taiwanese, were gradually included in the decision-making process. After 1969, the KMT recognized that it was impossible to wait for the re-election of the representatives of its three national "elected" organs until the KMT recovered China. To partially meet Taiwanese's expectation of political participation, the regime argued that Taiwan's voters would be able to vote for representatives of "Taiwan's area" in the National Assembly and

the Legislative Yuan because of the population growth in Taiwan (Cohen, 1991,p.22). As a result, representatives of these national organs were composed of two groups. While one group was elected in mainland China in 1947 so they did not have to face election pressure, the other locally-elected group had to worry about losing their seats if they did not win enough votes at the next election.

By the 1980s, the average age of the KMT's life-long representatives was 80 and their numbers began to dwindle rapidly (Cohen, 1991,pp.21-22; Tien, 1989,p.146). This endangered the KMT's claim that a complete re-election should not be undertaken until mainland China was recovered, because these senior representatives had comprised fa'tung (traditional legitimacy). In addition, their younger colleagues were increasingly inclined to reject these senior members' continuing supremacy, because they did not need to respond to the electorate's demand while the former had to compete in winning elections (Domes, 1993, p.122). The younger and better-educated new blood enabled the KMT leaders to be more aware of growing criticisms. This change was another force that pushed the KMT to reform.

Chiang was replaced by his vice president Lee Teng-hui after his death on 13 January 1988. Lee continued the reform. Lee's education in both Japan and the US made him a pro-democratic leader. His Taiwanese background also made him less hostile to Taiwanese nationalism. In fact, many Taiwanese believe Lee is emotionally pro-independence although he repeatedly claimed that he would follow the KMT's traditional policy of reuniting with China. Even though Lee's true intention is unclear, there is one thing for sure, that is, he at least tolerates Taiwanese nationalism and definitely has a strong Taiwanese consciousness and identity. This can be seen from policies under

his leadership.

For instance, under Lee's leadership, Taiwan has actively tried to join many international organizations. The KMT supports the movement to re-enter the United Nations. Taiwan's international status is also promoted in the international community as a de facto independent political entity. Second, President Lee publicly expressed his views on "the sorrow to be a Taiwanese", that the "KMT is an alien regime" and on "Taiwan First" (before the Mainland) without any hesitation. He leads the state to devote itself to construct a community culture and to reinforce Taiwan consciousness and the sense of identity with "Common life Community", i.e. with Taiwan. These policies are quite contrary to the traditional KMT's past attempt to always strengthen "Chinese identity". Third, Lee also criticized the fact that Taiwan's textbooks placed too much emphasis on Chinese history and culture while overlooking Taiwan's history and geography. Fourth, his government stresses the independent characteristic of Taiwanese culture from Chinese culture. Taiwanese culture is no longer viewed as a sub-culture of Chinese culture, as the KMT and Mainlanders used to believe. These policies make it clear that the KMT's state under Lee's leadership has transformed from a regime identifying with China to one identifying with Taiwan. It also demonstrates its goal to build a new nation. Because of Lee's efforts, rhetoric like "Love Taiwan", "Taiwan First" and "The sorrow to be a Taiwanese" is no longer the patent of the DPP; the KMT's mainstream elite also utilized the same expressions to appeal to Taiwanese people (Chien and Wang, 1995, pp.26-27).

These policy changes illustrate the new disposition to "emphasize political representation grounded on Taiwan's localism" and to "use Taiwan consciousness and sovereignty for Taiwan's population" to reinforce Taiwan's residents to associate

their national identity with Taiwan (Chien and Wang, 1995,p.27).

### **External influences**

In addition to Taiwan's domestic changes that provided a better environment for the growth of democracy and Taiwanese nationalism, international factors also nourished them and increased their popularity in Taiwan. The main foreign actors were the United States and China. The Philippines and South Korea also played a minor role in terms of demonstration effect as they democratized, but they will not be discussed in detail here.

#### **American influences**

The US government decided to build up an official relationship with China in the 1970s<sup>45</sup>. Washington's first act was to send the National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger to make his secret visit in 1971. This eventually motivated many states to recognize the PRC as the legitimate government of China. The KMT's ROC was forced to withdraw from the United Nations. When American President Nixon agreed on the PRC-US Joint Communiqué of 28 February 1972(the Shanghai Communiqué) that the US government "acknowledge" and "not challenge" Beijing's claim to Taiwan, Taiwan was further isolated from international society. As a result of the Americans' removal of their support, the KMT's claim to represent and rule the whole of China also lost its appeal, due to its international isolation.

Losing both the representative seat as China in the United Nations and American support was a serious crisis for Taiwan's population and for the KMT regime. But this also reminded residents of Taiwan of the possibility of seeking other solutions to resolve Taiwan's international isolation. One of the potential choices for them was to replace the KMT's ROC by a Republic

<sup>45</sup> The decision was announced on 15 December 1978 but their official

of Taiwan as some Taiwanese nationalists desired. Consequently, some Taiwanese were attracted to Taiwanese nationalism in their eagerness to have a nation to identify with, so they could resist China's threat and return to international associations. Furthermore, democracy also became an urgent demand for them; since the KMT could no longer represent China as they claimed, there was no need for Taiwan's people to sacrifice democracy to fulfill the KMT's impossible dream of reuniting China.

The Chinese government's continuous efforts to isolate Taiwan by all means in the international arena and its cruel suppression of political dissidents also reinforced Taiwan's population to embrace Taiwanese nationalism. This will be discussed in the following section.

#### **The effect of China's diplomatic and domestic policies**

Ever since the PRC won the battle for the seat in the United Nations, it has been trying to hinder any chance for Taiwan to actively participate in the international community. Its boycotts occur not only in political events when Taiwan's high-ranking officials have opportunities to meet leaders of other countries, but also in other areas, for instance, international economic and athletic events, such as the WTO and the Olympic games. Taiwan normally is either forbidden to join or has to use demeaning names such as Chinese Taipei instead of the ROC, due to China's protest and pressure on other countries.

The PRC's hostile policies against Taiwan in the diplomatic arena seems only to irritate Taiwan's residents, especially Taiwanese, to eagerly desire a separate identity. Furthermore, because of Taiwan's isolation in the international community, the ROC's passports have not been formally

relationship with each other did not commence until 1 January 1979.

recognized in the majority of the countries around the world. Sometimes middle class tourists suffer humiliation, depression and inconvenience when they use ROC passports. For instance, they are unable to visit certain countries because their passports are not recognized (Cohen, 1991,p.223). These all reinforce enthusiasm to have a Taiwanese nation instead of being recognized as part of the Chinese nation because they realize that the ROC's one-China policy restrains Taiwan from participating in the international community.

For most people from other countries, they probably never realize how fortunate they are to have a nationality recognized by the international community. Consequently, it may be difficult for them to imagine how hard and frustrating it may be to hold passports from the ROC, a country which is not officially accepted by the majority of countries. But we can see this clearly from a quotation from Wachman when he did an interview in Taiwan. An informant, Chiang Chun-nan, said:

The people in general don't care about reunification or independence.... They want to be a sovereign state...[in the] international community. They want to have their passport accepted in every country. Just like [people] from other countries. That's all (Quoted in Wachman, 1994,p.72).

Chiang may be right when he claimed that most people in Taiwan might not have cared about reunification with China or independence when they first had unpleasant experiences travelling overseas as ROC residents. But China's merciless crushing of the 1989 pro-democracy movement in Tienanmen Square, and China's attitude toward democracy in Hong Kong, disappointed and frightened them. Taiwan's population became more and more skeptical about Deng's proposal that Taiwan could reunite with China under the guideline of "one country two systems". They doubted the Chinese government's sincerity and willingness to guarantee Taiwan could maintain its democratic political system if they did reunite with China.



Suffering from more than 45 years of authoritarian rule by the KMT, and finally seeing some movement toward democracy, they did not welcome another dictatorial government like the PRC. These factors also pushed them to expect to have their own nation.

### **Legitimacy crises**

The KMT's legitimacy was in fact based on its claim that it was the government of China, and Taiwan was part of China. The withdrawal of US government support for that claim posed a threat to the KMT regime.

As stated earlier, the Chinese government's continuous efforts to isolate Taiwan by all means in the international arena and its cruel suppression of political dissidents also reinforced Taiwan's population to support Taiwanese nationalism.

With the winding down of the Cold War, the name that the KMT called its regime, "Free China", became more and more ironical because everyone knew the KMT's ROC was neither free nor China. As the KMT lost its international support, mainly from the US, it had to strengthen its domestic legitimacy so it relaxed the suppression of dissident opinions (Wakabayashi, 1994, pp.242-243).

The KMT's political reforms might also have had other purposes, such as to win more international support. To diminish China's military threats, Taiwan has tried to tie itself closely to the world economy and to the West. The reason the US withdrew its support of the KMT was that it no longer saw the need to support the authoritarian KMT to pressure China when the Cold War ended. After the Cold War was over, the KMT's leaders, especially Chiang Ching-kuo, probably realized that democratization was a very important way to tie Taiwan closer to the West, because if communist China threatens Taiwan, the KMT's appeal for help will be more effective if Taiwan is

democratic.

Probably it was due to these considerations that Chiang decided to undertake political reforms. Under the relaxed circumstances, many of the Taiwanese middle class became the forerunners for Taiwan's democratization and Taiwanese nationalism.

### **Political Movements**

Since the 228 incident, exiled Taiwanese had attempted to win support both from Taiwan and abroad to reach their goal of building their own Taiwanese nation. Several Taiwanese nationalist associations were created in Japan and the US between the 1950s to 1960s. In 1970, Trong R. Chai united several overseas independence groups into the World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI) (Cohen, 1991,p.290; Geoffroy, 1997,p.227). Its membership included the two largest groups, the Japan-based Taiwan Youth Association, and the US-based UFAI (United Formosans in America for Independence). According to Chai, the goal of WUFI was to seek

the establishment of a free, democratic, and independent Republic of Taiwan (Formosa) in accordance with the principle of self-determination of peoples. We are committed to the fundamental freedoms and human rights embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and therefore repudiate all forms of totalitarian rule, Chinese Nationalist or Communist (Quoted in Cohen, 1991,p.290).

WUFI is only an example that demonstrates Taiwanese nationalists' goal is both nationalist and democratic. Their activities, however, were not very successful in winning island-wide support in Taiwan as a result of the KMT's repression and indoctrination.

After the attempt to form an opposition party with Chinese liberals like Lei Chen failed in 1960, as mentioned in the last chapter, Taiwanese opposition did not vanish, even though the KMT harshly suppressed activists. Taiwanese dissidents were

restricted to participation only in local politics. Some of them built up their popularity and reputation through competing with KMT nominees as independent candidates in local elections. Gradually, they associated with each other and a sort of network was achieved.

By 1975, the old term “no-party, no-faction” as a phrase to refer to independent candidates against the KMT regime was replaced by “personalities outside the party” (“tang-wai jen-shih” or “tang-wai” for abbreviation). As a result of their success in the local and provincial elections of autumn 1977, their organization was gradually improved. In October 1978, they established a “Tang-wai Campaign Corps” to organize joint advertisements and meetings. This action was officially illegal but was tolerated by the government.

By 1979, the main domestic concern of Taiwan’s opposition movement was democratization. The political views of those political activists inherited the issues of 1950s *Free China*. Before the 1980s, most opposition activists only intended to be the loyal opposition of the KMT regime. They did not challenge the KMT’s claim as the only legitimate regime of China (Wang, 1996, pp.157-158). In August 1979, however, as an opposition journal, *Formosa* (Mei-li-tao) published its first issue, the pattern was changed. *Formosa*’s local offices became the organizational network of the opposition movement (Tien, 1989, p.96).

On 10 December 1979, a large Tang-wai demonstration organized by *Formosa*’s Kaohsiung offices resulted in a violent confrontation between the participants and the police (Domes, 1993, p.124; Tien, 1989, pp.96-97). As a result, several leaders of the opposition movements such as Huang Hsin-chieh, Yao Chia-wen, Chang Chun-hung, Lin Yi-hsiung, Lu Hsiu-lien, Chen Chu, Lin Huang-hsuan and Shih Ming-te were arrested (Chiou,

1994,p.31; Tien, 1989,p.97).

The trial of these political dissidents attracted widespread domestic and international attention (Lu, 1997,pp.311-312). Even though they did not attempt to overthrow the KMT government, they were charged with advocating Taiwanese independence, a serious crime in the authorities' eyes. Therefore, they were sentenced to from twelve years to life in prison.

Self-determination became an issue in the trial. Lin Yi-hsiung, for instance, claimed that:

Taiwan's future should be decided by its some 17,000,000 residents, Mainlanders and Taiwanese. It is a conclusion deducted from the democratic ideal in which I believe. This is not consciousness of Taiwanese independence. 17,000,000 people may also decide to recover mainland immediately (Quoted in Lu, 1997,p.428).

Although these opposition leaders did not admit that they advocated Taiwanese independence, they at least believe in the right of self-determination for the Taiwanese. Most of them were probably pro-independence. Their denial might simply result from their fear of the KMT's suppression. Lu Hsiu-lien's speech during the Kaohsiung demonstration may represent the views on Taiwan of some political dissidents. She stated:

What is Taiwan question? What is the history of Taiwan? ...What is the theory that Taiwan's legal status is unsettled? Do you know Taiwan is an orphan internationally? [Taiwan] has been an orphan for a long time. Do you know? ...After 51 years of cession to Japan, Taiwanese's [nationality] changed from Japanese to Chinese [when the KMT took over].

.... I want to ask, can our parliament, ... fully represent us? .... The US announced: Taiwan's question should be solved peacefully between the Chinese[ in Mainland China and in Taiwan]. I want to ask all of you, under our current condition as an international orphan, with what conditions can we have peace talk with the PRC? And who is entitled to reflect the will of our 18,000,000 residents? Who is entitled to represent us to strive for [our] rights?.... Under these circumstances, on the one hand, we are unable to negotiate peacefully with the PRC; on the other hand, when those who take part in the negotiation do not represent us, to whom will we leave the Taiwan question to solve? (Quoted in Lu, 1997,pp.428-429).

Lu's remark seemed to show that there was a connection between Taiwanese nationalism and Taiwan's democratization. As we have seen in preceding chapters, the Taiwanese were never allowed to make decision for themselves concerning their future. And they were prohibited from ruling themselves for centuries. Since the KMT justified every undemocratic element of their regime in the name of "China", when the middle class wished to push opposition movements for democratization, and confront the KMT's authoritarianism, "Taiwan" and "Taiwanese" seemed to be the only symbol and identity they could manipulate (Wakabayashi, 1994,p.243, p.245).

By the early 1980s, international society posed a greater impact on Taiwan. Taiwan's internationalization, however, revealed that Taiwan's insufficient international status as a consequence of the KMT's one-China policy gave the PRC excuses to suppress Taiwan from actively participating in the international community. Economic achievement could not mend the damage to Taiwanese's dignity from diplomatic setbacks. This resulted in Taiwanese resentment and opposition to the KMT's one-China policy. Because both the KMT and the PRC insisted that there was only one China, which caused the unpleasant international isolation, Taiwanese developed a stronger Taiwanese identity as a response to resist Chinese identity (You, 1997,p.228).

After the take off of Taiwan's economy, Taiwanese nationalism became more popular, with the support of the middle class, in Taiwan's changing political atmosphere. Under the growth of Taiwanese identity, Taiwan's first opposition party, the Democratic Progress Party (DPP hereafter), was established on 28 September 1986 by Tang-wai personalities. Although the government declared this move "illegal", it did not take any action. With the birth of the DPP, Taiwan's political transition

was accelerated down the road to mature democracy (Domes, 1993,p.126).

Since its birth in 1986, the DPP has always been viewed as a party mainly supported by Taiwanese and closely associated with Taiwanese nationalism. Although the party has several factions, its members generally agree that Taiwan independence is one of the party's most significant goals. Its former chairman, Hsu Hsin-Liang, for instance, once announced publicly: "The DPP is a party for Taiwan independence. We do not have inconsistency on the goal of our party to advocate Taiwan independence, not even on using the Republic of Taiwan as Taiwan's official name. What we disputed in the past was "when" we should propound the use of the official name [to Taiwan's residents]" (Chi, 1996, p.795). On 13 October 1991, the DPP also passed the so-called "Taiwan Independence Clause" that confirmed "based on the principle of popular sovereignty, the proposition to build a Republic of Taiwan with independent sovereignty and to write a new constitution should be chosen and decided by the whole population of Taiwan's residents by referendum" (Chi, 1996,p.795).

Because the DPP is a party that endorses Taiwan independence, its factions can be used as an example to show the relationship between democracy and Taiwanese nationalism. From the disagreement of the DPP's two major factions, we can also understand how Taiwanese nationalists see democracy and Taiwanese nationalism and their correlation. The DPP's two major factions, the *Formosa Faction* and the *New Tide Faction* have always held very different views on how to achieve the objective of Taiwan independence and build a new Taiwan nation. Members of *Formosa* believe politics is "a combination of both ideals and power", so the DPP should "separate its ultimate goal and its current policies". They are convinced that

Taiwan should pursue democracy first. Once democracy is instituted, then the DPP may win elections and rule Taiwan. Consequently, the Formosa faction's goal for Taiwan independence can be fulfilled and guaranteed by democratic means. In other words, in their view, the DPP should "replace the KMT and win the power to govern Taiwan in the process of fair democratic competition". Then it will make Taiwan a society that enjoys "freedom, democracy and wealth". And in the final stage, the DPP will lead Taiwan's population to build an independent Republic of Taiwan. Therefore, this faction believes the DPP should not advocate Taiwan independence now but should instead "push Taiwan's democratization and provide alternatives for public policies". Generally speaking, this faction articulates that the DPP should "pursue political democratization before Taiwan independence" (Chi, 1996,p.807).

On the other hand, however, the *New Tide Faction* considers Taiwan independence is "the best choice to solve the problem of Taiwan's future". Its members believe there is no possibility to establish democracy in Taiwan if Taiwan does not have independence. Therefore, they propose to "write a new constitution, elect a new parliament, build a new nation, and put Taiwan independence into practice". In sum, they emphasize the belief that Taiwan independence should be achieved before political democratization (Chi, 1996,pp.807-808).

Although they disagree on the sequence of Taiwan independence and democracy, we can see both factions see these two complement each other. While the *Formosa Faction* considers democracy as the means to achieve the goal of Taiwanese nationalism, i.e. gaining Taiwan independence and building a new Taiwan nation, the *New Tide Faction* assumes only by achieving Taiwan independence can democracy be secured in Taiwan. policies. Generally speaking, this faction

articulates that the DPP should pursue political democratization before Taiwan independence (Chi, 1996,p.805)

The DPP's advocacy of Taiwanese independence and Taiwanese nationalism is a good example of Taiwanese's response to the KMT's undemocratic rule. Before Martial Law was abolished, the KMT suppressed political dissidents and deprived the Taiwanese of their freedom of speech and human rights. Because the KMT sacrificed Taiwanese's political rights for its legitimacy, Taiwanese had to destroy the KMT's myth of "Chinese legitimacy". In other words, only by constituting the political reality that the KMT only ruled Taiwan could the goal of popular sovereignty and democratization can be achieved in Taiwan (You, 1997,p.228).

To assert that the KMT's sovereignty was only over Taiwan, Taiwanese had to emphasize the importance of Taiwan so it involved a process of Taiwanization. To break the KMT's legitimacy it was necessary to stem Chinese nationalism, and granting Taiwanese political power involved democratization. Consequently, Taiwanese independence became an important issue of Taiwan's democratic movement because it covers both Taiwanization and democratization (You, 1997,p.228).

After the abolishment of Martial Law in 1987, the KMT's authority was curtailed so the Taiwanese increasingly called for re-entering the United Nations and seeking Taiwan's independent international personality. Unwilling to be dominated by either the KMT or the PRC, Taiwanese wish to have Taiwan's sovereignty and determine their own fate. Accordingly, the goal to let Taiwan re-enter the international community as an independent and autonomous nation with the name of Taiwan became widely speculated (You, 1997,pp.228-229).



Changing identity

When the Mainlanders arrived in Taiwan, they only planed to temporarily stay on the island. Because they were born and brought up in Mainland China, they had no strong emotional attachment to the island as local born Taiwanese did. As years passed by, however, they gradually realized that it was impossible to recover China, and their attitude toward Taiwan changed.

The efforts of the KMT to instill Chinese nationalism and Chinese identity did have some success. But it is increasingly difficult for post-war generations in Taiwan to identify with a place where most of them have never been. Thus, it is natural for them to have stronger Taiwanese identity than Chinese identity. Taiwanese nationalism, therefore, becomes more attractive.

The developing popularity of Taiwanese nationalism, however, did not solve the controversial problem of national identity in Taiwan. Table 6.2 may give us an idea of the current national identity of Taiwan's population.

Table 6.2 Province origin and ethnic identity

Ethnic identity	Total	Fukien Taiwanese	Hakka Taiwanese	Mainlanders
Taiwanese	365	322 (88.22%)	40 (10.96%)	3 (0.82%)
	28.69%	34.81(%)	26.14 (%)	1.55(%)
Both Taiwanese and Chinese	455	360 (79.12%)	49 (10.77%)	46 (10.11%)
	35.77%	38.92 (%)	32.03 (%)	23.71(%)
Chinese	452	243 (53.76%)	64 (14.16%)	145(32.08%)
	35.53%	26.27 (%)	41.83 (%)	74.74 (%)
Total	1272	925	153	194
	100%	72.72%	12.03%	15.25%

Chi-square=181.258, DF=4, p< .001

Source: You, 1996,p.118, Table 4.3.

If we look at table 6.2, it is obvious that few mainlanders identify themselves as Taiwanese. Most people view themselves both as Taiwanese and Chinese. Mainlanders are the group who tend to identify with Chinese while Fukien Taiwanese are more likely to consider themselves as solely Taiwanese than Hokka Taiwanese are. To sum up, although Taiwanese nationalism is more prevalent than it was, it is still not influential enough to convince the whole population of Taiwan to believe that they are Taiwanese.

### **Conclusion**

In this chapter, we have seen that the structural changes from the 1970s resulted in a stronger middle class. They actively participated in politics. As a group, they were well educated and more independent from state dominance. They became activists of Taiwan's nationalist and democratic movements.

At the same time, the KMT ruling group also faced changes. Chiang Ching-kuo's Taiwanization policy and the supplementary elections of Taiwan's representatives in both the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan recruited more Taiwanese to important posts in both government and the KMT. As more Taiwanese joined the ruling group, the regime became less hostile to democracy and Taiwanese nationalism. After Lee Teng-hui succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo on 13 January 1988 and became Taiwan's first Taiwanese president, he continued political reform to increase democratization. Although Lee's national identity is unclear, he at least tolerates Taiwanese nationalism. Therefore, democratization and Taiwanese nationalism have developed since the 1970s.

The 1970s also saw the end of the Cold War. As a consequence, the US established formal relations with China. The KMT was forced to withdraw from the United Nations. Withdrawal from the United Nations threatened the KMT's

domestic legitimacy because it seemed the KMT could no longer represent “China”. Understanding the US would no longer tolerated its dictatorial rule and hoping to strengthen its domestic legitimacy, the KMT decided to undertake political reforms due to *external influences* from the US, and its *legitimacy crisis*.

In sum, since the 1970s, *structural changes, the political elite’s patronage, external influences and a legitimacy crisis* helped the growth of democracy and Taiwanese nationalism in Taiwan.

## Chapter Seven

### **Conclusion**

As mentioned in the introduction, the main focus of this research is to explore why and how democracy and Taiwanese nationalism have been correlated and have complemented each other in the process of Taiwan's political transition to democracy. As indicated in preceding chapters, the correlation between the two was not made explicit until the 1970s because Taiwanese nationalism was taboo in Taiwan for decades due to the KMT's success in suppressing dissident beliefs and instilling Chinese nationalism.

Chapter 1 gave us an introduction to Taiwan's history and politics. It briefly discussed the correlation between Taiwanese nationalism and Taiwan's democratization.

In chapter 2, definitions of nation as well as the meaning and content of nationalism, democracy and democratization were the main topics. How colonialism enriched anti-colonial nationalism was also covered. As Anderson and Kahin found in Indonesia, when colonial powers introduced Western-style education to their colonies, colonial regimes dug their own graves because the education provided brought about a new group of local elite who were able to use the knowledge and

skills they learned from colonial education to contest with the regime. The colonial regimes' discriminatory policies also intensified the sense of community of the colonized people as a result of their common suffering. We also see there are four common forces that may push democracy and nationalism to grow in any nation: *structural changes, the political elite's patronage, external influences* and *legitimacy crises*.

Then we began looking at Taiwan's political development under Japanese colonial rule in chapter 3. We viewed several political movements with both nationalism and democratic elements during this period. Unlike nationalist movements in other countries such as Indonesia, however, Taiwanese nationalist movements under Japanese rule did not arduously promote the goal of building a new nation state in Taiwan. The explanation to this phenomenon might be that although Taiwanese recognized their characteristics as an ethnic group distinct from the Japanese, they did not separate themselves from the Chinese nation. Realizing China could not provide practical or even moral support to their national aspirations, the Taiwanese elite attempted to gradually accomplish their nationalist goals by urging Japanese to grant them self-rule, democracy and equal rights. But we do see one of the significant phenomena pointed out by Anderson and Kahin in their research on Indonesia was repeated in Taiwan's colonial experience: the majority of leaders of these nationalist and pro-

democracy movements were graduates of Japanese universities, so their educational achievements were the by-products of Japanese colonialism. Furthermore, they also used tactics and skills they learned from their Japanese education, for instance, petitions to challenge colonial rule. The most significant meaning of Japan's fifty years of colonial dominion was to mold Taiwanese into an ethnic group with a sense of community and a common historical experience that made them incompatible with later arriving Mainlanders, so the conflict between these two groups created hostility as well as tragedy and changed the evolution of Taiwan's political history from 1945.

Chapter 4 provided a detailed description of the watershed event in Taiwan's history, the 228 Incident of 1947. Originally a minor accident, the incident turned into an island-wide rebellion against the KMT's corruption and inefficiency in Taiwan since 1945. When the KMT ignored Taiwanese people's demands for democracy, justice, and fairness and crushed the rebellion by ruthlessly killing thousands of Taiwanese, especially intellectuals, the hatred of the Taiwanese toward the regime was silenced but not diminished. The massacre carried out by Chinese soldiers after the 228 Incident reminded Taiwanese of their differences from Mainland Chinese. As a result, Taiwanese identity began to divide clearly from Chinese identity and Taiwanese nationalism developed. In response to the KMT's cruelty, many Taiwanese were exiled and started

their struggle for a democratic and independent Taiwan. In this chapter, we also saw the importance of common shared history and common language in forming a nation, at least in Taiwan.

Chapter 5 described early KMT rule. To build up its power base in Taiwan, the Chinese KMT government initiated land reform. The reform was crucial for the KMT's survival in Taiwan in two ways. On the one hand, it decreased the wealth of Taiwanese landlords, one of the traditional opposition groups, so they lost the power and will to challenge the KMT regime. On the other hand, the reform won the KMT popular support from rural residents, especially peasants. At this stage, Taiwan was basically an agriculture society so it did not have a powerful middle class to threaten the KMT regime. The KMT also promoted Chinese nationalism at schools so many post-war generations in Taiwan were educated to believe in the myth of China recovery and to have strong Chinese national identity. As a result, national identity divided Taiwan's population into two main groups. While one group identify with the Chinese nation, the other were convinced that they were Taiwanese.

Furthermore, since Mainlanders dominated the political arena during the KMT's early rule, they were hesitated to open up the opportunity for Taiwanese to participate in politics because of the fear of losing its regime. Consequently, the authoritarian regime suppressed every possible political movement so both nationalist and democratic movements could

not mobilize mass support. Although some Taiwanese dissidents were able to stay in the US and Japan safely, these two governments basically tolerated the KMT's harsh political control in Taiwan. Therefore, external influences, although helpful, did not favor the growth of Taiwan's nationalism and democracy during the 1950s to the 1960s.

Chapter 6 explained how *structural changes, the political elite's patronage, external influences* and *legitimacy crises* enlivened the correlation between democracy and Taiwanese nationalism from the 1970s. Beginning in the early 1970s, Taiwan's economic condition improved dramatically and gradually became an industrial society with a large middle class and with high literacy rate. At the same time, the KMT's myth of claiming itself as the sole legitimate Chinese government was severely collapsed as the number of its life-long Mainlander representatives declined and Taiwan was forced to withdraw from the United Nations. Losing both domestic and external legitimacy, the KMT reluctantly took political reforms and Taiwan's nationalist and democratic movements had a better chance to survive since then.

From the discussion of previous chapters, we can see the national identity of Taiwanese changed at different times. We also see this change intertwined with Taiwan's democratization process. In this chapter, we shall summarize the whole thesis by answering the four following questions: 1. How did national



identity develop in Taiwan? 2. How did political movements (both nationalist and democratic) come about and develop? 3. Why was there a connection between nationalism and democracy in Taiwan? 4. What is the contemporary identity in Taiwan?

### **The development of Taiwanese's national identity in Taiwan**

National identity of Taiwanese transited through three stages. At first, there was no national identity. In the second stage, they did not clearly distinguish themselves from the Chinese. In the third stage, there was divided national identity because they could not find a consensus on the issue of whether they are a part of a Chinese nation or a new Taiwanese nation.

The first stage can be traced from the seventeenth century when Chinese did not have national identity. Sub-ethnic conflict was common during this time because Chinese in Taiwan divided themselves into two groups: Fukiennese and Hakka. Each group fought with the other group for better land so they never considered each other as fellows who shared a common destiny, territory, and history.

This situation changed, however, when Japanese colonized Taiwan and became Taiwanese's masters. Japanese brought in new inventions such as railways, radios, and Western-style education; they also created Taiwanese's feeling of sharing a common history due to Japanese discrimination against them.

But Taiwanese did not clearly distinguish themselves from Mainland Chinese in this stage.

Then Japan lost the Second World War and Taiwan was returned to China once again. Taiwanese identification with Chinese faced serious disillusion so some of them refused to consider themselves as Chinese any longer. On the other hand, however, the KMT instilled Chinese identity to Taiwan's post-war generations so the issue of national identity divided Taiwan's population because many accepted the Chinese "imagined community" due to the KMT's educational efforts.

### **Political movements**

Modern political movements in Taiwan began during Japan's administration. Japan played a significant part in the evolution of Taiwanese nationalist and democratic movements. The first group of modern Taiwanese intellectuals emerged under Japanese rule. Their education either in Japan, China, or Taiwan enabled them to absorb modern Western political, social and cultural ideas, such as democracy, liberalism, socialism, and self-determination (Turumi, 1977,p.179; Watabuyashi, 1987,pp.40-41). Under Japanese rule, political movements often had both nationalist and democratic demands, although the former were less explicit.

Political movements under the KMT's rule, however, concentrated on demanding democracy only in the beginning. From the 1970s,Taiwan's economic growth created a larger

middle class and as the US and Chinese policies contributed to a KMT legitimacy crisis, Chinese nationalism was also challenged.

To summarize Taiwan's political movements under the Japanese and the KMT, we will find that these movements were in response to external suppression. Before Japanese ruled the island, Taiwanese were divided into sub-ethnic groups among themselves. Their common suffering under Japanese rule solidified their identity with the same imagined community, Taiwan. Originally they did not distinguish themselves from the Chinese. But the KMT's government discriminative policies convinced them that Taiwanese were not Chinese. Facing unfair treatments from Japanese and Mainland Chinese, Taiwanese were determined to demand equality, political participation, and democracy. Although their democratic and nationalist movements failed under both Japanese colonization and the KMT's early rule, Taiwanese never gave up the hope to attain democracy and to establish a Taiwanese nation. Nationalism was their weapon against the ruling group, either Japanese or Chinese. In other words, Taiwanese utilized nationalism to consolidate themselves and differentiate themselves from their rulers.

Both the Japanese and the KMT suppressed these movements. They used control of the media and education as means of suppression. Their harsh punishment also stopped

these movements from growing. After the 1970s, however, the KMT could no longer resist the trend demanding political reforms. Economic development helped the growth of a new middle class. They became supporters of political movements. In addition to their eagerness for democracy, resulting from Taiwan's deteriorating international status, the middle class were also attracted to the idea of building a Taiwanese nation because they considered it an alternative to gain higher dignity and to sustain democracy for Taiwan's population.

### **Relationship between democracy and Taiwanese nationalism in Taiwan**

Theories mentioned in chapter 2 seemed to demonstrate that major social scientists focused their research on either democracy, democratization or nationalism. Very few, if any, paid attention to the fact that there might be a connection between nationalism and democracy in some nations. Based on Huntington and other social scientists' theories on how and why democratization happened, I proposed that forces (structural changes, the political elite's patronage, external influences and legitimacy crises) that stimulated democracy might have also driven nationalism in some nations.

Discussion in previous chapters appears to have proved this argument. At least in Taiwan, these four forces had related nationalism to democracy. Structural changes helped both

nationalism and democracy to evolve because they resulted in a new group of new middle class who were more independent from government control. They became leaders or supporters of democratic and nationalist movements.

The political elite's patronage also had a significant influence in the development of both nationalism and democracy. Taiwan's experience showed the political elite's attitude toward democracy and nationalism was important. If the suppression from the ruling group is too severe, there is no chance for nationalism or democracy to grow. To put it another way, while opposition elite had significant influence on promoting democratic and nationalist ideas, the chance for democracy and nationalism to grow will be limited if the ruling elite resist and suppress them.

The growth of nationalism and democracy may also be affected by external influences, especially superpowers' policies. As we have seen in Taiwan's case, the American government was influential in Taiwan's democratic and nationalist movements. The US support strengthened the KMT's legitimacy. Consequently, it increased the difficulty of challenging the regime either by nationalistic or democratic demands. But the US also had positive impact on the development of Taiwanese nationalism and democracy when it provided shelter for Taiwanese political dissidents, urged the KMT government to reform and aided Taiwan to create the so-called economic

miracle.

Although the three factors mentioned above were crucial, the legitimacy crisis was also important. Without legitimacy crises, nationalist and democratic movements would not pose a meaningful threat to a regime. A legitimacy crisis would make nationalistic and democratic demands more appealing. At the same time, a legitimacy crisis might force the ruling group to yield because they were afraid to lose power. This might lead to better chances for political reforms and for democratic and nationalist movements to develop.

### **Current national identity in Taiwan**

National identity is still an unsettled issue in contemporary Taiwan. As demonstrated in the last chapter, the population of Taiwan can be divided into three groups according to their national identity: Taiwanese, Chinese, and those who believe they are both.

Will the controversy over national identity in Taiwan be solved in the future? Probably not in a short time. It is possible that more and more people, Aborigines, Mainlanders and Taiwanese, will identify with Taiwan if Taiwan maintains the status quo. If Taiwan's status, whether as a part of China or as an independent state, cannot be settled, however, national identity may still divide Taiwan's residents.

Although Taiwanese nationalism was one of the motivating

forces of Taiwan's democratization, its recent development worries some scholars as it may turn into a force against democracy in the future. Some Taiwanese are very hostile toward those who cannot speak Taiwanese, especially Mainlanders. They dislike those who identify themselves as Chinese instead of Taiwanese. This kind of intolerant attitude may hurt democracy because one of its most important characteristics is to respect people's opinions. The strong and irrational fever for Taiwanese nationalism also appears in some Taiwanese's unconditional support of President Lee Teng-hui simply because he is a member of the Taiwan nation, a Taiwanese. It is believed that some Taiwanese voted for Lee based on their rationale that if they voted for others, Taiwanese may lose control of Taiwan's government to Mainlanders. The mutual suspicion between these two major groups produces an uneasy tension in Taiwan. Therefore, emphasizing Taiwanese nationalism too heavily may pose a threat to the prospect of democracy in Taiwan, because it creates conflict between major ethnic groups on the island.

To solve problems mentioned above, a growing number of people are trying to create a new "imagined community" in Taiwan. President Lee Teng-hui, for instance, advocated a concept of "New Taiwanese". The concept re-defines the meaning of Taiwanese by claiming Mainlanders can also be Taiwanese as long as they identify with Taiwan. The concept

strives to include all ethnic groups of Taiwan into the framework of a Taiwanese nation. Furthermore, it is increasingly argued that anyone in Taiwan is a Taiwanese as long as they identify with the island and are willing to dedicate themselves to the welfare of the Taiwan nation. This new interpretation of Taiwanese is more inclusive so it may ease the worry that Taiwanese nationalism will threaten democracy. If the concept can be widely accepted, national identity may not be a controversial issue any longer.

### **Conclusion**

I will conclude this thesis by pinpointing its main findings. The development of Taiwanese nationalism is theoretically significant for its two distinct characteristics. First, even though Taiwanese nationalism also developed as a result of decades of colonial rule, it was moderate comparing to its counterparts in other countries, for instance, Indonesia. In other words, Taiwanese did not demand to build their own nation under Japanese rule when the nationalist movement was first launched.

Second, after Japan left Taiwan, Taiwanese faced a new ruling regime, the Chinese KMT government. Although Chinese proclaimed that they were Taiwanese's countrymen, they ruled Taiwan in a way similar to Japan's colonial style. As a result, Taiwan's most dramatic anti-colonial nationalist movement, the 228 Incident, was not against the previous colonizers, the



Japanese, but against the newly arrived rulers, the Chinese. The event demonstrated that in fact so-called common blood is probably less crucial in generating nationalism than shared history and common suffering, at least in Taiwan.

Third, common forces (structural changes, the political elite's patronage, external influences and legitimacy crises) stimulated Taiwan's democratization and Taiwanese nationalism in the 1970s-90s. Although these forces were not as powerful during the Japanese colonial era, they also contributed to the early growth of Taiwan's political movement under the Japanese government, both nationalist and democratic, to an important degree.

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